Binance Pool
Binance Pool: Mining, staking, or validator resource for blockchain networks.
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Binance Pool is indexed in ABAB Crypto Map under Mining & Staking. This page keeps the official site, category, tags, and related ABAB coverage together as a searchable crypto project profile. Official domain: pool.binance.com.
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VeVe & David Yu: From Physical Collectibles Entrepreneur to a Global Digital Collectibles Ecosystem — Rise, Business Empire, and Controversies
1、VeVe was not founded by David Yu alone. The two core co-founders are David Yu — legally identified in ECOMI disclosures as David Shu-Han Yu — and Daniel “Dan” Crothers. Over VeVe’s history, David has generally functioned as the founder-CEO, collector, strategic public face and key figure around the company’s direction and licensing relationships, while Crothers has been the other founding operator. ECOMI’s 2025 MiCA disclosure identified David as Founder/Co-CEO and Daniel Crothers as COO/Co-Founder. After Ben Rose’s departure, however, VeVe explicitly returned to a founder-led model, and by 2026 EY identified David simply as “Co-founder and CEO of VeVe.” For that reason, David is the appropriate primary subject when discussing “the founder” of VeVe, but Dan Crothers is indispensable to any accurate account of the company’s creation. 2、David Yu’s background is unusually different from that of the stereotypical Web3 founder: his starting point was collecting, gaming, retail and licensed merchandise, not blockchain. The New Zealand Herald described Yu as a “collector maniac,” reported that he had spent roughly 25 years in the gaming-retail business and owned two Auckland Vagabond Games & Collectables stores. The article also described his extensive personal collection, including New Zealand collectibles such as Crown Lynn pieces. That history helps explain why VeVe has consistently emphasized “collecting” rather than merely crypto-asset trading. David’s path was effectively the reverse of many early NFT projects: rather than starting with a token and searching for a use case, he already understood why collectors care about editions, scarcity, first appearances, complete sets, provenance and emotional attachment to IP, and then looked for a digital infrastructure capable of reproducing those behaviors. EY likewise emphasizes that he had approximately 25 years of experience in games and collectibles before building VeVe. 3、His entrepreneurial career began extremely early, although public sources differ slightly on the precise age. When David won EY Entrepreneur Of The Year 2023 New Zealand, judging chair Cecilia Robinson noted that he had been running businesses since age 16. A 2026 Noteworthy profile, drawing on New Zealand business reporting, gives a more specific account: at around 17 he founded Games R Us on Auckland’s Karangahape Road, financing the venture by selling stamps and phone cards. The safest conclusion is therefore that Yu was already an entrepreneur by roughly age 16–17. The available story also does not point to a large family enterprise or institutional venture-capital platform as the origin of his career. Instead, the recurring narrative is one of small-scale specialty retail, hobby goods and reinvesting operating experience. That does not, however, establish his family’s socioeconomic status. 4、Reliable public English-language material on his family, birth date, birthplace and parents is extremely limited. His full legal name, David Shu-Han Yu, can be confirmed from ECOMI’s MiCA disclosure, and his business career is firmly based in Auckland, New Zealand. High-quality public sources do not establish his birth date, parental occupations, childhood household wealth or detailed family history, so those points should not be inferred. This unusually low level of personal disclosure is consistent with Yu’s public image. His identity has remained centered on being a collector and entrepreneur rather than a celebrity founder. EY judging commentary describing him as a “silent achiever” fits that pattern. 5、Formal education is similarly peripheral to the public David Yu narrative. Reliable public material does not establish a university, degree or academic specialization for David. What can be verified is a long operating progression through Games R Us, specialty collecting and gaming retail, distribution and supply chain operations, Vagabond Games & Collectables, and eventually ECOMI and VeVe. His development therefore looks more like an industry apprenticeship than an academic-founder trajectory: procurement, inventory, fandom, collector psychology, licensing, distribution and commercial relationships appear far more prominently than computer science or finance credentials in the published record. EY explicitly connects his later digital-collectibles venture to his prior 25 years in games and collectibles. Public LinkedIn search information for Dan Crothers lists Auckland’s Rangitoto College in his education history, although the currently available material does not justify extrapolating a university degree from that. 6、VeVe was not David’s first venture; it is better understood as the digital culmination of decades spent around physical collectibles. The 2026 Noteworthy profile says that after Games R Us, Yu built Retail Management Group, a distribution and supply-chain business serving publicly listed retailers across Australasia. He subsequently remained deeply involved in gaming and collectibles retail. The NZ Herald independently confirms his ownership of Vagabond Games & Collectables and approximately 25 years in gaming retail. The continuity is therefore: physical collecting → specialty retail → distribution and supply chain → licensing/IP relationships → digital collecting → blockchain-based scarcity → mobile marketplace. That continuity is one of the most important ways to understand why VeVe developed as it did. 7、The conceptual origin of VeVe dates to roughly 2017–2018, well before the 2021 NFT boom. EY’s profile says David entered the nascent digital-collectibles field in 2017, when there was no established market and little evidence of demand for what he envisioned. ECOMI’s current site identifies 2018 as its founding year, while its MiCA filing records 2 May 2018 as the registration date of ECOMI Technology Pte. Ltd. The NZ Herald similarly reported that Yu and Dan Crothers began thinking about virtual collecting years before NFTs became a mainstream speculative phenomenon, co-founding Orbis Blockchain Technologies and developing what became VeVe. The fundamental early thesis was therefore not “chase the NFT boom.” It was: the psychology of physical collecting will eventually migrate into digital space. From Physical Collecting to VeVe: Timeline, Product and Business Architecture 8、2018 was the key organizational year, but VeVe’s “founding” or “launch” date depends on what exactly is being measured. Public sources use 2018, 2020 and 2021 for different stages. 2018 corresponds to organizational formation: ECOMI says it was founded in 2018, and VeVe’s current LinkedIn company page also lists 2018 as its founding year. ECOMI’s current site is more precise about operations, saying it “has powered digital collecting on VeVe since 2020,” and it labels OMI as launched in 2020. 2021, meanwhile, was the genuine global commercial breakout, when VeVe gained major IP and entered the center of the NFT market. EY’s later company narratives often frame this period as the beginning of VeVe’s large-scale consumer expansion. A more accurate sequence is therefore: 2017 concept → 2018 company formation → 2020 operating infrastructure → 2021 mass-market breakout. 9、ECOMI and VeVe must be separated conceptually; otherwise the capital structure and economics are easily misunderstood. ECOMI currently describes itself as the token, utility and rewards layer powering the VeVe digital-collectibles ecosystem. VeVe is the consumer-facing collectibles, comics and marketplace product. ECOMI says it has powered on-chain digital collecting on VeVe since 2020, while VeVe describes itself as a mobile-first licensed digital-collectibles platform. The legal structure is more specific. ECOMI’s MiCA filing identifies ECOMI Technology Pte. Ltd. as a Singapore company, registration number 201814792N, with David Shu-Han Yu as beneficial owner and sole director. It separately identifies Orbis Blockchain Technologies Limited, New Zealand company number 6545833, in connection with “VeVe.” The ecosystem is therefore better represented as: VeVe consumer platform → operating/licensing infrastructure → ECOMI token layer → OMI → blockchain and marketplace partners such as Immutable and StackR. It is inaccurate to reduce the whole structure to “VeVe is the OMI token company.” 