U.S. President Donald Trump: Heavy Strikes Possible on Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La if Iran is Found to be "Playing Tricks"
Donald Trump has repeatedly listed Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La, located south of Iran's Natanz nuclear facility, as a target for strikes, stating that if the U.S. determines Iran is "playing tricks," it may carry out heavy strikes against it. The mountain, known as Pickaxe Mountain in Western media, is located in Isfahan Province, about 220 kilometers from Tehran, and approximately 1 to 2 kilometers from the Natanz uranium enrichment complex. Research indicates the mountain's elevation is nearly 5,300 feet, with underground chambers buried at least 80 to 100 meters deep, and assessments suggest over 300 feet, carved into granite, with two pairs of tunnel entrances. Satellite images show construction vehicles entering and exiting, with roads and openings still being reinforced, while some tunnels on the eastern side have been backfilled and blocked off.
The above-ground enrichment facility at Natanz has been deemed destroyed, and the underground section has been at least heavily damaged; Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La has not been struck in the wars of December 2025 and the new round of strikes in 2026. In July, Trump initially stated that "invisible activities" could still lead to a strike "through the front door," but later changed his tone, saying there would be a "quick and heavy" strike, asserting that the nuclear facility would be "blown up as soon as it is mentioned." In September, he claimed to have seen activity at Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La and warned Iran not to "play smart." Iran's Foreign Ministry stated there are no nuclear activities in the area and views the U.S. claims as a pretext for strikes; a parliamentary advisor referred to it as "the world's most deeply fortified nuclear facility."
The UN nuclear oversight agency has never entered this site. Some Israeli assessments suggest enriched uranium may have been transferred there, but the U.S. has not publicly confirmed this. Weapons experts question whether even a 30,000-pound GBU-57 bunker buster could penetrate the granite chambers at that depth; others suggest sealing the entrances to cut off access or sending engineers inside for demolition. Shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and oil prices have become issues in the U.S. midterm elections due to the conflict.
From a market mechanism perspective, this is a geopolitical risk premium rather than a corporate event: sellers are funds avoiding Gulf shipping capacity and insurance, while buyers are acquiring energy and defense as threats become verbalized. Funds are flowing out of transportation and petrochemicals threatened by shipping routes, and into contractors for bunker-busting weapons and alternative crude oil. The beneficiaries are those who have severely damaged Natanz and need remaining targets to maintain a deterrent narrative; the pressured side is Iran's nuclear reconstruction timeline and countries reliant on imports through the Strait. The event driver is the president's verbal escalation, not new qualitative satellite reports.
The verbal strikes reflect market disagreements over "whether it can penetrate granite": penetrating would mean military closure, while failing to penetrate would lead to long-term blockades and oil price discounts.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La is the next layer of geological insurance after Natanz was breached. After the main facility was damaged in 2025, Iran pushed its projects deeper into granite, similar to how Fordow once housed centrifuges within the mountain: trading rock thickness for time. Trump's linking of "invisible activities" and "quick and heavy" in the same sentence turns an unfinished site into a deterrent chip that can be cashed in at any time, rather than waiting for the International Atomic Energy Agency to assess it.
The capital path does not follow project financing but rather involves Strait insurance, tanker rerouting, and bunker munitions stockpiling. If the U.S. only seals the entrances, the cost lies in munitions and resupply; if no one can prove the chambers are destroyed, Iran retains the option for underground reconstruction. The motivation is to prevent enrichment capabilities from re-emerging at another coordinate while providing a recognizable external target for domestic oil price pressures. Resource mobilization relies on the air and naval forces already deployed in the Gulf, rather than opening a new ground campaign.
Analogies can be drawn to the Fordow and Syrian reactor airstrikes, as well as the repeated "next target" rhetoric regarding North Korea's Yongbyon. In terms of industry positioning, nuclear facility offense and defense have shifted from facility-level to mountain-level: whoever first moves critical materials into unverifiable caves changes the verification formula. Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La has not yet been operational, but it is already being priced—because it is the only candidate cave that has not yet been bombed.
Structural judgments belong to regulatory changes (failure of international verification) combined with a transfer of pricing power (deterrence shifting from facility lists to geological depth). The mechanism is: once enrichment facilities can be taken out by satellites and bunker busters, survival strategies become "digging until the bomb formula fails"; the president's verbal designation of this mountain as a target effectively announces that the next phase of competition is depth rather than the number of centrifuges. The oil market does not provide nuclear equivalence but rather the number of days of disrupted shipping routes.
ABAB News · Cognitive Laws
- Facilities that can be destroyed will push capabilities into the mountains.
- The more specific the deterrent statement, the more oil prices are determined by shipping routes.
- When depth is sufficient, verification rights yield to geological rights.