Thai Merchants Sue Tether to Freeze $42.4 Million USDT
Two Thai merchants have filed a lawsuit against Tether in the Southern District of New York, claiming that the company froze approximately 42.4 million USDT at the informal request of personnel from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, without obtaining a search warrant, subpoena, or court order.
Plaintiffs Nutthawat Rukthammachalern and Natthawat Kasamvilas submitted their complaint on August 31, with the exact disputed asset amount being 42,417,785.62 USDT, distributed across 10 Ethereum addresses. The complaint states that Tether blacklisted the relevant addresses on October 30, 2025.
The plaintiffs claim that the freeze occurred while U.S. law enforcement had not yet obtained judicial authorization to support the measure. Subsequently, U.S. authorities reportedly obtained a seizure order in February 2026, requiring Tether to destroy the frozen USDT and reissue corresponding tokens to a government-controlled address; the plaintiffs' legal challenge focuses on whether the initial freeze had sufficient legal basis.
According to the complaint, one of the plaintiffs discovered the wallet was restricted while attempting to make a transaction; after contacting Tether, they were directed to an email of a Department of Homeland Security officer, without receiving specific explanations regarding the basis for the freeze. These facts belong to the plaintiffs' claims and have not yet been adjudicated by the court or verified by Tether's response.
The plaintiffs seek to lift the blacklist on the addresses, prohibit Tether from destroying the relevant USDT, and have made claims for conversion, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment. They also seek compensation for losses from the frozen assets and to recover profits earned by Tether from the corresponding reserve assets during the investment period.
The core of the case is not whether USDT has the technical ability to freeze, but whether a private stablecoin issuer can freeze tokens circulating in the secondary market solely based on an informal request from law enforcement before a judicial seizure order has been issued. Tether's Ethereum contract includes functions such as
addBlackList and destroyBlackFunds, which can freeze USDT in addresses and destroy the frozen balance under certain conditions.
This incident is also linked to a fraud investigation involving approximately $61 million, but public reports have not fully disclosed whether the plaintiffs are being charged, the source of the funds involved, the specific reasons for the freeze by the U.S. government, or whether Tether will use anti-money laundering, sanctions compliance, contractual obligations, and law enforcement cooperation as defenses. At this stage, the plaintiffs' allegations cannot be directly equated with facts already established by the court.
In market mechanisms, USDT holders purchase tokens that are stable in dollar value and transferable on-chain; Tether, as the issuer, retains blacklist and destruction functions, allowing law enforcement to gain access to enforce against specific addresses. If the court recognizes that Tether can freeze under informal law enforcement requests, the speed of cooperation between issuers and law enforcement will increase, but holders will bear a higher risk of centralized freezing; if the court requires stricter judicial procedures, Tether and other stablecoin issuers' compliance responses will face higher legal thresholds, while decentralized stablecoins and self-custodied assets may gain some narrative premium for "anti-censorship."
ABAB AI Insight
Tether has long served exchanges, market makers, cross-border settlements, and DeFi liquidity as a "on-chain dollar," but its technical architecture has never been a permissionless system. The issuance, redemption, blacklisting, and destruction rights of USDT are controlled by the issuer, and Tether has previously cooperated with sanctions and law enforcement requests to freeze addresses. The uniqueness of this case lies not in Tether's ability to freeze, but in the plaintiffs' assertion that the freeze occurred before the formal seizure order: blacklisting 10 wallets on October 30, 2025, while the judicial document requesting destruction and reissuance to a government-controlled address only appeared in February 2026.
In terms of capital flow, users exchange fiat currency for USDT through the issuer or its authorized channels, and Tether allocates corresponding reserves to treasury bills, cash equivalents, and other assets, generating commercial profits through reserve earnings. Once 42.4 million USDT are blacklisted, the plaintiffs cannot transfer or redeem them, while Tether's corresponding reserve assets may continue to earn interest; thus, the plaintiffs demand the return of reserve investment earnings during the freeze period. The dispute exposes the two-layer property rights of stablecoins: users hold transferable on-chain claims, while the issuer controls the redemption channels and contract administrator rights, with reserve cash flow remaining on the issuer's balance sheet.
Historically, Circle froze USDC in 2023 due to U.S. Treasury sanctions against Tornado Cash-related addresses; after the 2022 OFAC sanctions, the blacklisting ability of centralized stablecoins has become a counterparty risk that DeFi protocols must consider. Unlike bank account freezes, stablecoin addresses can be instantly marked on a global public ledger, and the effects of freezing can spread through lending collateral, DEX liquidity pools, OTC settlements, and cross-chain wrapped assets. If Tether's lawsuit enters substantive hearings, it may become an important case to test the boundaries of "issuer compliance discretion" and "token holder property rights."
This falls under regulatory changes. The core competition of stablecoins is no longer just on-chain transfer speed and dollar peg, but how issuers allocate control between sanctions, anti-money laundering, judicial seizures, and user property rights. Law enforcement agencies want issuers to quickly freeze suspicious funds, and institutional users also need compliant and controllable dollar tools; however, when freezing can occur before formal judicial procedures, stablecoins will be closer to digital bank balances that can be controlled by administrative cooperation, rather than neutral on-chain cash. The outcome of the case will affect the internal standards for issuers handling law enforcement requests and change the market's pricing of the compliance and anti-censorship of USDT, USDC, and decentralized stablecoins.