10、The clearest early capital event was not a traditional VC round but ECOMI’s private ICO. The MiCA filing states that in 2019 ECOMI raised US$4.49 million through a private ICO at a US$44 million project valuation, with the offering unavailable to U.S. residents. The document separately describes ECOMI Technology Pte. Ltd., the OMI issuer, as privately held and pre-revenue. A critical distinction follows: The US$44 million figure was a token-project valuation in the context of the 2019 ICO; it should not be treated as a later VeVe equity valuation. Likewise, describing the token issuer as pre-revenue does not mean the VeVe commercial platform has generated no sales. ECOMI’s 2026 website simultaneously displays a self-reported ecosystem counter of “Platform revenue $1.4B+.” These figures refer to different layers and should not be merged. 11、One of David and Dan’s most consequential product choices was not to require mainstream consumers to behave like crypto natives. VeVe placed blockchain largely behind the user interface and presented users with a mobile app, catalogs, drops, blind boxes, AR display, a marketplace and Gems. The MiCA filing states that users can acquire Gems with credit cards on the web or through Apple and Google in-app payment systems, and that OMI is not required to use VeVe. That was particularly important in 2021. Many NFT platforms required users to understand wallets, gas, chains and cryptocurrencies. VeVe’s model allowed a Disney, Marvel or comic collector to buy a collectible first and encounter the blockchain layer only indirectly. In effect, it digitized a lesson from physical retail: remove purchase friction before explaining the technology. EY accordingly describes VeVe as combining blockchain and AR to deliver licensed collectibles globally, rather than as a cryptocurrency exchange. 12、VeVe’s strongest moat was never the blockchain itself; it was elite IP licensing. ECOMI’s 2026 site lists a VeVe ecosystem containing Disney, Marvel, Star Wars, DC, Ultraman, Funko, Coca-Cola, Jurassic Park, Ghostbusters, DreamWorks, 20th Century, Cartoon Network, TMNT, Street Fighter, Assassin’s Creed, BLACKPINK, Ubisoft, Lamborghini, Maserati, Star Trek and USPS, among others. It currently claims 200+ officially licensed brands and characters. Early NZ Herald reporting already described Yu and Crothers securing digital rights relating to characters and properties associated with Disney, Marvel, Sony, MGM, Warner Bros. and other global rights holders. Disney, Marvel and DC themselves remain the IP owners; VeVe does not own those characters. VeVe’s value is its contractual ability to commercialize licensed digital content and aggregate many powerful licensors into a single collector marketplace. The real moat is therefore closer to license aggregation + collector distribution than smart-contract code. 13、2021 produced VeVe’s legitimacy breakthrough: major IP arrived in rapid succession and transformed it from a niche startup into a global licensed-NFT channel. Key 2021 milestones included Givenchy, Marvel, Star Trek, USPS and Disney Golden Moments. In August, Marvel used VeVe for officially licensed Spider-Man digital collectibles marketed as the first official Spider-Man NFT; Disney Golden Moments later brought Disney, Pixar and Star Wars-related fandom into the ecosystem. Around the Marvel announcement, Stuff reported that VeVe had already passed US$40 million in sales in six months. That suggests Marvel arrived after the platform had already demonstrated unusually strong monetization rather than serving as its first evidence of demand. The deeper accomplishment was credibility transfer: decades of collecting, retail and licensing knowledge helped a New Zealand startup persuade global rights owners to entrust it with highly sensitive “first digital collectible” and “first NFT” moments. 14、The core VeVe product deliberately reproduces familiar physical-collecting mechanics: editions, serial numbers, rarity, First Appearance designations, blind boxes and secondary trading. Official VeVe drop materials show classic collectible architecture. A DreamWorks Trollhunters drop, for example, used Common, Uncommon, Rare, Ultra Rare and Secret Rare tiers with different edition counts, sold via blind box. Individual assets carry edition and First Appearance metadata. VeVe has also disclosed that portions of some editions are withheld for licensors, promotion, team and complimentary distribution. VeVe therefore did not try to reinvent collecting psychology. It ported the scarcity architecture of physical toys, trading cards and comics into software. That is exactly where Yu’s industry experience matters: collectors often care not just about an image, but whether it is the first edition, which mint number it carries, how many exist and whether a complete set can be assembled. 15、AR became a second major differentiator from flat-image NFT marketplaces. VeVe allows users to position 3D collectibles in real environments through mobile AR, photograph them, interact with them and display them in virtual environments. The company consistently describes blockchain plus augmented reality as a core technological combination. The value proposition is therefore not simply “I control an on-chain token,” but “I possess a digital object that can be displayed like a figure.” VeVeVerse extends that logic. VeVe’s official help material describes the 2025 product as a digital playground in which collectors can showcase, interact with and customize their VeVe digital collectibles and comics. 16、The underlying blockchain stack also evolved substantially: from GoChain toward Ethereum/Immutable X and later Base. The MiCA filing states that OMI originated on GoChain and began migrating to Ethereum ERC-20 in January 2022. VeVe’s NFT infrastructure uses Immutable X, an Ethereum Layer 2 designed to provide low-friction NFT transactions, and OMI later expanded onto Base beginning in 2024. VeVe company materials say Immutable X provides rapid confirmation, scalability, zero gas fees for users and a sharply reduced environmental footprint compared with older Ethereum NFT workflows. The strategic consistency is clear: the less the collector has to think about the blockchain, the better the product is supposed to work. 17、VeVe’s subsequent expansion has followed the same collecting logic across additional media rather than abandoning the original thesis. In 2024, VeVe expanded VeVe Comics, combining mobile comic reading and digital collectibility; company materials highlight same-day releases with print and guided panel-by-panel reading. The company also developed the VeVeVibes music direction, including BLACKPINK-related initiatives, and pursued physical-plus-digital or “phygital” collaborations involving brands such as Funko, Marvel, Christian Louboutin and FiGPiN. FiGPiN explicitly described its VeVe partnership as pairing limited physical pins with digital collectible counterparts. In June 2026, VeVe formally introduced VeVe Stickerverse, a new collecting experience distributed through Telegram. The product lineage can therefore be read as: 3D collectibles → comics → music → phygital → metaverse/display → social stickers. The persistent logic is licensed IP, scarcity, collectibility, display and exchange. Assets, Capital, Partner Network and Business Model 18、It is important to separate VeVe’s true operating assets from its influence assets. Operating assets include the VeVe brand and software, account infrastructure, marketplace, collectible databases, AR/display products, blockchain integrations, operating entities and contractual licensing relationships. Disney, Marvel, DC, Star Wars and Lamborghini IP are not VeVe-owned assets. Those brands belong to licensors and partners. VeVe’s value comes from obtaining the rights to commercialize licensed digital content and assembling multiple premier licensors inside a single collector ecosystem. Its most important influence assets may therefore be: licensor trust + collector community + historical “firsts” + distribution ability + the VeVeFam community. These are relationship assets that are much harder to replicate than software code. 19、ECOMI/OMI is the most important economic layer adjacent to VeVe, but OMI is not VeVe stock. ECOMI describes OMI in consumer-facing language as the utility and rewards token for the VeVe ecosystem. In the more precise legal terminology of MiCA, however, its filing states that OMI is not a “utility token” under the narrow MiCAR definition, because its function is not solely to provide access to a good or service supplied by the issuer. It falls into the broader Title II crypto-asset category. Even more importantly, the filing explicitly states that OMI holders receive no equity, profit participation, claim on ECOMI or VeVe assets, or claim on intellectual property. It also discloses no corporate governance voting rights for OMI. Buying OMI should therefore never be equated with buying equity in VeVe. 20、OMI has gradually evolved from a token narrative toward more concrete ecosystem utility. Historically, OMI centered on ecosystem utility, Master Collector Program incentives and planned future features. Over time, those functions became more explicit: eligible OMI holdings can influence MCP rewards; later integrations connected OMI, StackR and Gems; and ECOMI has now launched OMI Unlimited staking. ECOMI currently says that certain StackR marketplace activity and USDC-to-Gem purchases remove OMI from circulating supply. Its 2026 site displays a self-reported figure of 440B+ OMI burned. OMI Unlimited Season 1, launched on 1 October 2026, lets holders lock OMI, accumulate XP and become eligible for VeVe collectibles and Gems based on seasonal ranking; it is not presented as OMI interest yield. ECOMI reported that within the first 24 hours, 578 stakers had locked 13.85B OMI, about US$4.18 million in total value locked, helping lift the Season 1 Gem reward pool to 120,000 Gems. By 2026, ECOMI is therefore making a much more explicit attempt to close the loop between token holders and VeVe collectors. 