我至今仍会想起德鲁肯米勒（Druckenmiller）在互联网泡沫时期讲过的这个令人震撼的故事。 “我犯过很多错误，但有一个错误是真正的‘大坑’。 这么说吧，这是个挺有意思的故事——至少在 15 年后回看时是这样，因为当年的痛已经稍微淡了一些。 1999 年，在雅虎和美国在线（AOL）都已经涨了差不多 10 倍之后，我在索罗斯基金里突然灵机一动，决定做空互联网股票。大概在 2 月份，我投了 2 亿美元去做空，结果到了 3 月中旬，这 2 亿美元的空头头寸已经亏了 6 亿美元，被市场打得体无完肤，全年一度亏损接近 15%。 而我一直非常自豪的一点是：我从来没有出现过年度亏损。那一刻我觉得，完了，我职业生涯可能就此结束了。 接下来发生的事情是——我已经记不清是我去了硅谷，还是和某个 22 岁、患有阿斯伯格综合征的年轻人聊过——不管是谁，他彻底说服了我：一场全新的科技繁荣即将到来。 于是我去请了几位“神枪手”（交易高手），因为我们当时只懂 IBM 和惠普。 我需要 Veritas、VeriSign 这些公司，我想要完整的一组科技股。 结果我们请了这位高手，当年年初还亏 15%，最后全年竟然做到盈利 35%，而纳斯达克指数同期上涨了 400%。 这件事我永远忘不了。 2000 年 1 月，我走进索罗斯的办公室，对他说： “我要把所有科技股全卖掉，全部清仓。这太疯狂了……市盈率 104 倍，简直荒谬。” 我说，就像我之前解释的那样，我们要先退场，等待下一个‘好球’。 我没有解雇那两个“神枪手”。他们管理的资金规模还不足以真正伤害基金，但他们开始每天赚 3%，而我却已经清仓离场，这让我快疯了。 他们那个小账户年内已经涨了 50%，而 Quantum 基金才涨了大概 7%，就那么放在那里。 大概到 3 月左右，我能感觉到那种冲动正在逼近。 我就是忍不住，我必须参与。 同一周里我三次拿起电话，又放下，告诉自己：别做、别做。 但最后，我还是拿起了电话。 我想我只差一个小时就错过了顶部。 我买入了 60 亿美元的科技股。六周之后，我离开了索罗斯基金，而仅仅这一笔交易，我就亏掉了 30 亿美元。 你问我学到了什么？ 我什么也没学到。 因为我本来就知道自己不该这么做。 我当时只是情绪彻底崩溃，完全控制不了自己。 所以，也许我学到的只是：下次别再这么干。 但说实话，这一点我原本就已经知道了。” Still think about this incredible story from Druckenmiller during the Tech Bubble “I made a lot of mistakes, but I made one real doozy. So, this is kind of a funny story, at least it is 15 years later because the pain has subsided a little But in 1999 after Yahoo and America Online had already gone up like tenfold, I got the bright idea at Soros to short internet stocks. And I put 200 million in them in about February and by mid-March the 200 million short I had, lost $600 million on, gotten completely beat up and was down like 15 percent on the year And I was very proud of the fact that I never had a down year, and I thought well, I’m finished. So, the next thing that happens is I can’t remember whether I went to Silicon Valley or I talked to some 22-year-old with Asperger’s But whoever it was, they convinced me about this new tech boom that was going to take place. So I went and hired a couple of gunslingers because we only knew about IBM and Hewlett-Packard. I needed Veritas and Verisign. I wanted the six. So, we hired this guy and we end up on the year — we had been down 15 and we ended up like 35 percent on the year. And the Nasdaq’s gone up 400 percent. So, I’ll never forget it. January of 2000 I go into Soros’s office and I say I’m selling all the tech stocks, selling everything. This is crazy…at 104 times earnings. This is nuts. Just kind of as I explained earlier, we’re going to step aside, wait for the next fat pitch. I didn’t fire the two gunslingers. They didn’t have enough money to really hurt the fund, but they started making 3 percent a day and I’m out. It is driving me nuts. I mean their little account is like up 50 percent on the year. I think Quantum was up seven. It’s just sitting there So like around March I could feel it coming. I just — I had to play. I couldn’t help myself. And three times the same week I pick up a — don’t do it. Don’t do it. Anyway, I pick up the phone finally. I think I missed the top by an hour I bought $6 billion worth of tech stocks, and in six weeks I had left Soros and I had lost $3 billion in that one play. You asked me what I learned. I didn’t learn anything. I already knew that I wasn’t supposed to do that. I was just an emotional basket case and couldn’t help myself. So, maybe I learned not to do it again, but I already knew that.
