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Financial Times reports that Iran-linked ships hover over subsea cables

The Financial Times reported that ships linked to Iran were hovering over subsea telecommunications cables in the Middle East, at a time after Tehran threatened to attack the cables and data centers if the U.S. and Israel launched another round of bombing. At least four ships tracked by maritime analytics company Windward took unusual routes and lingered in the subsea cable corridor in the Gulf of Oman.

Three of them were tankers under U.S. sanctions, and the fourth was a small Iranian fishing boat, which hovered over the Europe India Gateway and Transworld cables from October 21 to 26. The ships were observed slowing down, circling, turning back, lingering, or switching off tracking signals after arriving at specific cable corridors, unlike the behavior of other ships waiting for oil cargoes. The cables involved included 2Africa and Falcon.

Hossein Mohebbi, a spokesperson for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said on October 19 that there are seven major internet cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz, warning that if the conflict escalates, new targets and new weapons will be introduced. Windward data showed that the ships involved had links to the Iranian National Oil Company or military networks. An attack on cables in the Gulf region would have a significant impact on neighboring economies, but the report has not confirmed any actual acts of damage.

Original source:

  1. Title: Iran-linked ships hover over subsea cables after threats
    Publisher: Financial Times
    Publication date: 2026-11-05
    URL: https://www.ft.com/content/492b2c62-8e15-47b3-bf24-842ae62e7217
    Source nature: Media report (citing Windward tracking data and public statements by the IRGC)
    Verification status: The original text was read and cross-checked with Windward's public analysis and related Reuters reports
    Supporting content: Four Iran-linked ships lingering in the cable corridor in the Gulf of Oman, three sanctioned tankers and one fishing boat, slowdown/off-tracking behavior, the timing of the IRGC threat

ABAB AI Insight

Windward recorded through ship tracking and satellite imagery that the relevant ships were sailing normally before reaching the specific cable corridor, and only then slowed down, circled, or switched off AIS signals. This pattern differs from commercial waiting to load and was described by the company as consistent with surveying cable routes or related activity. The three tankers were empty and had links to networks associated with the Iranian National Oil Company or the military.

Iranian officials had previously publicly mentioned the cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz and warned that they could become targets if the conflict escalates. The ships' activity appeared before and after the public threat, but the report did not confirm whether the ships carried out any specific damage. Among Gulf countries, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar rely heavily on international connections that pass through cables crossing the strait.

In terms of capital flows, subsea cables carry most of the international data traffic in the region. If the cables are damaged and repairs are obstructed, the impact would be concentrated on communications and financial transactions in neighboring Gulf economies rather than on global overall bandwidth. Current observations remain at the stage of abnormal ship trajectories and have not turned into confirmed physical damage.

Structurally, this is a report that places public threats alongside traceable ship behavior. When sanctioned tankers and fishing boats show non-commercial lingering in a cable corridor, their trajectories are used to assess potential infrastructure risk. The report emphasizes abnormal behavior but does not directly equate the trajectories with an attack that has already been carried out.

ABAB News · Laws of cognition

  1. After arriving in the cable corridor, the ships slowed down or switched off signals, distinguishing their behavior from ordinary commercial waiting to load.

  2. The juxtaposition of public threats and traceable abnormal ship trajectories provides observable grounds for assessing infrastructure risk.

  3. Some Gulf countries' international connections rely heavily on cables crossing Hormuz, so any local damage would have a regional rather than global impact.