21、The publicly disclosed capital structure does not resemble the classic Silicon Valley venture-capital story. ECOMI’s MiCA filing says ECOMI Technology Pte. Ltd. has no parent company and identifies David Shu-Han Yu as beneficial owner and sole director. At the time of disclosure, the token issuer reported no external debt and said operations were principally supported by a Business Development Fund. As of October 2025 that fund contained about 16.3B OMI, then valued at roughly US$5 million, for purposes including exchange listings, liquidity, marketing and partnerships. Its clearest disclosed early outside-capital event remains the US$4.49 million 2019 private ICO rather than a conventional large institutional VC round. Again, however, those disclosures describe ECOMI Technology Pte. Ltd. and the OMI issuer, not a complete VeVe operating-company capitalization table. 22、Much of VeVe’s effective capital is relationship capital rather than purely financial capital. David’s scarcest resources appear to be decades of collectibles expertise, licensing credibility, brand negotiation, distribution capability, collector demand and community trust. Relationships with Marvel, Disney, DC, Star Wars, USPS, Lamborghini, Funko, BLACKPINK, Ubisoft and many others collectively form a powerful licensing network. ECOMI now quantifies the ecosystem as encompassing 200+ licensed brands and characters. The technical and service network is also substantial. The MiCA disclosure names providers and partners including Immutable, Amazon Web Services, Salesforce, Checkout.com, GetStream, Cavrnus and StackR. ECOMI also began working with CoolBitX in 2018 on its Secure Wallet, demonstrating that the original ECOMI vision extended beyond collectibles into broader digital-asset security and hardware. 23、The first layer of VeVe’s business model is licensed digital-goods issuance. VeVe works with IP owners to turn characters, comics, artwork and branded properties into limited digital collectibles, typically structured around fixed edition counts, rarity and blind-box or timed-drop mechanics. Official drop pages disclose list prices, edition sizes, rarity and release schedules. Economically, VeVe therefore combines characteristics of a: digital toy producer, licensed-merchandise company, publisher and primary marketplace. The precise revenue share and royalty terms with each licensor are contractual and are not publicly standardized, so a single percentage should not be invented. The Chaosium example at least demonstrates that some agreements can include creator participation: Chaosium said artists involved in its original VeVe collectibles shared in sale proceeds. That arrangement cannot automatically be generalized to Disney, Marvel or other licenses. 24、The second economic layer is the secondary marketplace and continuing turnover, not merely the initial drop. VeVe allows collectors to buy and resell assets inside its marketplace. This extends the traditional licensed-merchandise model: a physical toy company usually monetizes the initial product sale, whereas a digital-collectibles platform can place primary issuance and ongoing collector-to-collector circulation within one ecosystem. VeVe’s own positioning consistently combines buying, collecting, selling/trading and displaying. Strategically, VeVe is therefore attempting to own not just distribution but the collector-liquidity layer. That makes activity, market confidence, fair allocation and bot control much more strategically important than they would be for an ordinary digital-content store. 25、The third layer is Gems, which abstract crypto complexity away from mainstream consumers. Users do not need to acquire OMI before buying VeVe collectibles. The MiCA filing says Gems can be acquired by card and through Apple/Google in-app payments, while OMI is not a prerequisite for using the platform. Beginning in the later evolution of the ecosystem, VeVe and ECOMI used StackR to reconnect OMI with the Gem economy. The architecture can therefore be summarized as: early VeVe: “hide the crypto”; later VeVe: “make crypto an optional loyalty/economic layer rather than an entry requirement.” That is one of the deepest product differences between VeVe and a crypto-native NFT marketplace. 26、The fourth layer is retention: MCP, VeVeVerse, staking and scarcity create reasons to remain inside the ecosystem. The Master Collector Program translates collecting and eligible OMI-related behavior into ranks or points; VeVeVerse creates additional places to display assets; OMI Unlimited now connects token locking to VeVe rewards. Economically, all of these features address the same question: Why should a collector return after the initial NFT sale is over? VeVe’s answer increasingly resembles a live-service game: collections, ranks, events, points, social interaction, display environments, new drops, trading and seasonal rewards form an ongoing retention loop. 27、The fifth layer is horizontal content expansion: Comics, music, phygital products and Stickerverse allow the same licensing relationships to generate multiple product formats. Marvel can be more than a supplier of a 3D Spider-Man collectible; it can also participate through digital comics. FiGPiN links physical pins and VeVe digital counterparts. VeVeVibes brings music fandom into the collecting model. Stickerverse uses Telegram to reduce distribution friction and expose collection behavior to a broader social environment. This suggests that VeVe is attempting to evolve from a single NFT application into digital fandom infrastructure. If that transition works, its long-term value becomes less dependent on whether “NFT” remains a fashionable label and more dependent on whether consumers continue paying for scarce, licensed digital fandom products. Outcomes, Controversies, Turning Points and Current Position 28、David Yu’s greatest achievement is not inventing NFTs; it is persuading the world’s leading IP owners to entrust major official digital “firsts” to a New Zealand startup. Blockchain and NFTs were not invented by VeVe, nor was augmented reality. VeVe’s innovation was combining licensed merchandise, mobile payments, blockchain-based scarcity, 3D/AR presentation and secondary-market behavior, then using globally recognizable IP such as Disney, Marvel, DC and Star Wars to lower the comprehension barrier for mainstream collectors. The first official Spider-Man NFT and Disney Golden Moments created additional historical provenance within digital collecting. Yu’s most meaningful industry impact is therefore better described as changing the distribution model for licensed collectibles rather than changing blockchain protocol design. 29、A second major achievement was turning an Auckland-rooted business into a genuinely global product. EY’s 2024 World Entrepreneur Of The Year profile said VeVe had sold more than eight million NFTs and had a highly international customer base, with approximately 35% in the United States and 40% in the UK and Europe at the time. VeVe’s current LinkedIn page says more than ten million NFTs have been sold and lists 51–200 employees with headquarters in Auckland. ECOMI’s 2026 site now shows 12M+ collectibles minted and 200+ licensed brands/characters. These metrics use different dates and definitions, so they should not be mechanically combined. But the direction is unmistakable: VeVe has grown far beyond its founders’ original physical-collectibles retail base. 30、Mainstream recognition of David’s entrepreneurial status rose sharply from 2023 onward. David won EY Entrepreneur Of The Year 2023 New Zealand. Judging chair Cecilia Robinson characterized him as a “silent achiever,” emphasizing his very early entrepreneurial activity, adaptability and willingness to enter a completely new industry. In 2024, he represented New Zealand in the EY World Entrepreneur Of The Year ecosystem. EY’s official profile highlighted the unusual risk involved in entering a digital-collectibles market before clear demand existed. VeVe also ranked at the top end of New Zealand’s 2023 Deloitte Fast 50; a 2026 Noteworthy profile citing Deloitte reports 1,239% revenue growth over three years. By 2026, Yu had moved from EY award recipient to an EY New Zealand Entrepreneur Of The Year judge, while retaining the official title of VeVe co-founder and CEO. That places him well beyond the status of a niche NFT founder and inside New Zealand’s mainstream entrepreneurial establishment. 