Boring_Businessnobody asks about your external rate of return
目录
观点原文
我至今仍会想起德鲁肯米勒（Druckenmiller）在互联网泡沫时期讲过的这个令人震撼的故事。
“我犯过很多错误，但有一个错误是真正的‘大坑’。
这么说吧，这是个挺有意思的故事——至少在 15 年后回看时是这样，因为当年的痛已经稍微淡了一些。
1999 年，在雅虎和美国在线（AOL）都已经涨了差不多 10 倍之后，我在索罗斯基金里突然灵机一动，决定做空互联网股票。大概在 2 月份，我投了 2 亿美元去做空，结果到了 3 月中旬，这 2 亿美元的空头头寸已经亏了 6 亿美元，被市场打得体无完肤，全年一度亏损接近 15%。
而我一直非常自豪的一点是：我从来没有出现过年度亏损。那一刻我觉得，完了，我职业生涯可能就此结束了。
接下来发生的事情是——我已经记不清是我去了硅谷，还是和某个 22 岁、患有阿斯伯格综合征的年轻人聊过——不管是谁，他彻底说服了我：一场全新的科技繁荣即将到来。
于是我去请了几位“神枪手”（交易高手），因为我们当时只懂 IBM 和惠普。
我需要 Veritas、VeriSign 这些公司，我想要完整的一组科技股。
结果我们请了这位高手，当年年初还亏 15%，最后全年竟然做到盈利 35%，而纳斯达克指数同期上涨了 400%。
这件事我永远忘不了。
2000 年 1 月，我走进索罗斯的办公室，对他说：
“我要把所有科技股全卖掉，全部清仓。这太疯狂了……市盈率 104 倍，简直荒谬。”
我说，就像我之前解释的那样，我们要先退场，等待下一个‘好球’。
我没有解雇那两个“神枪手”。他们管理的资金规模还不足以真正伤害基金，但他们开始每天赚 3%，而我却已经清仓离场，这让我快疯了。
他们那个小账户年内已经涨了 50%，而 Quantum 基金才涨了大概 7%，就那么放在那里。
大概到 3 月左右，我能感觉到那种冲动正在逼近。
我就是忍不住，我必须参与。
同一周里我三次拿起电话，又放下，告诉自己：别做、别做。
但最后，我还是拿起了电话。
我想我只差一个小时就错过了顶部。
我买入了 60 亿美元的科技股。六周之后，我离开了索罗斯基金，而仅仅这一笔交易，我就亏掉了 30 亿美元。
你问我学到了什么？
我什么也没学到。
因为我本来就知道自己不该这么做。
我当时只是情绪彻底崩溃，完全控制不了自己。
所以，也许我学到的只是：下次别再这么干。
但说实话，这一点我原本就已经知道了。”
Still think about this incredible story from Druckenmiller during the Tech Bubble
“I made a lot of mistakes, but I made one real doozy. So, this is kind of a funny story, at least it is 15 years later because the pain has subsided a little
But in 1999 after Yahoo and America Online had already gone up like tenfold, I got the bright idea at Soros to short internet stocks. And I put 200 million in them in about February and by mid-March the 200 million short I had, lost $600 million on, gotten completely beat up and was down like 15 percent on the year
And I was very proud of the fact that I never had a down year, and I thought well, I’m finished.
So, the next thing that happens is I can’t remember whether I went to Silicon Valley or I talked to some 22-year-old with Asperger’s
But whoever it was, they convinced me about this new tech boom that was going to take place. So I went and hired a couple of gunslingers because we only knew about IBM and Hewlett-Packard. I needed Veritas and Verisign. I wanted the six. So, we hired this guy and we end up on the year — we had been down 15 and we ended up like 35 percent on the year. And the Nasdaq’s gone up 400 percent.
So, I’ll never forget it. January of 2000 I go into Soros’s office and I say I’m selling all the tech stocks, selling everything. This is crazy…at 104 times earnings. This is nuts. Just kind of as I explained earlier, we’re going to step aside, wait for the next fat pitch. I didn’t fire the two gunslingers. They didn’t have enough money to really hurt the fund, but they started making 3 percent a day and I’m out. It is driving me nuts. I mean their little account is like up 50 percent on the year. I think Quantum was up seven. It’s just sitting there
So like around March I could feel it coming. I just — I had to play. I couldn’t help myself. And three times the same week I pick up a — don’t do it. Don’t do it. Anyway, I pick up the phone finally. I think I missed the top by an hour
I bought $6 billion worth of tech stocks, and in six weeks I had left Soros and I had lost $3 billion in that one play. You asked me what I learned. I didn’t learn anything. I already knew that I wasn’t supposed to do that. I was just an emotional basket case and couldn’t help myself. So, maybe I learned not to do it again, but I already knew that.
