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Justin Sun's Sale of HSR After Token Swap Causes Price Crash

In the 2017 cryptocurrency private placement wave, Justin Sun, founder of TRON, reached a token swap agreement with Xu Zijing, known as "Martian" at the time, related to Hcash. Sun later stated that the other party exchanged 140,000 HCASH (HSR) for 333 million TRON tokens, completing the transaction on the spot.

This swap was included in the customary practices of mutual endorsement among projects that year: popular tokens holding each other's positions and publicly supporting each other to send "binding" signals to the market. HSR was one of the high-profile tokens at the time, while TRON had just completed its initial coin offering and moved trading to overseas exchanges after ICOs were halted in China.

Regarding the post-delivery sale, English reports mainly come from anonymous sources claiming to be close to Sun: they stated that he sold the HSR he had just received immediately after leaving the gathering, making a profit of about 30 million RMB, which triggered a sell-off the next day. The scene of this sale did not appear in the SEC's indictment or in The Verge's independent investigation of Sun's market-making team, remaining in the realm of rumors; however, it can be verified that both sides subsequently publicly fell out, with Hcash demanding nearly 29.68 million RMB in cash calculated at a unit price of 212 RMB, rather than a token refund.

The Hcash project was deeply tied to Xu Zijing, and the market once viewed "Martian" as the very faith in the token price. That same year, he publicly bet that if the price did not reach 1,000 RMB by the end of the year, he would eat feces in public; after failing to meet the price target, he faced public backlash. On the TRON side, there was a surge from late 2018 to early 2019, while it remained under the shadow of manipulation and wash trading accusations.

The SEC later accused Sun and others of unregistered issuance of TRX and BTT, and of engaging in over 600,000 trades and other manipulative behaviors between April 2018 and February 2019. Another English investigation mentioned that a market-making team in Beijing traded TRX at price levels designated by him. These are cited regulatory and investigative texts, but do not automatically confirm the sell-off that night.

From a market mechanism perspective, the seller is the project party holding a large amount of new tokens, needing the other party's traffic and title endorsement, while the buyer treats the other party's tokens as instantly liquid inventory. The event-driven factor is the liquidity from the 2017 swap. Whoever first dumps the less liquid token into the market completes the pricing first. The beneficiaries are the party that sells first and the market-making account that absorbs the volatility; the ones under pressure are the holders who treated the swap as a friendship lock-up and those who viewed celebrity endorsements as fundamental market support.

Source: Public Information

ABAB AI Insight

Justin Sun's path to success involved quickly converting personal titles into token subscriptions: his backgrounds at Peking University and the University of Pennsylvania, as an advisor to Ripple China, and his voice product Peiwo, culminated in the August 2017 issuance of TRON tokens worth about $70 million, finishing the public offering just before China halted ICOs. This model was repeated—acquiring BitTorrent to issue BTT, taking control of the Huobi group, and using stablecoins to make TRX a channel asset. The swap counterpart Xu Zijing took another early premium path: Baidu Bitcoin Bar, ETC computing power, and Hcash's honorary chairman, directly writing personal IP into token prices.

The capital path is "exchanging chips for traffic, and traffic for sales windows." The 2017 mutual holding by project parties did not create new cash flow; it merely temporarily mortgaged the attention of the other party's community to its own market. Whoever treats the other party's tokens as inventory rather than locked-up assets can unilaterally end the mortgage. The SEC documents Sun faced later focused on control over issuance and trading, rather than the morality of a dinner meeting. Hcash wanted cash redemption rather than a token refund, indicating they had turned the swap price into a RMB debt rather than a blockchain friendship.

Similar cases show that many "strategic token swaps" turned into unilateral sell-offs the next day, akin to bridge placements in traditional securities followed by price drops. The industry phase was the selling period of the ICO frenzy, not the innovation phase of the protocol layer. TRON survived to become one of the USDT clearing networks, while HSR did not complete equivalent infrastructure, with the gap not lying in the dinner meeting, but in who first embedded tokens into real transfer needs.

Structural judgment belongs to the transfer of pricing power. The mechanism is: a swap without a lock-up period rewrites "ally positions" into "counterparty inventory"; celebrity endorsements lower the other party's selling alert but increase one's own selling efficiency. Price discovery shifted from white paper commitments to who presses the sell button first.

ABAB News · Cognitive Law

  1. Swap positions are not alliances; they are the other party's selling inventory.
  2. Titles can bring trust but cannot bring lock-up periods.
  3. The one who presses the sell button first completes the pricing for friendship.

Source

·ABAB News
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7 min read
·7 hrs ago
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