量子计算不会杀死加密行业，也不会杀死比特币。 而且如今无法否认，整个市场是被比特币所驱动的，所以如果比特币真的死掉，那对加密行业来说将会是一个巨大的问题（至少可以这么说）。 Quantum won't kill crypto, nor Bitcoin. And today, one can't deny that the market is driven by Bitcoin, so if it were do die, that would become a huge problem for crypto (to say the least).
Charles GuillemetCTO, ledger
观点原文
量子计算不会杀死加密行业，也不会杀死比特币。
而且如今无法否认，整个市场是被比特币所驱动的，所以如果比特币真的死掉，那对加密行业来说将会是一个巨大的问题（至少可以这么说）。
Quantum won't kill crypto, nor Bitcoin.
And today, one can't deny that the market is driven by Bitcoin, so if it were do die, that would become a huge problem for crypto (to say the least).
Bitcoin
相关观点
- 围绕比特币是否具备抗量子能力的讨论，往往集中在“量子计算机是否会在不久的将来出现”这一问题上。事实上，没有人真正知道，在未来几年甚至几十年内，出现一台在密码学层面具有实际威胁性的量子计算机的概率究竟有多大。然而，比特币的价值从根本上依赖于人们对其安全性和可靠性的信任。 对比特币而言，最大的威胁并不是量子计算本身，而是人们对量子计算可能到来的恐惧。这种威胁已经存在，而且无法仅靠纯粹理性的论证来消除。我个人相信，在我的有生之年，可能都看不到一台能够破解现代密码学的量子计算机，但事实是，我并不真正确定。 在这样的背景下，最审慎的做法，是主动将比特币协议升级为具备抗量子能力，并明确一条清晰的迁移路径，其中还应包括如何处理“丢失的比特币”（例如中本聪的比特币）这一策略。 但这并非一件轻而易举的事情。任何此类迁移都伴随着真实而艰难的权衡：基于格的后量子密码学尚未经受时间的充分考验；基于哈希的方案则显得相当“古老”；BIP32 需要被重新设计；而且我们还将失去 Schnorr 签名在多重签名场景下所具备的可加性优势。最后，在如何处理丢失比特币的问题上，也不存在一个干净利落的解决方案——冻结这些币会为比特币中的“没收行为”树立一个危险的先例，而如果继续让它们暴露在潜在风险之下，又可能对整个网络的系统性稳定构成威胁。 The debate around Bitcoin’s quantum resistance largely focuses on the likelihood of a quantum computer emerging in the near future. In reality, no one knows the true probability of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer appearing in the coming years or even decades. Yet Bitcoin’s value fundamentally depends on trust in its security and reliability. The greatest threat to Bitcoin is not quantum computing itself, but the fear that it might arrive. That threat is already present, and it cannot be dispelled by purely rational arguments. I personally believe I might not see a quantum computer capable of breaking modern cryptography in my lifetime, but the truth is, I don’t actually know. In this context, the prudent course of action is to proactively upgrade the Bitcoin protocol to be quantum-resistant and to define a clear migration path, including a strategy for handling “lost” coins (such as Satoshi’s). This would not be trivial. Any such migration involves real trade-offs: lattice-based post-quantum cryptography has not yet stood the test of time; hash-based schemes feel archaic, BIP32 would need to be rethought, and we would lose Schnorr’s additive signature advantages for multisignature setups. Finally, with respect to lost coins, there is no clean solution. Freezing them would set a dangerous precedent for confiscation in Bitcoin, while leaving them vulnerable could pose a systemic risk to the network’s overall stability.Charles Guillemet · 2025/12/21
- 印钞机要开始疯狂运转了…… The printer will go brrr...Charles Guillemet · 2025/12/03
- 任意代码执行、持久化攻击，以及在主机系统上的权限提升…… 现代浏览器是极其复杂的软件系统，安全性 notoriously 难以做到万无一失。 而这些漏洞的悬赏金额，与成功利用这些漏洞所带来的巨大收益相比，低得令人震惊。 不要把重要的私密信息存放在浏览器里，使用硬件签名设备（hardware signer）。 与此同时，请务必立即更新你的 Chrome / Brave 浏览器。 Arbitrary code execution, persistence, and privilege escalation on the host system… Modern browsers are extremely complex pieces of software and notoriously hard to secure. The bounties paid for these vulnerabilities are shockingly low compared to the massive upside of exploiting them. Don’t store valuable secrets in your browser, use a hardware signer. In the meantime, update your Chrome/Brave browser.Charles Guillemet · 2025/12/03
- megaSaga 远未结束 —— 这笔 5 亿美元的预存款基本上将被全部回滚。 MegaETH 原计划在主网上线前进行一轮 “预存款”（pre-deposit） 销售，允许通过验证的用户提前锁定 MEGA 代币配额，初始上限为 2.5 亿美元，最终目标是筹集高达 10 亿美元。 上线后，销售机制迅速崩溃：他们的第三方 KYC / 跨链桥服务商（Sonar）被流量压垮，同时合约里写错了 SaleUUID，导致无法处理用户的存款，交易不断失败。 在混乱中，团队在大约 23 分钟的系统中断后修复了合约并重置系统，但他们已提前签好了一笔多签交易（6 个中有 4 个签名）。按正确流程，他们本应等到指定时间再签第 4 个签名，但团队提前把 4 个签名都预签完，原本想等到“正确时间”再执行——但 Safe（多签）不是这么运作的：一旦满足签名数量，任何人都能立即执行。 于是事情发生了 —— 有人提前约 34 分钟执行了交易，导致存款窗口重新开放。 这引发了疯狂的抢购：2.5 亿美元的额度在短短 156 秒内被瞬间抢光。 随后存款金额继续暴涨，大幅超过原定限制。团队尝试将上限调整为 4 亿美元失败，最终只能在 5 亿美元 时强制冻结。原本计划筹 10 亿美元的设想被取消。团队停止进一步募资并宣布允许参与者提款。 现在，他们宣布将把整个预存款流程彻底回滚。 看到如此巨额的资金在一个仍处早期、尚不成熟的系统中高速流动，确实令人警惕。 让我们继续观察后续如何发展。 The megaSaga is not over, the $500m pre-deposit will basically be rolled-back. MegaETH planned a “pre-deposit” sale ahead of its mainnet launch, letting verified users commit funds to secure allocations of its MEGA token with an initial cap of US$250 million, and an eventual goal of raising up to US$1 billion. At launch the sale broke: their third-party KYC/bridge provider (Sonar) overloaded, and the contract had a wrong SaleUUID, meaning deposits could not process and users were stuck with failed transactions. In the rush, after about 23 minutes of downtime, the team fixed the contract and reset the system, but they had pre-signed a multisig transaction (4 out of 6). Instead of waiting the right time to pre-sign the 4th one, the team pre-sign the 4 and wanted to wait foe the right time to execute it. But this is not how Safe works. Once signed, anyone could execute it and this is what happened, just ~34 minutes early, reopening deposits. That caused a rush, filling the $250 M cap in just 156 seconds. Deposits flooded way past intended limits, first attempts to cap at $400 M failed, so they finally froze everything at US$500 million. The original plan for a $1 billion raise was scrapped. The team halted further fundraising and announced a withdrawal option for participants who want out. And now they’ve announced they’re rolling back the entire pre-deposit. It’s a bit alarming to see such massive amounts of money moving so quickly through systems that are still so early-stage. Let’s see how the next events unfold.Charles Guillemet · 2025/11/28