31、The 2024 appointment of Ben Rose represented an important experiment in moving from a founder-driven startup toward more professionalized management. Former Binance New Zealand general manager Ben Rose joined VeVe as Co-CEO alongside David and publicly stated that he was also becoming a shareholder. His remit clearly involved growth, strategy, communications and scaling, while David remained actively engaged. This is a classic scale-up transition: a founder may remain strongest in product, IP relationships and vision while an experienced operator is brought in to professionalize execution. Rose later cited a refreshed business plan, greater community engagement, faster VeVeVerse development, additional VeVe Comics publishers and the Affiliates Program among initiatives launched during his tenure. 32、The Co-CEO structure was subsequently reversed and VeVe returned explicitly to a founder-led model. Rose later announced that he was finishing as VeVe Co-CEO and said the company was shifting to a founder-led approach, with the Co-CEO structure being phased out. By 2026, EY again identified David directly as CEO rather than Co-CEO. This is best understood as a meaningful organizational experiment followed by a strategic reversal. It does not automatically mean Rose’s tenure failed—several of the initiatives he highlighted remain part of the business—but it does show that VeVe ultimately decided its next stage should again be directed primarily by its founders. 33、One of VeVe’s earliest concrete operating controversies involved bots, scripts, auto-clickers and fairness around highly sought-after drops. In February 2022, VeVe/ECOMI published a dedicated anti-bot explanation. It said the app had reached 1.9 million monthly active users and acknowledged that bots, auto-clickers, scripts and emulators were targeting high-demand digital sales, forcing the company to impose account restrictions and defend its detection systems against concerns about false positives. This controversy was, in a sense, a by-product of VeVe’s own success: limited supply + elite IP + synchronized drops + expectations of secondary-market appreciation = strong economic incentives for automation. It resembles the bot problems seen in sneakers, concert tickets and limited physical collectibles, translated into a digital marketplace. 34、A second category of controversy concerns the NFT concept itself rather than a personal scandal involving David Yu. The clearest example is Chaosium / Call of Cthulhu. Chaosium began discussions with VeVe in 2019 and released Call of Cthulhu digital collectibles in 2021. As hostility toward NFTs intensified among tabletop-gaming fans, Chaosium suspended future NFT plans in February 2022. Importantly, Chaosium did not accuse VeVe of fraud. It said it had conducted several rounds of due diligence, described VeVe as an ethical company and credited the Immutable X architecture with materially reducing environmental impact. Its decision to pause was driven by concerns and opposition from its own community. The case reveals a structural VeVe risk: a platform can operate legitimately and still encounter deep cultural resistance when an IP’s core fans reject NFT commercialization itself. 35、Environmental concerns have been another recurring source of controversy. VeVe has consistently promoted a carbon-neutral strategy. Its company materials say it committed to 100% carbon-neutral NFTs in 2021 and that its Immutable X infrastructure dramatically reduced environmental impact relative to older Ethereum NFT approaches. Chaosium likewise cited reduced environmental impact as an important factor in its decision to work with VeVe. That did not eliminate criticism. When Sesame Street-related Cookie Monster NFTs appeared on VeVe in 2023, some fans objected to linking a children’s cultural property to NFTs, environmental concerns and speculative digital assets; the backlash was reported by NBC News and other outlets. Two separate questions therefore need to be distinguished: whether VeVe’s blockchain stack is substantially less energy-intensive than early proof-of-work NFT systems, and whether consumers are philosophically comfortable with turning beloved cultural or children’s IP into NFTs. 36、OMI is another area in which misunderstanding can easily become controversy. ECOMI’s consumer-facing site calls OMI a utility and rewards token, but its MiCA white paper explicitly warns that the asset may lose some or all of its value, may not always be transferable or liquid, and is not covered by bank-deposit or investor-compensation schemes. The same document states that OMI represents no VeVe or ECOMI equity or profit right. Strong VeVe operating performance therefore does not automatically translate into corporate economic participation for OMI holders. Conversely, OMI market-price volatility should not be treated as a direct valuation of VeVe’s operating business. That is one of the most important conceptual distinctions in any serious analysis of the company. 37、User figures also require careful interpretation because historical and current metrics use different definitions. In early 2022 VeVe itself claimed 1.9 million monthly active users. ECOMI’s 2026 site currently displays 700K+ ecosystem users, alongside 12M+ collectibles minted, 200+ licensed brands/characters and $1.4B+ platform revenue. It would be methodologically wrong to infer directly that “users fell from 1.9 million to 700,000,” because the first metric is explicitly monthly active users while the current “ecosystem users” counter is not defined sufficiently to establish comparability. The defensible conclusion is narrower: VeVe experienced extraordinary user growth during the 2021–2022 NFT peak and remains a scaled ecosystem in 2026, but its published user metrics across periods do not share a clearly comparable methodology. 38、The most important strategic evolution from 2023 through 2026 is VeVe’s effort to reduce dependence on the singular “NFT bull market” narrative. Its product portfolio increasingly diversified: Lamborghini, Stan Lee and phygital initiatives in 2023; VeVe Comics, music and physical-digital projects in 2024; accelerated VeVeVerse, StackR and publisher expansion in 2025; Stickerverse and OMI Unlimited in 2026. The strategic inference is that VeVe wants to redefine itself from an: “NFT marketplace” into a: “licensed digital collecting ecosystem / fandom platform.” That repositioning matters because “NFT” experienced a major reputational and market-cycle reversal after 2021, whereas Disney collecting, comics, fandom and scarce licensed merchandise are much older consumer behaviors. This is an inference from the product roadmap rather than a quoted company statement. 39、As of October 2026, David Yu remains structurally central rather than functioning as a retired financial founder. EY’s 2026 material identifies him as VeVe Co-founder and CEO, and he now sits within the EY New Zealand Entrepreneur Of The Year judging ecosystem. ECOMI’s legal disclosure simultaneously identifies him as beneficial owner and sole director of ECOMI Technology Pte. Ltd., meaning he remains deeply connected to the token and infrastructure layer surrounding VeVe. VeVe was still launching new products such as Stickerverse in 2026, while ECOMI launched OMI Unlimited in October 2026. David is therefore not merely “the man who founded VeVe.” He remains at the intersection of: corporate governance + product direction + collecting culture + the ECOMI/OMI economic layer + IP relationships. 40、In one sentence, David Yu is better understood as a licensed-collectibles entrepreneur for the digital age than as a conventional blockchain founder. His capability chain is not primarily: write protocol → issue token → build community. It is closer to: collector → retailer → distributor → licensing-relationship operator → digital-collectibles founder → global fandom-marketplace CEO. His scarce capability is the ability to understand three constituencies simultaneously: IP owners need brand protection; collectors want scarcity, authenticity and emotional value; mainstream consumers do not want to master complex crypto tools. VeVe’s architecture is, in many ways, an attempt to reconcile those three interests. 41、VeVe’s greatest moat is also the source of its greatest risks. The moat consists of premier licenses, the accumulated digital-collectible catalog, historical “firsts,” community, marketplace behavior and David’s long-standing relationships in the collecting business. A catalog spanning 200+ licensed brands and characters and more than 12 million minted collectibles cannot be reproduced quickly. The risks arise from the same structure: dependence on third-party IP licenses; cyclicality in digital-collectible prices and trading; reputational resistance to NFTs; regulatory and tokenomic complexity around OMI; and the persistent need to control bots and maintain confidence in scarce-drop allocation. VeVe’s long-term outcome therefore depends less on whether NFTs experience another speculative boom than on whether it can prove a more durable proposition: that consumers will continue collecting, displaying, exchanging and paying for licensed digital Disney, Marvel, comics, music, cars and designer objects even when they no longer care about the word “NFT.” 42、The entire 2017–2026 trajectory can be compressed into one timeline. 2017: David begins pursuing digital collectibles before demand is established. 2018: the ECOMI/VeVe corporate ecosystem takes shape; ECOMI is registered and early technology relationships such as CoolBitX are established. 