DWF Ventures released a report stating that as trading fees approach zero, social trading has become a new direction for financial trading platforms to compete for users and build moats.

The report outlines three evolutionary product lineages: early brokerage copy trading, investment communities like Reddit and Stocktwits, and applications that integrate real position verification, trading signals, and social relationships into the same interface. After the homogenization of execution layers, platform differentiation has been compressed to network effects, resources of well-known traders, and exclusive information distribution. The pioneer of copy trading, eToro, once drove over 50% growth in account openings in Europe and Australia with its one-click mirror portfolio feature, which is estimated to have a penetration rate of over 40%; the newer AfterHour connects social homepages to brokerage accounts for verifying public positions.

The growth mechanism is described as a flywheel. The platform first binds traders with followers, who accumulate reputation through public transactions, amplifying price impacts through follower trading, which in turn brings attention and user scale back to the platform. Public calls are said to potentially create self-fulfilling prophecies: following funds push prices in the direction of the calls, benefiting the signal sender first. Customer acquisition methods include one-click copy trading, low entry barriers, trading competitions, and fee incentives, while the cross-platform migration of top traders is seen as a bulk user acquisition channel. Crypto social trading and traditional stock social trading are judged to possibly continue to converge.

Structural losses are the hard data in the report. DWF cites statistics on realized profits from approximately 292,000 wallets on Fomo over the past three months, with a profit ratio of only 6.16%. The English summary further clarifies: of about 292,531 wallets, approximately 18,033 recorded profits, with the group incurring a total loss of about $1.26 billion, and the median trader losing about $120; among the profitable samples, 88% earned less than $100, with only 25 wallets netting over $10,000. In comparison, about 1% of betting sites with a 1% rake had a user profit ratio of about 37%. DWF therefore believes that the promise of "following winners to increase win rates" is weakened by the data.

Conflicts of interest are framed as mechanisms rather than luck. Followers lack independent logic and can be easily driven by the herd; traders can publicly call positions while reversing or exiting early in other wallets, making it difficult to eliminate information asymmetry even if the platform verifies displayed positions. Platform revenue and user win rates can move inversely: Fomo once recorded a peak weekly agreement revenue of $1.57 million, with another metric mentioning monthly revenue around $10.4 million, while the vast majority of copy trading wallets are in the loss side.

In market mechanisms, buyers are consumer-grade trading applications seeking attention and distribution rights, while sellers are traders selling their transaction records and follower relationships to the platform. Funds flow from followers' principal to platform fees and a few addresses being copied, then spread to market making and issuance through slippage and counterparties. Event-driven changes stem from product redirection after zero commissions, rather than a single asset's crash. The beneficiaries are platforms that lock in trader lists and information flows, while the pressured parties are pure execution terminals that only compete on matching speed and followers treating public positions as replicable alpha.

Supplementary data shows that on-chain queries route Fomo fees as a statistical entry; within the same group of 290,000 wallets, addresses that made over $10,000 in profit have been pointed out to be mixed with aggregator tip accounts, indicating that the leaderboard itself can also be polluted by infrastructure addresses.

Source: Public Information