ABAB AI 解读
一、先给一句结论（最高密度）
德鲁肯米勒不是输给了市场，而是输给了“明知不该做，却还是做了”的那一刻。
这比判断错趋势更致命。
二、这不是“判断失误”，而是三次不同层级的人性崩塌
第一层崩塌：理性正确，但时间错误
他做空互联网股票时：
- 逻辑是对的
- 估值是荒谬的
- 泡沫最终必破
但问题在于一句老话：市场在你破产之前，可以一直保持非理性。
在 1999 年：
- 做空 ≠ 理性
- 做空 = 反周期的自我牺牲
👉 真相不等于可交易性。
第二层崩塌：从“原则型交易者”变成“比较型交易者”
真正的转折点不是亏钱，而是这几件事：
- 他一生从未亏过一个完整年度
- 年轻交易员每天赚 3%
- 小账户涨 50%，主基金涨 7%
这触发的不是投资判断，而是：自尊、身份、历史记录
👉 从那一刻起，他不再是在和市场交易，而是在和“别人”交易。
第三层崩塌：FOMO + 规模 = 灾难
最恐怖的一句话是：“我买了 60 亿美元的科技股。”
这不是建仓，这是：
- 情绪宣泄
- 规模化冲动
- 对错失机会的报复性参与
而且：
- 他几乎买在顶部前一小时
- 6 周亏掉 30 亿美元
👉 当你用最大仓位，去追最不确定的东西，结局已经写好了。
三、最震撼的一句话，其实是这一句
“你问我学到了什么？我什么也没学到。”
这不是谦虚，这是顶级认知的残酷真相：
- 知识 ≠ 行为
- 经验 ≠ 免疫
- 智慧 ≠ 情绪防火墙
👉 人在极端情绪下，是会“绕过自己全部理性系统”的。
四、为什么这段故事对“高手”反而更危险？
因为普通人会说：“他太贪了。”
而高手会意识到：“我也可能会这样。”
危险来自三点：
- 你知道太多
- 你曾经成功太多
- 你有能力下重注
这三点叠加，极其致命。
五、这段故事真正讲的不是科技泡沫，而是：科技股值不值、泡沫会不会破
✅ 而是：
- 人在“知道结局”的情况下，依然会自毁
- 最难战胜的不是市场，是你自己的状态
六、顶级交易系统真正防的是什么？
不是：判断错误、模型失效
而是：情绪状态切换、身份焦虑、比较心理、破坏自己规则的那一刻
这也是为什么真正的顶级基金：限制个人权限、有强制风控、有“你不能下这笔单”的机制
👉 系统，是为了防住人。
七、一句送你的“硬核总结”
所有灾难性亏损，几乎都发生在：你已经知道该停，但你却选择继续的那一刻。
这正是 Stanley Druckenmiller 的故事被奉为经典的原因——它不是教你如何赚钱，而是告诉你：人类在金钱面前，能有多么不可靠。
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- 这个视频是沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）在2003年于内布拉斯加大学（University of Nebraska）的演讲录像，主题围绕投资、领导力和人生经验。演讲时长约78分钟，主要面向商学院学生，巴菲特分享了他的职业生涯、教育背景、管理哲学以及对成功的见解。视频以巴菲特站在讲台上演讲为主，没有额外的视觉元素或字幕，主要依赖他的口头表达和手势。 演讲结构大致分为三个部分： 个人背景与教育经历：巴菲特回忆了自己与内布拉斯加大学的渊源，包括他的父母和祖父都曾在这里就读。他强调大学教育对他职业生涯的影响，特别是会计课程（由教授Ray Dein授课），称会计是商业的“语言”，比他在沃顿商学院或其他地方学到的更实用。他举例说明，通过阅读财务报表（如10-K和10-Q报告），他能判断公司质量，甚至在电话上就敲定了17亿美元的收购交易（Clayton Homes公司）。 伯克希尔·哈撒韦的管理与领导力：巴菲特解释了伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）的独特管理模式。公司有超过15万员工，但总部只有15.8人（演讲中提到那天只有13.8人）。他强调领导力的核心是“通过他人实现目标”：设定长远愿景，然后放手让经理人执行。他管理的经理人大多是出售公司给他后继续留任的富豪（许多身家超过5000万美元），他们工作不是为了钱，而是因为热爱——能“画自己的画”（即自主决策）。例如，FlightSafety公司的85岁创始人继续管理公司，购买价值数亿美元的模拟器而不需巴菲特批准。巴菲特每两年只发一封信给经理人，强调“不能损失一分声誉”，因为声誉是公司最宝贵的资产（伯克希尔当时被《财富》杂志评为全球最受尊敬公司第四名）。 Q&A与人生建议：后半部分涉及学生提问，巴菲特讨论了投资决策、公司文化和个人成功要素。他提到成功的三要素：智力（intelligence）、精力（energy）和诚信（integrity）。他强调诚信是最重要的，因为缺少它，聪明和勤奋反而会带来麻烦。 主要观点与见解 巴菲特的演讲充满实用智慧和谦逊，强调长期主义、简单原则和人性化管理。以下是关键观点总结： 会计与财务素养的重要性：会计不是枯燥的数字，而是理解商业的核心工具。巴菲特建议学生像掌握母语一样熟练掌握会计，这能帮助他们在商业中“看清真相”，避免被CEO误导。 领导力的本质：不是 micromanage（微观管理），而是赋予人才自主权。巴菲特比喻自己像棒球教练，只给“400击球手”提供球棒，让他们自由挥杆。公司成功靠经理人的热情和创造力，而不是总部指令。他避免会议、预算和顾问，相信信任能释放最大潜力。 声誉高于一切：金钱可以赚回，但声誉一旦受损就难以修复。巴菲特警告，即使是“小污点”也会放大（想象被不友好的记者报道）。他以伯克希尔的高排名为例，强调诚信是长期成功的基石。 工作的动力：富人继续工作不是为了钱，而是为了自主和认可（“掌声”）。巴菲特自己72岁仍工作，因为他享受“画画”的过程，并为股东（如他的姨妈和家人）创造价值。他举例Offner夫妇（无人知晓的校友）捐赠7.5亿美元给大学，证明普通人也能通过积累财富影响世界。 投资与人生哲学：投资不是预测市场，而是概率游戏（从回复中可见）。成功源于内在动机：选择热爱的事业，避免短期投机。巴菲特鼓励学生问自己：“谁会隐藏我？”（源自一位大屠杀幸存者的友谊标准），以此评估人际关系和人生成功。 这个演讲被许多人视为投资经典，强调 temperament（气质）胜过IQ，耐心胜过行动。Boring_Business · 2026/02/02
- 成为卓越的人，其实比你想象的要容易得多。 当今的大多数人，都生活在自己的“信息孤岛”里，他们只用单一视角去理解这个世界。 即便是在许多非常优秀的组织中，很多领导者也拥有极深的专业知识，却几乎没有知识广度。 哪怕是在金融领域，如果你问一位年入数百万美元的银行董事总经理（MD），只要问题稍微超出金融或他们所覆盖的行业范围，他们往往就会愣住，不知如何作答。 同样地，如果你去问顶级的软件对冲基金分析师有关汽车或能源市场的问题，他们对这些领域的了解通常也非常有限。 真正令人惊讶的是：只要拓宽自己的知识面，你就能轻松地在最聪明的人之上建立竞争优势。 多学习，多了解一切你能接触到的事物。把多个领域的知识组合起来，构建一个对世界连贯、整体的理解框架。 好奇心也许不会让你在学校里拿到最高分，但它在现实世界中，绝对是一种巨大的优势。 It is a lot easier to be exceptional than you think The average person today lives in a silo. They only have one lens through which they view the world Even leaders at a lot of incredible organizations have fantastic depth of knowledge, but almost no breadth Just within finance, if you ask a banking MD earning millions of dollars any question that falls just a little outside the realm of finance or an industry they cover, they will freeze up If you ask the top software hedge fund analyst about autos or energy markets, they will not know very much about it It is incredibly easy to build competitive advantages against the smartest people by simply increasing your breadth of knowledge Learn a lot and learn about everything you can get your hands on. Combine multiple topics to build a coherent understanding of the world Curiosity may not get you the highest grades in school, but it is absolutely an edge in the real worldBoring_Business · 2026/01/26
