US Treasury Secretary Bessent Forecasts Sanctions on Iran-Linked Bank
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that the US may announce sanctions against a bank with business ties to Iran this week, with another bank sanction to be revealed next week; specific banks, jurisdictions, and sanction tools have not been disclosed.
During the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting in Asheville, North Carolina, Bessent mentioned that the US is coordinating with allies and has received "strong support." He stated that the US will adopt a "zero tolerance" policy towards Iran, aiming to "suffocate" the Iranian regime economically and force it into negotiations.
The initial focus of the US Treasury is on secondary sanctions, which not only target Iranian entities but may also penalize third-country banks that assist Iran in cross-border settlements, trade financing, or evading restrictions. Bessent previously indicated that the next step could be to completely cut off sanctioned entities' access to the US dollar-based financial system.
In addition to banks, the Treasury is also reviewing aircraft leasing companies and other businesses providing services to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard or its affiliates. Bessent stated that the US is tracking Revolutionary Guard assets, and the potential scope of sanctions could extend to any entity doing business with the Revolutionary Guard, although no specific companies have been named yet.
This action is referred to by the US government as "Operation Economic Outcast." The US is also privately communicating with China to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to maintain freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz; Bessent previously warned that countries and entities continuing to do business with Iran may also face US sanctions.
The European Union has publicly expressed support for imposing additional economic pressure on Iran and stated it will cooperate with the US and other partners. Bessent noted that the European Central Bank, the UK, the UAE, and Bahrain have also expressed support to the US; these political statements do not equate to a commitment from all parties to implement the same sanctions or freeze measures.
In market mechanisms, secondary bank sanctions will first affect US dollar clearing, letters of credit, trade financing, correspondent bank accounts, and insurance settlements, rather than just the targeted banks themselves. Regional banks, shipping companies, aircraft lessors, and commodity intermediaries trading with Iran will increase compliance screening or actively reduce business; traders with alternative settlement networks and non-dollar payment channels may take on some transactions, but cross-border payment costs, discounts, and compliance risks will also rise.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
The US financial pressure on Iran has long focused on US dollar clearing and secondary sanctions. In 2012, the US and Europe restricted Iranian banks' access to the SWIFT system; after the US withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, sanctions were reinstated, again bringing third-party entities linked to Iranian oil trade, banking settlements, and shipping insurance into the risk scope. The current "first banks, then expand" approach indicates that the Treasury still views cross-border settlement capability as a more effective lever than a simple trade ban: goods can find intermediaries, but US dollar payments rely on the global banking network.
The transmission of capital pathways occurs in three layers: after banks lose US dollar agency relationships, importers find it difficult to open letters of credit and pay for goods; shipping, aviation, and energy trade companies raise quotes or withdraw due to uncertain payments; Iran is forced to rely on discounted oil, cash, non-dollar currencies, barter, or intermediary networks to maintain foreign exchange inflows. Bessent's inclusion of aircraft leasing companies in the review suggests that the US is attempting to trace back from the financial end to the usage and maintenance chain of high-value assets, rather than just tracking payment addresses.
This approach shares commonalities with the US's actions against Russia's financial system, Venezuela's oil trade, and North Korea's sanctions evasion networks: initial lists often serve merely as signals, while real pressure comes from global banks and companies taking "over-compliance" measures to preserve their US dollar accounts. However, Iran has years of experience in coping and can mitigate some impacts through regional trade, offshore intermediaries, and non-dollar settlements. Therefore, the effectiveness of sanctions depends on allies' enforcement, third-country banks' risk preferences, and whether the US can continuously identify alternative networks, rather than whether a single bank is named.
Essentially, this represents a change in regulation: secondary sanctions will extend US domestic financial jurisdiction to third-country commercial choices. Companies face not the question of "whether to directly violate their own laws," but rather "whether they are willing to bear the cost of losing US dollar clearing, financing, and global customers for an Iran-related transaction." As long as the US dollar system remains the core channel for bulk trade, insurance, and reserve assets, the US Treasury can transform financial compliance from administrative rules into cross-border commercial pricing conditions.
ABAB News · Cognitive Law
- Sanctioning banks does not close accounts, but rather closes settlement networks.
- Secondary sanctions target transactions; the real deterrent is the bystanders.
- Goods can take detours, but US dollar clearing is hard to bypass.