2019: ECOMI raises US$4.49 million through its private ICO; early licensing discussions are underway with IP owners including Chaosium. 2020: ECOMI’s current account says it begins powering digital collecting on VeVe, with OMI entering the ecosystem. 2021: VeVe breaks out globally as Marvel, Spider-Man, Disney Golden Moments, Star Trek, USPS and other major properties arrive; sales and user adoption accelerate rapidly. 2022: operating-scale problems such as bots become prominent; OMI migrates from GoChain toward Ethereum, Immutable X becomes central infrastructure and cultural opposition to NFTs grows. 2023: Lamborghini, Stan Lee and phygital initiatives broaden the catalog; David wins EY Entrepreneur Of The Year New Zealand and VeVe reaches the top tier of Deloitte’s Fast 50. 2024: VeVe Comics, VeVeVibes/BLACKPINK and additional phygital initiatives expand the product; Ben Rose joins as Co-CEO and shareholder in an attempt to professionalize management. 2025: VeVeVerse accelerates; StackR deepens the OMI/Gem connection; Ben Rose exits and the company explicitly returns to a founder-led structure. 2026: David is again clearly identified as CEO; VeVe launches Stickerverse; ECOMI launches OMI Unlimited. ECOMI’s current self-reported ecosystem counters show 200+ brands/characters, 12M+ collectibles minted, 700K+ ecosystem users, $1.4B+ platform revenue and 440B+ OMI burned. The most important long-term interpretation is therefore not simply “an NFT company that rode a boom and survived a bust.” It is the story of a physical-collectibles entrepreneur spending nearly a decade trying to rebuild scarcity, trading, display, fandom, licensing and collector identity on digital infrastructure.
KuCoin Founder and Exchange: The Rise and Fall of a Tech Geek to the 'People's Exchange' and High-Risk Offshore Giant
1. Overview of Individuals and Exchange Structure (1) KuCoin is a centralized cryptocurrency exchange that started in China, moved to Singapore, and later registered primarily in Seychelles. KuCoin officially launched in 2017, branding itself as the "People’s Exchange," focusing on long-tail assets and high-frequency listings. (2) In publicly available English materials, the core founders and co-founders primarily revolve around three individuals: Chun "Michael" Gan, Ke "Eric" Tang, and Johnny Lyu, who later became the actual leader. Early official materials and media reports have differing accounts regarding the list of founders, leading to inconsistencies. (3) In terms of power and narrative structure, Michael was mainly responsible for early technology and overall strategy, Eric and Ke Tang leaned more towards backend compliance and system architecture, while Johnny gradually rose from the business and operations side to become the main representative of the exchange during a period of increased regulatory pressure. 2. Founding Structure and the Question of "Who Counts as a Founder" (1) Some official and third-party materials state that KuCoin was "founded by Chun Gan, Ke Tang, Johnny Lyu, and others," while others mention "founded by Michael Gan and Eric Don, also known as Ke Tang, with others as core team members." Some materials also list early executives like Top Lan, Kent Li, John Lee, Jack Zhu, and Linda Lin, indicating a clear inconsistency in the founding team list. (2) From a technical and code origin perspective, multiple English sources indicate that Gan and Tang began writing the underlying architecture and matching engine for the future exchange as early as 2013, with KuCoin officially launching in 2017. This narrative is consistent across different sources, indicating that the two were among the earliest technical and institutional founders of KuCoin. (3) Johnny Lyu is described by several sources as a "co-founder and CEO." Relevant materials emphasize that he has been involved in product, listing, and business development since 2017, and became KuCoin Global CEO after 2020. In terms of actual role, he resembles a hybrid figure of a "second-tier founding partner" and a "professional manager." 3. Michael Gan: Early Years, Education, and Technical Path (1) Regarding his family and upbringing, authoritative English and Chinese sources have disclosed little about his parents' professions, family class, and economic conditions, with limited public information available. Currently, it can only be confirmed that he has stated he was a tech enthusiast from a young age and began engaging with the internet and programming early on. (2) Multiple English biographies mention that he started learning programming at age 8, attempted his first startup at 16, and became one of the first users of NetEase's personal homepage service in 1998. These experiences show he was long influenced by China's early internet culture and technological environment. (3) Regarding his educational background, a consistent statement is that he attended Chengdu University of Technology. The specific major and degree obtained have not been disclosed, indicating limited public information, but it can be generally inferred that he has an engineering or technical educational background rather than a traditional finance background. (4) In his early career, he served as the lead developer and co-founder at Missyi Inc., primarily developing image-sharing and editing applications. These products were part of the mainstream UGC and social networking sector at the time, allowing him to accumulate experience in high-concurrency internet systems and user product development. (5) He later joined the Alibaba group, working as a technical expert in Ant Financial's artificial intelligence department. Multiple official press releases mention that during this phase, he observed the application of artificial intelligence and financial technology across different industries, which became an important technical background for his later construction of the exchange, self-developed risk control systems, and trading engines. (6) Around 2012, Gan began participating in Bitcoin mining. Many biographies view this experience as the true starting point of his entry into the cryptocurrency field. Thus, he is a typical "engineer + early miner" type entrepreneur, rather than a traditional finance professional entering the crypto industry after the market matured. This also explains KuCoin's early emphasis on technical architecture, matching performance, and product details. 4. Michael Gan's Role Evolution and Key Decisions at KuCoin (1) According to multiple platforms, Gan officially launched KuCoin in 2017 as founder and CEO, responsible for the overall technical architecture, product direction, and the branding of "People’s Exchange." His goal was to create a trading platform that placed greater emphasis on long-tail assets and was relatively friendly to ordinary retail investors. (2) In 2018, KuCoin completed a $20 million Series A financing round, with investors including IDG Capital, Matrix Partners, and Neo Global Capital. This round of financing not only endorsed its early growth but also provided Gan with capital to expand the product line and promote globalization. This marked the first significant turning point for KuCoin as it transitioned from a small long-tail asset exchange to a mainstream platform. (3) In March 2020, the company established KuGroup, dividing its business into three main segments: KuCoin Global, responsible for centralized exchange operations. KuCloud, responsible for exchange white-label and infrastructure services. KuChain & KCS Business Group, responsible for public chain and KCS ecosystem. Gan was promoted from KuCoin CEO to KuGroup Chairman, beginning to focus more on group strategy, public chain KuChain, and KCS ecosystem layout. Daily operations of the exchange were gradually handed over to Johnny Lyu. This structural adjustment clearly served the needs of group expansion and reducing risks associated with a single business and regulatory entity. (4) In terms of product and business model, Gan led the design of KuCoin Shares, later renamed KuCoin Token, or KCS. KCS initially adopted a "platform token + fee distribution" model, distributing about 50% of daily trading fee revenue to KCS holders based on their holdings. This was one of the core mechanisms for KuCoin to build user loyalty and enhance platform valuation, and it was widely imitated by many centralized exchanges at the time. (5) As the platform developed, KCS gradually transformed from a purely revenue-sharing token to a comprehensive platform asset with fee discounts, node and voting rights, ecosystem governance, and payment functions. The initial total supply of KCS was 200 million, with plans to reduce the final total supply to 100 million through buybacks and burns. The amount of KCS bought back and burned was linked to KuCoin's overall revenue, tightly binding the platform's profitability to the token's value. This was also an important design by Gan at the financial engineering level. (6) In September 2020, KuCoin's hot wallet private keys were leaked, resulting in the theft of approximately $280 million worth of crypto assets. This was one of the largest hacking incidents in the crypto industry that year, posing a significant challenge to Gan's technical credibility and KuCoin's survival. (7) After the hacking incident, Gan and newly appointed CEO Johnny Lyu tracked the stolen funds on-chain, requested project parties to redeploy contracts, and collaborated with other exchanges to freeze addresses, ultimately recovering about 84% of the stolen funds, valued at approximately $239 million. The remaining loss of about $45.55 million was borne by platform funds and insurance funds. KuCoin repeatedly emphasized that users did not suffer permanent losses. This handling plan somewhat restored user trust. (8) From a corporate governance perspective, this hacking incident exposed KuCoin's early shortcomings in hot wallet management, multi-signature mechanisms, internal risk prevention, and basic security processes. The incident also accelerated Gan's transition from personally managing technology and exchange operations as CEO to becoming the group chairman and ecosystem planner. For the company, this incident became an important turning point for upgrading security and compliance systems. 