- 来自沃伦·巴菲特致股东信的经验（1977–1980） 在沃伦·巴菲特在执掌伯克希尔·哈撒韦近 60 年后终于卸任 CEO 之际，我回过头重新阅读了他历年的年度致股东信。 以下是一些对投资者与经营者都具有长期价值的原则。 我会持续发布他截至 2025 年的股东信要点，形式与本帖类似。 1977 年致股东信 EPS（每股收益）并不是好的投资决策指标 “大多数公司把‘创纪录’利润定义为 EPS 创新高。由于企业通常会逐年增加权益资本，我们并不认为‘权益资本增长 10%，EPS 增长 5%’这种组合有什么值得称道的管理表现。毕竟，即使是完全不动的储蓄账户，也会因为复利而逐年产生更高的利息收入。除了一些特殊情况（例如异常的债务/股本结构，或资产负债表中资产价值明显失真的公司），我们认为衡量管理层经济绩效更合适的指标是股东权益回报率（ROE）。” 处在“好生意”里的优势 “身处某些行业（如保险业）令人感到安心，因为即使犯下一些错误，整体表现仍可能相当令人满意。从某种意义上说，这与我们的纺织业务恰恰相反——即使管理极其优秀，也可能只能取得平庸的结果。管理层学到、并且不幸反复学到的一课是：选择顺风而非逆风行业的重要性。” 关注企业盈利，而非股价 “我们的大部分重要股票投资将持有多年，投资成败应由这段时间内的企业经营结果来评判，而不是某一天的股价。正如收购整家公司时过分关注短期前景是愚蠢的一样，在购买公司的一小部分（上市股票）时，沉迷于短期盈利预测或近期盈利趋势同样不合理。” 选股标准 “我们选择股票的方式，几乎与评估整体收购一家企业相同。我们希望企业具备： (1) 我们能理解的业务； (2) 良好的长期前景； (3) 诚实且有能力的管理层； (4) 非常有吸引力的价格。 我们通常不会因为短期股价表现而买入股票。事实上，只要企业经营依然令我们满意，我们反而欢迎股价下跌，以便在好公司上加大持仓。” 关于市场非有效性 “我们的经验表明，真正卓越的企业，其部分股权有时会在证券市场上以远低于整体收购价格的水平交易。 因此，通过持有股票，投资者可以间接获得在直接并购中无法获得的‘便宜的企业所有权’。当价格合适时，我们愿意在精选公司中建立非常大的持仓，并非为了控制权或并购，而是期待企业的优秀经营成果，最终转化为长期的市值与分红回报。” 少数股东 vs 控股股东 “如果直接购买这些企业，成本大约是通过股票市场购买的两倍，而且直接控制并不会给我们带来实质优势。 虽然控制权意味着我们可以亲自管理，但我们并不能比现有管理层做得更好。事实上，作为非控股股东，我们反而能获得更好的管理结果。这是一种非正统观点，但我们认为它是正确的。” 1978 年致股东信 关于预测股价 “我们不试图预测证券市场的短期走势；成功预测短期股价变动，我们认为既不是我们、也不是任何人能做到的。但从长期来看，我们相信许多核心持股的价值将远高于买入价格，投资收益将显著增加整体经营回报。” 导致低资本回报率（ROIC）的因素 “资本周转缓慢、销售利润率低，必然导致资本回报不足。提高利润率的方式包括产品差异化、通过更高效设备或更好的人力利用来降低成本等。我们的管理层在这些方面非常努力——但问题在于，竞争对手同样在努力做这些事。” 资本密集型、同质化行业 “纺织业是一个教科书式的例子：在资本密集、产品高度同质的行业中，除非供给紧张或出现真实短缺，否则企业几乎注定只能获得不足的资本回报。只要产能过剩存在，价格就会反映直接运营成本，而非投入资本。我们希望不要再进入太多这种经济特性糟糕的行业。” 关于并购 “我们以低价买入企业小部分股权（股票），这与企业热衷于高价整体收购形成鲜明对比。要么企业在高价并购中犯下重大错误，要么我们最终会因为在股市中以折价买入企业部分所有权而赚到可观收益。” 长期买入与集中持仓 “我们并不在意市场是否迅速重新定价我们认为被低估的股票。事实上，我们更希望相反，因为大多数年份我们都是净买家。与短期上涨带来的卖出机会相比，持续以合理价格买入更有利。我们的策略是集中持仓——当我们确信其吸引力时，就买入有意义的数量。” 何时留存收益、何时分红 “如果全资子公司能以高回报率再投资，我们并不介意它们保留全部利润。对于我们持有少数股权的公司亦然。 当然，在资本需求低或管理层长期把钱投入低回报项目的行业，利润就应该分红或回购股票——往往这是最佳的资本配置方式。” 1979 年致股东信 管理层经济绩效的检验 “衡量管理层绩效的首要标准，是在不依赖过度杠杆或会计手段的前提下，实现高 ROE，而不是 EPS 的持续增长。” 通胀对投资回报的影响（投资者痛苦指数） “通胀率 + 投资者为把企业收益变成个人购买力所需支付的税率，可被视为‘投资者痛苦指数’。当该指数超过企业 ROE 时，即便投资者一分钱不花，其实际购买力仍会缩水。” 高 ROIC 对估值的影响 “某些行业（如电视台）几乎不可避免地产生极高的资本回报，因此资产价格也极高。尽管价格昂贵，但这种‘容易赚钱的生意’往往是更好的选择。我们尝试过相反的路径。” 避免“困境反转型”投资 “我们的结论是：困境企业极少真正反转。同样的精力和能力，用在好企业、公允价格上，回报更高。” 高通胀环境下的债券投资 “我们严重怀疑长期固定利率债券在持续通胀的世界中是否仍是合适的投资工具……因此，我们选择：‘既不做短期借款人，也不做长期放贷人。’” 与股东沟通的理念 “股东应当直接从 CEO 那里听到企业真实状况，而不是公关文件。公共公司应给予股东与私企所有者同等的坦诚。” 你会得到你应得的股东 “企业会吸引与其沟通方式相匹配的股东。如果你强调短期结果，就会吸引短期投资者。企业就像餐厅，无法一会儿做法餐，一会儿卖外卖炸鸡。” 构建长期股东基础 “我们不理解管理层为何追求高换手率。我们更希望拥有理解我们、认可我们、愿意长期持有的股东。” 伯克希尔的管理原则 “财务决策高度集中，经营权高度下放。这种方式减少层级、加快决策，并吸引真正顶尖的人才。” 1980 年致股东信 股票回购 “当优秀企业的股价显著低于内在价值时，回购股票是最确定、最有利的资本使用方式。” 通胀是一种隐形税 “在高通胀环境下，即便企业 ROE 为正，股东的实际回报也可能为负。” 股票如何跑赢通胀 “只有在无需持续增加资本投入的情况下，企业盈利能随物价上涨而同步增长，股票才能真正抗通胀。这样的企业极少。” 坏生意 + 好管理 ≠ 好结果 “当卓越管理者面对糟糕经济特性的行业时，最终往往是行业的名声保持不变。” 收购标准 “我们偏好产生现金的企业，而不是消耗现金的企业。 在任何情况下，我们都会保持充足流动性、适度负债和强大的资本实力。” Lessons from Warren Buffett's Shareholder Letters (1977 - 1980) In the wake of Warren Buffett finally giving up his helm as Berkshire Hathaway CEO after nearly 6 decades, I went back and started to reread all of his annual shareholder letters Here are some evergreen lessons for investors and operators alike. I will be posting lessons from all of his letters going through 2025 with subsequent posts, similar to this one 1977 Letter to Shareholders EPS as a poor measure for investment decisions "Most companies define “record” earnings as a new high in EPS. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, a totally dormant savings account will produce steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding. Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial economic performance to be Return on equity capital." Merits of being in a good business "It is comforting to be in a business [insurance] where some mistakes can be made and yet a quite satisfactory overall performance can be achieved. In a sense, this is the opposite case from our textile business, where even very good management probably can average only modest results. One of the lessons your management has learned—and, unfortunately, sometimes re-learned – is the importance of being in businesses where tailwinds prevail rather than headwinds." Focusing on Earnings rather than Stock Price "Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard of our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, not by prices on any given day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company (i.e. marketable common stocks)" Stock Picking Criteria "We select our marketable equity securities in much the same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be: (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price. We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short term. In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good" On Inefficient Markets "Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities markets at very large discounts from the prices they would command in negotiated transactions involving entire companies Consequently, bargains in business ownership, which simply are not available directly through corporate acquisition, can be obtained indirectly through stock ownership. When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with expectation that excellent business results by corporate will translate over the long term into correspondingly excellent market value and dividend results for owners, minority as well as majority" Being a minority vs majority shareholder: "To purchase, directly, properties [businesses] would cost in the area of twice our cost of purchase via the stock market, and direct ownership would offer no important advantages to us. While control would give us the opportunity—and the responsibility—to manage operations and corporate resources, we would not be able to provide management in either of those respects equal to that now in place. In effect, we can obtain a better management result through non-control than control. This is an unorthodox view, but one we believe to be sound." 