我对 Uniswap Labs 提案的担忧如下： 虽然我欣赏 Hayden 和 Uniswap Labs 希望重新将注意力聚焦到 Uniswap 协议本身的努力，而这对他们来说可能确实是正确的方向，但我认为，如果将这套模式更广泛地应用到整个 DeFi 或其他 DAO，其结果并不是最优的。 当一个 DAO 确实需要去中心化决策 时，尤其是对于那些拥有需根据市场变化而动态调整的“活跃参数”的协议（例如 Aave 这类借贷协议），去中心化治理 就成为协议弹性（resiliency）的核心。 弹性正是许多用户和集成方信任 Aave 的主要原因，也是 Aave 成为最受信任的 DeFi 协议之一的原因。Aave DAO 有一套经过预审的、多方参与的流程，确保不会列出垃圾资产，并确保协议不会承担超过其应承担的风险。这一治理方式在多个市场周期中都被证明是有效的——从 FTX 崩盘、Terra Luna 事件，到多轮熊市、最近的“黑色星期五”行情，以及上周 DeFi 市场的事件。 当利益相关者拥有足够的利益绑定（skin in the game）和各自独立的专业能力时，去中心化决策可以运作得非常良好。他们能够验证提案、相互制衡。 其次，真正的弹性还意味着：即便某个利益相关方退出，协议仍应能够存活、继续增长，并为新的利益相关人提供进入的机会。 如果对弹性的需求是真实且强烈的，那么去中心化决策只有在拥有足够多的 独立 利益相关方时才能运作良好。若缺乏独立的利益相关者，就不存在真正的去中心化，也没有弹性；相反，决策会集中化，形成单点故障。 要建立独立性，每个利益相关者都应当作为独立的业务实体运营，拥有自己的愿景、使命与资产负债表。通过让他们都“有赌注”在协议上，可以保持利益一致。 确保“独立性 + 一致性（skin in the game）”的最佳方式，是构建一个要么使用该协议并帮助其扩大市场份额、要么向协议提供服务的业务。这是因为，这种模式在 DAO 内部创造了最资本主义、最具激励一致性的环境。我更看好第一条路径，而非第二条。主要原因是：依赖单一 DAO 的服务型业务难以规模化；服务商通常需要支持多个类似协议，这反而可能引入利益冲突。 我认为，如果一个 DAO 依赖单一的核心实体，其结果将明显低效。这个实体会在协议上获得过多影响力，这会削弱服务提供商之间的竞争，并导致 DAO 的成本上升。如果服务提供商和 Labs 团队不专注于在协议之上构建自己的业务，DAO 就会开始依赖于利益一致性更弱的第三方。这最终可能导致底层协议被商品化（commoditized）。当协议被应用层完全抽象掉之后，如果第三方可以同时支持多个类似产品并自由选择最低成本方案，那么它就没有理由维持与协议的强一致性。相反，若有多个利益相关者在协议之上构建成功业务、真实承担风险，这将形成更强的利益一致性。 有人可能会说，Labs 实体可以简单地为 DAO 构建这些服务。但问题在于，这样的实体无法与在真正市场竞争中运营的公司竞争。这样的模式往往会带来平庸的产品，被那些没有治理负担的中心化团队击败。它会使 Labs 成为依赖资助（grant）和治理流程的组织，降低其在协议生态中作为“获客层（acquisition layer）”的竞争力。相对而言，让利益一致的服务商基于协议构建业务，会带来更大的市场份额、更具竞争力的产品、更高的协议收入、以及更多代币持有者价值。协议的使命应是赋能业务和产品，并追求最高可能的市场份额，而实现这一点的最佳方式，是完全竞争且资本主义的路径。 另一个重要的问题是：为什么 DAO 要主动把自己锁死在依赖单一核心实体的局面，而不是选择与多个团队进行多元化、利益一致的合作？并且，为什么 DAO 要资助产品层（acquisition layer），并承担风险投资式的风险？这个角色应当由服务商或在协议之上构建业务的实体承担，且应由他们使用自己的资产负债表来承担风险。DAO 与协议应主要聚焦在协议开发和费用管理，以确保为代币持有者带来最优结果。 My concerns around the Uniswap Labs proposal: While I appreciate Hayden’s and Uniswap Labs’ commitment to refocusing attention on the Uniswap protocol, and while that may be the right direction for them, I find that the proposal does not lead to the best outcome when applied more broadly across DeFi and other DAOs. When a DAO has a genuine need for decentralized decision making, and this is typically the case for protocols with active parameters that must adjust to changing market conditions, such as lending protocols like Aave, decentralized governance becomes essential for protocol resiliency. Resiliency is the key reason why many users and integrators trust Aave, and why Aave has become one of the most trusted DeFi protocols. The DAO has a pre-vetted, multi-stakeholder process that ensures no junk assets are listed and that the protocol does not take on more risk than it should. This approach has been proven across multiple market cycles, from the FTX crash and Terra Luna to several bear markets, the recent Black Friday, and last week’s events in DeFi. Decentralized decision making can work very well when stakeholders have sufficient skin in the game and distinct expertise, allowing them to validate proposals and keep one another in check. Second, true resiliency also means that if any stakeholder is removed from the equation, the protocol should still survive, continue growing, and create opportunities for new stakeholders to enter. If there is a real need for resiliency, decentralized decision making works only when there are enough independent stakeholders. Without independent stakeholders, there is no real decentralization and no resiliency. Instead, decision making becomes concentrated, creating single points of failure. To establish independence, each stakeholder should operate as its own business, with its own vision, mission, and balance sheet. Alignment can still be maintained by ensuring that all independent stakeholders have skin in the game. The best way to ensure both independence and alignment or skin in the game is to build a business that either uses the protocol and helps scale its market share, or provides services to the protocol. This works because it creates the most capitalistic and incentive aligned scenario within a DAO. I am more bullish on the first path than the second, mainly because it is difficult to scale a business that relies on a single DAO. A service provider would typically need to support multiple similar protocols, which can introduce conflicts of interest. I believe that if a DAO relies on one core entity, the outcome is far less efficient. The entity gains too much influence over the protocol, which reduces competition among service providers and results in higher costs for the DAO. If service providers and labs teams do not focus on building businesses on top of the protocol, the DAO becomes reliant on third parties with weaker alignment. This can lead to the underlying protocol becoming commoditized. If the protocol is fully abstracted away by the application layer, a third party has little reason to care about alignment when it can simply support multiple similar products and choose the lowest cost option. In contrast, having multiple stakeholders building successful businesses on top of a protocol, with real skin in the game, creates far stronger alignment. Some may argue that a labs entity could simply build these services for the DAO. However, in that case, it becomes difficult for such an entity to compete with businesses operating in truly competitive capitalistic markets. This approach would likely result in mediocre products that are outcompeted by centralized teams with fewer governance constraints. It risks turning the labs entity into a grant driven organization with governance overhead, making it a less competitive acquisition layer for the protocol. In contrast, a model where aligned service providers build businesses powered by the protocol leads to higher market share, more competitive products, higher fees for the protocol, and more value for tokenholders. Protocols are meant to power businesses and products and to pursue the highest possible market share, and the best way to achieve that is through a fully competitive and capitalistic approach. Another important point is why the DAO would corner itself into relying on a single core entity when it could instead place diversified and aligned bets with multiple teams. Also, why should the DAO sponsor the acquisition layer and take on venture risk to do so? This role should belong to service providers or entities building businesses on top of the protocol, using their and using their own balance sheet. The DAO and protocol should remain focused primarily on protocol development and fee management to ensure the highest outcome for tokenholders.