Bofur Capital Suffers Approximately $2 Million Loss from Address Poisoning Attack
According to monitoring by PeckShieldAlert, an address marked as Bofur Capital suffered an address poisoning attack after withdrawing from Compound, resulting in a loss of approximately $2 million.
Phishers sent a dust transaction of 0.0002 USDC, faking a similar address. The victim mistakenly used the wrong address while copying and pasting, leading to the theft of funds. The stolen funds have been exchanged for about 2 million DAI.
Address poisoning is a common on-chain attack method where attackers insert similar addresses into the victim's transaction history through small transactions, misleading subsequent large transfers.
The relevant funds are currently held in an address controlled by the attacker. The incident highlights the importance of verifying addresses after large withdrawals.
Such attacks continue to occur in active trading environments, relying on users' habits of copying and pasting.
From a market mechanism perspective, poisoning attacks directly transfer victims' funds, with stolen assets quickly exchanged for stablecoins; the incident is driven by social engineering, benefiting the attacker while putting pressure on users and institutions that rely on manual address input.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
The Bofur Capital address was immediately subjected to dust poisoning after a withdrawal from Compound, indicating that the attacker was monitoring large on-chain operations in real-time and precisely inserting similar addresses, exploiting the user's habit of copying from transaction history to complete the theft.
In terms of capital flow, the attacker exchanged $2 million in assets for a very low cost dust transaction, with resources flowing directly from the victim's wallet to the attacker's address and converted into DAI, motivated by exploiting human operational vulnerabilities for a non-technical fund transfer.
Similar cases have been seen in recent years with multiple stablecoin and ETH address poisoning incidents, with losses ranging from hundreds of thousands to tens of millions; the current on-chain environment is characterized by increased trading frequency, with users still relying on copy-paste habits.
This essentially represents a technological substitution: secure address verification is replaced by dust poisoning and copying habits as an attack entry point, with the mechanism being to disrupt user perception and operational inertia at a very low cost, thereby bypassing private key and contract security.
ABAB News · Cognitive Law
A dust of 0.0002 USDC is enough to steal $2 million
The habit of copying addresses from transaction history is the best entry point for poisoning
The first transfer after a large withdrawal is often the most dangerous