1978 Letter to Shareholders On Predicting Stock Prices "We make no attempt to predict how security markets will behave; successful forecasting short term stock price movements is something we think neither we nor anyone else can do. In the longer run, however, we feel that many of our major equity holdings are going to be worth considerably more money than we paid, and that investment gains will add significantly to the operating returns" Factors that lead to low ROIC "Slow capital turnover, coupled with low profit margins on sales, inevitably produces inadequate returns on capital. Obvious approaches to improved profit margins involve differentiation of product, lowered manufacturing costs through more efficient equipment or better utilization of people, etc. Our management is diligent in pursuing such objectives. The problem, of course, is that our competitors are just as diligently doing the same thing." Undifferentiated Goods in Capital-Intensive Businesses "The textile industry illustrates in textbook style how producers of relatively undifferentiated goods in capital intensive businesses must earn inadequate returns except under conditions of tight supply or real shortage. As long as excess productive capacity exists, prices tend to reflect direct operating costs rather than capital employed Such a supply-excess condition appears likely to prevail most of the time in the textile industry, and our expectations are for profits of relatively modest amounts in relation to capital. We hope we don’t get into too many more businesses with such tough economic characteristics." On M&A "This program of acquisition of small fractions of businesses (common stocks) at bargain prices, for which little enthusiasm exists, contrasts sharply with general corporate acquisition activity, for which much enthusiasm exists. It seems quite clear to us that either corporations are making very significant mistakes in purchasing entire businesses at prices prevailing in negotiated transactions and takeover bids, or that we eventually are going to make considerable sums of money buying small portions of such businesses at the greatly discounted valuations prevailing in the stock market." On Being a Long-Term Buyer with Concentration "We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices. In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a net buyer of securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities provided by a short-term run-up in stock prices to levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying. Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts." When Companies Should Retain Capital vs Pay Dividends "We are not at all unhappy when our wholly-owned businesses retain all of their earnings if they can utilize internally those funds at attractive rates. \Why should we feel differently about retention of earnings by companies in which we hold small equity interests, but where the record indicates even better prospects for profitable employment of capital? (This proposition cuts the other way, of course, in industries with low capital requirements, or if management has a record of plowing capital into projects of low profitability; then earnings should be paid out or used to repurchase shares - often by far the most attractive option for capital utilization.)" 1979 Letter to Shareholders Testing Managerial Economic Performance "The primary test of managerial economic performance is the achievement of a high earnings rate on equity capital employed (without undue leverage, accounting gimmickry, etc.) and not the achievement of consistent gains in earnings per share. In our view, many businesses would be better understood by their shareholder owners, as well as the general public, if managements and financial analysts modified the primary emphasis they place upon earnings per share, and upon yearly changes in that figure" Impact of Inflation on Investment Returns (Investor Misery Index) "That combination - the inflation rate plus the percentage of capital that must be paid by the owner