5. Ke "Eric" Tang, Eric Don: The Low-Key Partners (1) Regarding Ke Tang, also written as Eric Tang or Eric Don, his family background, birthplace, and educational experience are not disclosed in most authoritative English materials, with limited public information available. His overall image is very low-key, leaning more towards a backend partner. (2) Some media and commentators mention that he and Gan began systematically engaging with Bitcoin and blockchain during their time at Ant Financial. Some sources claim that it was Tang who introduced Bitcoin to Gan. The two began writing the core code and system architecture for future KuCoin in 2013, indicating that Tang was a core figure in technical solutions and system design. (3) Earlier English evaluation materials positioned Eric Don as a COO or CTO type figure, describing him as a senior internet researcher and system architect who had served as CTO and senior partner in several IT companies. However, the specific information and resumes of these companies are difficult to verify, and some company domains are no longer accessible, indicating inconsistencies that need to be viewed cautiously. (4) After KuCoin officially launched, Tang and Don appeared more in the founding team list, company registration materials, and legal documents rather than in external media interviews. This contrasts sharply with the high exposure of Gan and Johnny, indicating that their roles leaned more towards institutional design, equity arrangements, and company backend governance rather than personal brand-type founders. (5) Around 2020, he briefly appeared on the board of directors of the Singapore entity PhoenixFin Pte. Ltd. Later, during the transfer of domain and trademark, he resigned as a director, and the company registration gradually shifted to Seychelles entities like Mek Global and FortuneIcon. His personal role in public company registration gradually faded, synchronizing with KuCoin's more thorough offshore structure. 6. Johnny Lyu: From Business Partner to Core Leader (1) Regarding Johnny Lyu's educational background, some materials indicate that he studied e-commerce at Chengdu Neusoft University from 2004 to 2008. Other sources claim he attended Shanghai Maritime University, majoring in logistics management. The records from different sources are inconsistent, indicating discrepancies. However, the general consensus is that he received applied business, e-commerce, or logistics management education rather than pure computer science or financial engineering training. (2) Before entering the crypto industry, he accumulated extensive business experience in e-commerce, automotive, and luxury goods sectors. He served as CEO of IMOOLO Jewelry and was a technical or business leader at Hongkong Milanoo. This indicates he has long-term practical experience in supply chain, e-commerce operations, and frontend products, rather than a singular engineering background. (3) Multiple authoritative directories and KuCoin's official blog list him as a co-founder. After 2017, he was responsible for KuCoin's listings, business development, and strategic investment teams. He was also one of the main promoters of products like Spotlight, Pool-X, and KuCloud. Spotlight is KuCoin's IEO launch platform. Pool-X is a staking and liquidity mining platform. KuCloud is a white-label exchange SaaS service for institutions. Thus, he is a crucial execution hub for KuCoin's multi-product matrix strategy. (4) During the group restructuring in March 2020, he was appointed as KuCoin Global CEO, taking over the daily operations of KuCoin, KuMEX, Pool-X, and the expansion of the KCS ecosystem. KuMEX was later renamed KuCoin Futures. At the same time, Gan was promoted to KuGroup Chairman, and Lyu became the frontline operations leader. This marked a new phase for KuCoin, transitioning from founder-led management to professional management teams taking the forefront. (5) In the 2020 hacking incident, Johnny Lyu continuously spoke out, promising that the platform would fully cover user losses and pushed to restore deposits and withdrawals for most cryptocurrencies within two months. This crisis management process gradually made him the main representative of KuCoin in the eyes of users and media. Subsequent interviews viewed this crisis response as a significant achievement in his personal record. (6) Between 2021 and 2022, Johnny Lyu frequently published articles or gave interviews discussing long-tail assets, dual-track strategies for globalization and compliance, and the brand positioning of "People’s Exchange." He also led significant financing and global expansion, gradually evolving from operations leader to the core figure in the exchange's external strategic narrative. (7) Currently, most materials still list him as KuCoin CEO and co-founder, responsible for the platform's daily operations, product matrix, and global compliance advancement. After Gan and Tang exited U.S. governance and operations, Johnny Lyu remains the most practically controlling and representative manager of KuCoin in most markets. 7. KuCoin's Corporate Structure and Capital Network (1) Registration and Entity Structure KuCoin was launched in 2017 based on a Chinese team. After regulatory crackdowns on cryptocurrency exchanges in China, KuCoin moved its operations out of China, establishing related entities in Singapore and Seychelles. The mainstream view is that KuCoin is an exchange "registered in Seychelles and operating globally." (2) Core entities include: PhoenixFin Pte. Ltd. in Singapore, which once held the KuCoin domain and trademark. Operating entities in Seychelles such as Mek Global and Peken Global. The brand, domain, and trademark have been transferred among multiple offshore entities, and the board has undergone several changes. This makes it difficult for outsiders to clearly identify KuCoin's ultimate equity structure and control chain. (3) Reports indicate that the Singapore High Court issued a temporary injunction against the KuCoin.com domain and related assets. Around the same time, KuCoin announced a restructuring and entity adjustment, shifting from PhoenixFin to Seychelles entities for brand and operations. Some observers view this as a typical operation to utilize corporate structural adjustments to address litigation and regulatory risks across multiple jurisdictions. (4) On the capital front, KuCoin secured $20 million in Series A financing in 2018, with participation from institutions like IDG Capital, Matrix Partners, and Neo Global Capital. In 2022, KuCoin completed a $150 million Pre-Series B financing led by Jump Crypto, with Circle Ventures, IDG, and Matrix participating, achieving a valuation of approximately $10 billion. Subsequently, KuCoin also received about $10 million in strategic investment from SIG. The total disclosed financing amount is approximately $180 million. (5) Investment institutions like Jump Crypto, Circle, and SIG not only provide funding to KuCoin but also support it in institutional resources, derivatives liquidity, and Web3 investment networks. These collaborations allowed KuCoin to rapidly enter the top ten platforms by global trading volume during the 2021-2022 bull market. (6) Internally, Gan and the team divided KuGroup into three main segments: KuCoin Global: centralized exchange operations, including spot, leverage, and contract trading. KuCloud: providing white-label exchanges and infrastructure services to other institutions or projects. KuChain & KCS Business Group: responsible for self-developed public chains and platform token ecosystems. This structure separates infrastructure, proprietary trading operations, public chains, and token ecosystems, corresponding to different business models and regulatory risks. (7) KuCoin Labs and KuCoin Ventures undertake research incubation and investment functions, making early investments in DeFi, GameFi, and blockchain infrastructure projects. KuCoin Ventures positions itself as the exchange-led Web3 investment department and participates in project investments alongside crypto investment institutions like HashKey and TRGC. This forms a multi-faceted binding relationship of "exchange traffic + capital + listing resources." 