to transfer into his own pocket the annual earnings achieved by the business (i.e., ordinary income tax on dividends and capital gains tax on retained earnings) - can be thought of as an “investor’s misery index”. When this index exceeds the rate of return earned on equity by the business, the investor’s purchasing power (real capital) shrinks even though he consumes nothing at all. We have no corporate solution to this problem; high inflation rates will not help us earn higher rates of return on equity." Impact of High ROIC on Business Multiples "In some businesses - a network TV station, for example - it is virtually impossible to avoid earning extraordinary returns on tangible capital employed in the business. And assets in such businesses sell at equally extraordinary prices, one thousand cents or more on the dollar, a valuation reflecting the splendid, almost unavoidable, economic results obtainable. Despite a fancy price tag, the “easy” business may be the better route to go. We can speak from experience, having tried the other route." Avoiding Turnaround Businesses as Investments "Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price" Investing in Bonds in a High-Inflation Environment "We have severe doubts as to whether a very long-term fixed-interest bond, denominated in dollars, remains an appropriate business contract in a world where the value of dollars seems almost certain to shrink by the day. Those dollars, as well as paper creations of other governments, simply may have too many structural weaknesses to appropriately serve as a unit of long term commercial reference. If so, really long bonds may turn out to be obsolete instruments and insurers who have bought those maturities of 2010 or 2020 could have major and continuing problems on their hands. We, likewise, will be unhappy with our fifteen-year bonds and will annually pay a price in terms of earning power that reflects that mistake. Some of our convertible bonds appear exceptionally attractive to us, and have the same sort of earnings retention factor (applicable to the stock into which they may be converted) that prevails in our conventional equity portfolio. We expect to make money in these bonds (we already have, in a few cases) and have hopes that our profits in this area may offset losses in straight bonds. And, of course, there is the possibility that our present analysis is much too negative. The chances for very low rates of inflation are not nil. Inflation is man-made; perhaps it can be man-mastered. Furthermore, present interest rates incorporate much higher inflation projections than those of a year or two ago. Such rates may prove adequate or more than adequate to protect bond buyers. We even may miss large profits from a major rebound in bond prices. However, our unwillingness to fix a price now for a pound of See’s candy or a yard of Berkshire cloth to be delivered in 2010 or 2020 makes us equally unwilling to buy bonds which set a price on money now for use in those years. Overall, we opt for Polonius (slightly restated): “Neither a short-term borrower nor a long-term lender be.” Philosophy on Communication with Shareholders "When you do receive a communication from us, it will come from the fellow you are paying to run the business. Your Chairman has a firm belief that owners are entitled to hear directly from the CEO as to what is going on and how he evaluates the business, currently and prospectively. You would demand that in a private company; you should expect no less in a public company. A once-a-year report of stewardship should not be turned over to a staff specialist or public relations consultant who is unlikely to be in a position to talk frankly on a manager-to-owner basis. We feel that you, as owners, are entitled to the same sort of reporting by your manager as we feel is owed to us at Berkshire Hathaway by managers of our business units. Obviously, the degree of detail must be different, particularly where information would be useful to a business competitor or the like. But the general scope, balance, and level of candor should be similar. We don’t expect a public relations document when our operating managers tell us what is going on, and we don’t feel you should receive such a document." You Get the Shareholders You Deserve "Companies obtain the shareholder constituency that they seek and deserve. If they focus their thinking and communications on short-term results or short-term stock market consequences they will, in large part, attract shareholders who focus on the same factors And if they are cynical in their treatment of investors, eventually that cynicism is highly likely to be returned by the investment community. Phil Fisher, a respected investor and author, once likened the policies of the corporation in attracting shareholders to those of a restaurant attracting potential customers. A restaurant could seek a given clientele - patrons of fast foods, elegant dining, Oriental food, etc. - and eventually obtain an appropriate group of devotees. If the job were expertly done, that clientele, pleased with the service, menu, and price level offered, would return consistently. But the restaurant could not change its character constantly and end up with a happy and stable clientele. If the business vacillated between French cuisine and take-out chicken, the result would be a revolving door of confused and dissatisfied customers. So it is with corporations and the shareholder constituency they seek. You can’t be all things to all men, simultaneously seeking different owners whose primary interests run from high current yield to long-term capital growth to stock market pyrotechnics, etc." On Creating a Long Term Shareholder Base for Your Company "The reasoning of managements that seek large trading activity in their shares puzzles us. In effect, such managements are saying that they want a good many of the existing clientele continually to desert them in favor of new ones - because you can’t add lots of new owners (with new expectations) without losing lots of former owners. We much prefer owners who like our service and menu and who return year after year. It would be hard to find a better group to sit in the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder “seats” than those already occupying them. So we hope to continue to have a very low turnover among our owners, reflecting a constituency that understands our operation, approves of our policies, and shares our expectations." Management Principles of Berkshire "Company [Berkshire] is run on the principle of centralization of financial decisions at the top (the very top, it might be added), and rather extreme delegation of operating authority to a number of key managers at the individual company or business unit level. We could just field a basketball team with our corporate headquarters group (which utilizes only about 1500 square feet of space). This approach produces an occasional major mistake that might have been eliminated or minimized through closer operating controls. But it also eliminates large layers of costs and dramatically speeds decision-making. Because everyone has a great deal to do, a very great deal gets done. Most important of all, it enables us to attract and retain some extraordinarily talented individuals - people who simply can’t be hired in the normal course of events - who find working for Berkshire to be almost identical to running their own show" 1980 Letter to Shareholders On Share Buybacks "One usage of retained earnings we often greet with special enthusiasm when practiced by companies in which we have an investment interest is repurchase of their own shares. The reasoning is simple: if a fine business is selling in the market place for far less than intrinsic value, what more certain or more profitable utilization of capital can there be than significant enlargement of the interests of all owners at that bargain price? The competitive nature of corporate acquisition activity almost guarantees the payment of a full - frequently more than full price when a company buys the entire ownership of another enterprise. But the auction nature of security markets often allows finely-run companies the opportunity to purchase portions of their own businesses at a price under 50% of that needed to acquire the same earning power through the negotiated acquisition of another enterprise" Inflation as a Form of Taxation for Investors "High rates of inflation create a tax on capital that makes much corporate investment unwise - at least if measured by the criterion of a positive real investment return to owners. This “hurdle rate” the return on equity that must be achieved by a corporation in order to produce any real return for its individual owners - has increased dramatically in recent years. The average tax-paying investor is now running up a down escalator whose pace has accelerated to the point where his upward progress is nil. For example, in a world of 12% inflation a business earning 20% on equity (which very few manage consistently to do) and distributing it all to individuals in the 50% bracket is chewing up their real capital, not enhancing it. (Half of the 20% will go for income tax; the remaining 10% leaves the owners of the business with only 98% of the purchasing power they possessed at