8. Platform Token, Foundation, and Influence Assets (1) KCS is KuCoin's native platform token, with an initial total supply of 200 million. KuCoin plans to reduce the total supply to 100 million in the long term through a buyback and burn mechanism driven by platform revenue. Currently, KCS is officially positioned as a value participation layer connecting trading, rewards, payments, and ecosystem rights. (2) The early core selling point of KCS was fee revenue distribution. The platform once distributed about 50% of daily trading fee revenue to KCS holders, allowing users to earn corresponding rewards just by holding KCS. This model strengthened the interest binding between users and the platform and helped KuCoin attract a large number of retail users seeking passive income during the 2017-2018 exchange competition. (3) With increasing regulatory pressure, the revenue-sharing platform token has ambiguous boundaries regarding securities classification. Therefore, KCS later emphasized fee discounts, Launchpad and IEO quotas, staking, and ecosystem governance rights. Revenue distribution appeared more in the form of bonuses or rewards. Meanwhile, the KCS Foundation was established as a governance entity, involving KuCoin's core team, KCC GoDAO, institutional investors, and community representatives in decision-making. Its goal is to package KCS as a relatively decentralized ecological asset rather than a shadow equity of a single company. (4) From the perspective of influence assets, KCS, KuChain, public chain ecology, KuCoin Labs, and KuCoin Ventures' investment portfolio collectively constitute KuCoin's brand and resource network in the Web3 field. Most of these assets are not directly liquidatable equity assets in the traditional sense but represent a composite influence resource formed by discourse power, user traffic, project resources, and ecological entry points. 9. Business Model: From Matching Fees to Ecological Closed Loop (1) KuCoin's basic business model is similar to other centralized exchanges, generating revenue through transaction matching fees. Early income primarily came from spot and leverage trading. Later, the revenue focus gradually shifted towards perpetual contracts, futures, leverage, and high-yield products, such as KuCoin Earn and staking mining services, to enhance individual user income and retention rates. (2) Through the platform token KCS, KuCoin offers fee discounts, rebates, and additional rewards. Users holding a certain amount of KCS can enjoy lower rates in spot and contract trading and participate in new coin issuance or staking activities like Launchpad and BurningDrop. This allows KuCoin to combine fee discounts with platform token price expectations, forming a comprehensive incentive mechanism. (3) KuCoin Earn, Pool-X, and other businesses retain user assets on the platform through lending, staking, and liquidity mining, generating income from interest spreads, management fees, or protocol rewards. These products package complex DeFi yield sources into simpler operational interfaces, essentially repackaging DeFi risks into financial products that are easier for centralized exchange users to understand. (4) KuCloud provides white-label exchanges, liquidity, and risk control solutions, representing a SaaS and infrastructure charging model aimed at institutions. This allows KuCoin to not only be a proprietary trading platform but also become an industry infrastructure service provider. Related businesses can help KuCoin connect with more project parties and partner institutions, providing listing resources and liquidity back to KuCoin Global. (5) KuCoin Labs and KuCoin Ventures obtain early shares in projects through equity or token investments. When related projects launch on KuCoin or gradually grow, the platform can earn trading fees, enhance the ecological value of the platform token, and achieve project investment exit gains. This forms a business closed loop of "investment—launch—trading fees—market value appreciation." (6) This model inevitably faces criticisms of conflicts of interest. Exchanges may simultaneously act as project investors, underwriters, market makers, and listing reviewers, possessing information and traffic advantages. During bull markets, this structure can create significant leverage. However, in bear markets or during regulatory interventions, it can also become a focal point for regulatory scrutiny. KuCoin has been examined in this context in various enforcement cases across multiple countries. 10. Key Timeline and Turning Points (1) 2011-2013 Gan and Tang began researching blockchain technology and completed the prototype of KuCoin's technical architecture in 2013. This period was characterized by pure technical drive, without large-scale capital support, representing a phase of primitive accumulation. (2) 2017 KuCoin officially launched based on a Chinese team. Subsequently, due to regulatory pressure in China, it relocated and began offering spot trading to the global market, issuing the platform token KCS. Gan proposed the brand positioning of "People’s Exchange" as CEO, emphasizing service to long-tail assets and ordinary retail investors. (3) 2018 KuCoin completed a $20 million Series A financing round, gaining endorsement from institutions like IDG, Matrix, and NGC. The platform transitioned from a small exchange to a regional mainstream platform with well-known institutional shareholders. The founding team also shifted from purely technical entrepreneurs to a company management layer constrained by venture capital institutions, needing to balance growth, compliance, and investment exit expectations. (4) March 2020 KuGroup was officially established. Michael Gan was promoted to Group Chairman, and Johnny Lyu became KuCoin Global CEO. This marked a structural turning point for KuCoin, transitioning from founder-led management to group and professional management operations. In the same year, the Singapore court issued a temporary injunction against PhoenixFin and KuCoin, restricting the domain and some assets, exposing the complexity and opacity of its corporate structure. (5) September 2020 KuCoin experienced a hacking incident resulting in approximately $280 million in losses. This incident became a significant node in the careers of Gan and Johnny. The platform's technical security shortcomings were exposed, but by recovering most of the assets and fully compensating users, KuCoin's crisis management was viewed by some industry insiders as a reference case for large centralized exchanges dealing with security incidents. This incident amplified both positive and negative aspects of their reputations. (6) 2021-2022 During the crypto bull market, KuCoin reported a trading volume of approximately $20 trillion over six months, adding millions of users. In 2022, KuCoin completed a $150 million Pre-Series B financing round at a valuation of about $10 billion. The founding team transitioned from regional exchange operators to controllers of a global leading platform. However, the high valuation and global expansion also placed KuCoin under the close scrutiny of regulatory agencies in multiple countries. (7) March 2023 The New York Attorney General sued KuCoin, accusing it of providing cryptocurrency trading and yield products to local users without registering in New York. This lawsuit also explicitly classified ETH as a security for the first time in related filings. In December 2023, KuCoin agreed to pay approximately $22 million, of which about $16.77 million was for refunding New York users' funds, and about $5.3 million was a fine, while exiting the New York market. This event caused KuCoin to lose an important market at the state regulatory level in the U.S. and further pushed its business focus towards offshore and non-U.S. regions. (8) March 2024 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed criminal and civil charges against KuCoin and its two founders, Gan and Tang. Regulatory agencies accused KuCoin of deliberately failing to register and establish a compliance system in accordance with the Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering requirements since 2017. Related documents stated that over $5 billion in funds flowed into KuCoin, involving risks from dark web markets, malware, and fraud. This represents the most severe legal blow to the founders personally and marks a structural turning point in their professional roles. (9) January 2025 KuCoin pleaded guilty to charges of operating an unlicensed money transfer business in the U.S., agreeing to pay nearly $300 million in fines and forfeitures, and committing to exit the U.S. market for at least two years. Gan and Tang signed two-year deferred prosecution agreements, paying about $2.7 million and withdrawing from KuCoin's governance and operations. This means the two core founders officially retreated from the forefront of legal and corporate governance. (10) Early 2025 Michael Gan released an open letter stating that the U.S. Department of Justice agreed to withdraw charges against him and the co-founders upon completion of specific conditions. He also stated that he had resigned from all positions in the group and affiliated companies. From legal documents and media reports, this appears to be a typical arrangement of guilty pleas, deferred prosecution, and compliance rectification. In personal narratives, it is described as charges that will ultimately be withdrawn, but in reality, it is a costly legal settlement. (11) 2026 KuCoin continues to operate primarily from Seychelles, claiming to have over 40 million cumulative users and supporting trading of over 1,500 tokens. The platform continues to promote KCS from a single platform token to an ecological participation layer and has obtained security and privacy certifications such as SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001, and ISO 27701. KuCoin attempts to reshape its brand image with compliance and security, rather than solely emphasizing fast listing speeds, a wide range of long-tail assets, and leveraged trading. 11. Regulatory Disputes, Lawsuits, and External Criticism (1) Canadian Regulatory Incident The Ontario Securities Commission in Canada accused KuCoin in 2021 of providing cryptocurrency trading services to local investors without registration. In 2022, the regulatory agency obtained related injunctions and administrative penalties, permanently banning KuCoin from participating in Ontario's capital markets. (2) Dutch Regulatory Incident The Dutch Central Bank announced in 2022 that KuCoin had not registered according to local anti-money laundering regulations and classified it as an illegally operating cryptocurrency service provider. (3) UK Regulatory Warning In 2023, the UK's Financial Conduct Authority included KuCoin on its warning list of unauthorized digital asset service providers, emphasizing that the platform lacked necessary licenses in the UK. The accumulation of regulatory actions across multiple jurisdictions has placed KuCoin on a high-risk subject list in mainstream compliance markets in Europe and the U.S., limiting its formal development space. (4) KuCoin Earn Controversy The lawsuit by the New York Attorney General specifically classified KuCoin Earn and other yield products as unregistered securities, pointing out that KuCoin provided insufficient disclosure regarding users' jurisdictions and product nature. Regulatory agencies categorized it alongside other shadow crypto financial platforms. This poses a substantial challenge to KuCoin's business model, which relies on yield products and platform tokens. (5) U.S. Federal Anti-Money Laundering Case U.S. federal prosecutions and CFTC civil lawsuits further characterize KuCoin as a platform that has long neglected KYC and AML obligations. Regulatory documents indicate that KuCoin only officially launched what is called a compliant anti-money laundering program in July 2023, while previously allowing some U.S. users to bypass restrictions for login and trading. Thus, the platform has been criticized for long-term superficial compliance. (6) Lack of Transparency in Corporate Structure The temporary injunction from the Singapore High Court, along with reports of trademark and asset transfers among multiple entities like PhoenixFin, Mek Global, and FortuneIcon, has raised questions about whether KuCoin intentionally complicated its corporate structure to evade enforcement in different jurisdictions. Some media have also questioned the discrepancies between KuCoin's claims of obtaining investment from Matrix Partners and the actual disclosures from the investment institution. These situations further deepen the impression of its lack of transparency. (7) Core Criticisms Overall, external criticisms of KuCoin focus on the following aspects: Late awareness of compliance. Highly offshore and opaque corporate structure. Insufficient early security governance and wallet management capabilities. Overly binding company interests and high-risk speculative behaviors through yield products and platform token design. Regulatory agencies generally view it as a typical offshore high-risk centralized exchange, similar to platforms like BitMEX and early Binance in regulatory narratives. 12. Positive Outcomes and Successes (1) Scale Growth From a scale and business perspective, KuCoin has grown from a relatively unknown exchange to one of the top platforms by global trading volume within a few years. KuCoin supports thousands of tokens and serves tens of millions of users, with multiple official and media sources listing it as one of the major spot trading platforms globally. From an entrepreneurial path perspective, this is a success story of low starting points, relying on long-tail asset positioning, and capitalizing on the bull markets of 2017 and 2020-2021. (2) Product Innovation The KCS revenue distribution model, support for long-tail assets, and products like Pool-X and KuCloud have kept KuCoin at the forefront of platform token financial design and ecological layout among second-tier exchanges. These products have also influenced the platform token designs, yield products, and white-label service models of many subsequent centralized exchanges. (3) Handling of Hacking Incidents After the 2020 hacking incident, KuCoin quickly recovered most of the assets and used insurance funds and platform resources to cover the remaining losses. As a result, KuCoin became one of the few centralized exchanges that could fully compensate users after experiencing a large-scale security incident. Although this incident exposed serious security issues, it also heightened industry awareness of insurance funds, on-chain tracking, and cross-project collaboration mechanisms for asset recovery. (4) Web3 Investment Influence KuCoin Labs and KuCoin Ventures participate in early Web3 project incubation and liquidity building by investing in DeFi, GameFi, and infrastructure projects. Combined with KuCoin's own listing capabilities and user traffic, the platform has played an important role in the development of multiple projects. These influence assets, while difficult to quantify precisely in traditional financial statements, hold significant actual discourse power in the crypto ecosystem. 13. Current Position of Founders and the Platform (1) Michael Gan and Ke Tang Michael Gan and Ke Tang have withdrawn from KuCoin's governance and operational positions following the settlement of U.S. criminal and civil cases. Gan emphasized in an open letter that he has no intention of evading the law and did not participate in money laundering or fraud. He stated that he will enter a new phase of personal development. In practical terms, this settlement temporarily sealed personal and corporate criminal risks, allowing space for the platform to continue operating. (2) External Image of the Founders Gan and Tang have transitioned from technical founders to crypto entrepreneurs leaving the stage after completing a startup cycle, accompanied by compliance controversies. Compared to high-profile figures like Zhao Changpeng, their personal brands have lower visibility in global social media and regulatory narratives. The public remembers them more through KuCoin's legal and compliance risks. (3) Johnny Lyu Johnny Lyu remains active as KuCoin CEO. He continues to express views on the crypto market, global compliance trends, and emerging markets like India and Southeast Asia in interviews and columns. At the same time, he is responsible for promoting KuCoin's development in security certifications, compliance registration, and product expansion, including registration as a virtual asset service provider in India and tokenized stock products. His personal image aligns more with an operational manager and a professional manager of exchanges in the compliance era. (4) KuCoin Platform KuCoin faces multiple restrictions in mainstream compliance markets in Europe and the U.S., but maintains a certain market share in regions like Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The platform packages itself as a global digital asset ecological platform rather than a single centralized exchange by expanding Web3 investments, payment, and tokenized asset businesses. This is both a response to regulatory pressure and reflects the founding team's and current management's strategy to extend the company's lifecycle and valuation narrative. (5) Position in the Real World On a personal level, Michael Gan and Ke Tang have largely exited frontline management power and the public opinion arena. They leave with significant compliance controversies but have completed a notably growth-oriented entrepreneurial cycle. From a management perspective, Johnny Lyu and his team, as professional managers and second-tier founders, have taken over the front line amid regulatory pressures and lawsuits across multiple jurisdictions, tasked with continuing operations and rebuilding the brand. From an organizational perspective, KuCoin remains an important infrastructure in the global long-tail crypto asset and high-risk derivatives market. Regulatory agencies view it as a typical offshore high-risk centralized exchange, but the platform has also left a strong industry presence in security governance, platform token financial design, and handling of major hacking incidents. These overlapping identities, successes, and controversies collectively form the real position of KuCoin and its founders in today's world.