the start of the year - even though they have not spent a penny of their “earnings”). The investors in this bracket would actually be better off with a combination of stable prices and corporate earnings on equity capital of only a few per cent. Explicit income taxes alone, unaccompanied by any implicit inflation tax, never can turn a positive corporate return into a negative owner return. (Even if there were 90% personal income tax rates on both dividends and capital gains, some real income would be left for the owner at a zero inflation rate.) But the inflation tax is not limited by reported income. Inflation rates not far from those recently experienced can turn the level of positive returns achieved by a majority of corporations into negative returns for all owners, including those not required to pay explicit taxes. (For example, if inflation reached 16%, owners of the 60% plus of corporate America earning less than this rate of return would be realizing a negative real return - even if income taxes on dividends and capital gains were eliminated.). Of course, the two forms of taxation co-exist and interact since explicit taxes are levied on nominal, not real, income. Thus you pay income taxes on what would be deficits if returns to stockholders were measured in constant dollars. At present inflation rates, we believe individual owners in medium or high tax brackets (as distinguished from tax-free entities such as pension funds, eleemosynary institutions, etc.) should expect no real long-term return from the average American corporation, even though these individuals reinvest the entire after-tax proceeds from all dividends they receive. The average return on equity of corporations is fully offset by the combination of the implicit tax on capital levied by inflation and the explicit taxes levied both on dividends and gains in value produced by retained earnings." How Equities Can Outpace Inflation through High ROIC "Of course, earnings and dividends per share usually will rise if significant earnings are “saved” by a corporation; i.e., reinvested instead of paid as dividends. But that would be true without inflation. A thrifty wage earner, likewise, could achieve regular annual increases in his total income without ever getting a pay increase - if he were willing to take only half of his paycheck in cash (his wage “dividend”) and consistently add the other half (his “retained earnings”) to a savings account. Neither this high-saving wage earner nor the stockholder in a high-saving corporation whose annual dividend rate increases while its rate of return on equity remains flat is truly indexed. For capital to be truly indexed, return on equity must rise, i.e., business earnings consistently must increase in proportion to the increase in the price level without any need for the business to add to capital - including working capital employed. (Increased earnings produced by increased investment don’t count.) Only a few businesses come close to exhibiting this ability" Good Management In a Bad Business "We have written in past reports about the disappointments that usually result from purchase and operation of “turnaround” businesses. Literally hundreds of turnaround possibilities in dozens of industries have been described to us over the years and, either as participants or as observers, we have tracked performance against expectations. Our conclusion is that, with few exceptions, when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact." Acquisition Criteria for Businesses "Our acquisition preferences run toward businesses that generate cash, not those that consume it. As inflation intensifies, more and more companies find that they must spend all funds they generate internally just to maintain their existing physical volume of business. There is a certain mirage-like quality to such operations. However attractive the earnings numbers, we remain leery of businesses that never seem able to convert such pretty numbers into no-strings-attached cash. Businesses meeting our standards are not easy to find. (Each year we read of hundreds of corporate acquisitions; only a handful would have been of interest to us.) And logical expansion of our present operations is not easy to implement. But we’ll continue to utilize both avenues in our attempts to further Berkshire’s growth. Under all circumstances we plan to operate with plenty of liquidity, with debt that is moderate in size and properly structured, and with an abundance of capital strength. Our return on equity is penalized somewhat by this conservative approach, but it is the only one with which we feel comfortable"Boring_Business · 2026/01/19