Through the Storm of Life and Death: Bill Ackman Talks About Saying Goodbye to Short Selling, the Ten Commandments List, and the Principles of Billion-Dollar Long-Term Investments

Bill Ackman: The Impact of AI, Permanent Capital, and the Reconstruction of a Modern Berkshire If you only understand Bill Ackman as: Herbalife battle; Activist investing; Wall Street hedge fund mogul; you will seriously underestimate the changes that are happening with him today. In 2026, Ackman is no longer just that: openly shorting stocks; initiating proxy battles; confronting management directly as an Activist Investor. He is simultaneously advancing three completely different, yet logically consistent initiatives: Transforming Pershing Square into a permanent capital platform; Transforming Howard Hughes from a real estate company into a "modern Berkshire Hathaway"; Transforming a catastrophic brain hemorrhage suffered by his daughter into a multi-hundred-million-dollar brain science, rehabilitation, and longevity research platform. At the same time, he is facing perhaps the most difficult question of his career: If AI is rapidly dismantling the stable business moats that have existed for decades, what can a value investor still believe in? Ackman stated directly in the latest episode of "The Knowledge Project": AI has "significantly increased the risk of business disruption." Some of the most powerful companies in the world today may even: disappear entirely in the future. This statement is actually much more important than "Is AI a bubble?" Because it touches on the deepest pillar of value investing: Durability. Can future cash flows of companies still be predicted? This is the true main thread worth studying in this interview. ──────────────── 1. Let's start with the most important life event for Ackman in 2026: Lucy In February of this year, Ackman's 26-year-old daughter Lucy suffered a severe brain hemorrhage while living alone in New York. According to Ackman's latest description, she experienced bleeding around 9 AM, went missing for the day, until her family later found her collapsed and struggling to breathe in her Williamsburg apartment. She was subsequently taken to the hospital and underwent emergency craniotomy for decompression. Ackman said that from the onset of the bleeding to the end of the decompression surgery, the total time was about 19 hours; during the surgery, doctors removed about 40% of her skull to make space for the swollen brain tissue. There is a medical statement that must be corrected: It cannot simply be said: "Brain hemorrhage lasting more than 5 hours usually results in brain death." Public information does not support such an absolute medical conclusion. A more accurate statement is: Long-term intracranial hypertension significantly increases the risk of irreversible brain damage and death, and the sooner decompression occurs, the more critical it usually is; Lucy's situation was extremely serious, but her subsequent recovery exceeded many people's initial expectations. This is why Ackman referred to her recovery as a near-miraculous experience. ──────────────── 2. What truly changed for Ackman due to Lucy's recovery is not just a shift in charitable focus Lucy subsequently experienced: Weeks of coma; Inability to breathe independently; Inability to walk; Inability to speak; Severe vision impairment. Months later, she had regained cognitive and comprehension abilities, could walk over a hundred steps with assistance, and began to produce sounds and language again. Vision remains a significant challenge. For Ackman, this event directly changed a fundamental understanding: The "endpoint" of brain injury may be more malleable than the medical system has previously assumed. This is: Neuroplasticity. A brain that seems to have suffered extreme damage may still be able to: Rebuild pathways; Learn anew; Recover some functions. This does not mean that all severe brain injuries can recover similarly. Rather, it means: The upper limit of recovery may often be underestimated. ──────────────── 3. This is the starting point for the Ackman Oxman Institute—AOI Ackman and his wife Neri Oxman have announced a commitment of approximately $400 million to launch: The Ackman Oxman Institute (AOI). The goal is to build a new type of institution that integrates: Brain science; Rehabilitation; Recovery; Nutrition; Brain-computer interfaces; AI; Longevity research. Ackman also stated that there will be similar or even larger scale additional funding in the future. He has purchased a large life sciences property on Manhattan's West Side, with plans to develop it into the core base of AOI. Fortune reported that the project is located around 125 West End Avenue, with approximately 400,000 square feet of existing space and additional development rights. So your raw material's direction of "near 65th Street and 11th Avenue" is roughly correct, but a more accurate public address description should be: 125 West End Avenue / Manhattan West Side as the standard. ──────────────── 4. What is truly interesting about AOI is not "billionaires building research institutes" It is not uncommon for American billionaires to engage in medical philanthropy. What is truly interesting is Ackman's desire to change: The organization of medical research. His thinking is very much like: An investment firm. Not: First publish papers. Then wait ten years for translation. But rather: Identify problems; Assemble the strongest team; Invest capital; Conduct rapid experiments; Develop technologies; Implement them in patients; Then commercialize valuable technologies. Ackman even explicitly stated that AOI will establish: A Venture Funding Arm. If research leads to: Treatments; Devices; Rehabilitation technologies, companies can be formed. Economic returns: Will be reinvested into the research institute. This is essentially: Research → Venture → Cash Flow → More Research. A kind of research capital flywheel. ──────────────── 5. This is almost entirely consistent with Ackman's investment approach Ackman has never been: A "small grant type" personality. His typical model is: Identify an extremely important issue; Concentrate investment; Take long-term responsibility; Demand results. He even likened AOI to: Another Portfolio Company. In a recent interview, he said that once AOI's CEO and team are established, he will not operate it daily but will serve as chairman, in a manner similar to how he manages portfolio companies. In other words: He is directly transferring the asset management: Capital Allocation Discipline into: Medical research. ──────────────── 6. This actually reflects a very important modern trend: science is being re-entrepreneurialized Traditional research organizations: University; NIH; Academic Lab. New models increasingly include: Altos; Arc Institute; NewLimit; CZI Biohub; AOI. Common points: Long-term capital + top scientists + engineering culture + fewer traditional academic constraints. This may become one of the major changes in life sciences in the future. Capital is not only funding: Companies. It is also beginning to fund: New types of research institutions themselves. ──────────────── 7. Ackman even brought AI directly into his daughter's medical decisions He mentioned in the interview that: He has recently been using AI extensively, Especially in helping with his daughter's medical situation: Understanding medicine; Validating plans; Assisting in formulating questions. He even believes that doctors should also use AI like Claude to: "Check their own work." This certainly does not mean AI should replace doctors. What is truly important is: AI is significantly lowering the cost of acquiring expertise for the first time. In the past, ordinary families wanting to understand complex neuro-medical issues: Almost entirely relied on doctors' explanations. Today: Family members can quickly read papers; Compare options; Prepare questions. This changes: Patient Agency. ──────────────── 8. But this connects to the biggest new risk in Ackman's investment world: AI makes knowledge cheaper, but also makes moats weaker Ackman's assessment of the investment risks of AI is very direct: Many excellent companies were valuable in the past because they had: Stable business models; Strong brands; Networks; Information advantages; Cost advantages. With the emergence of AI: Some barriers may suddenly: Become ineffective. He clearly stated: AI makes "predicting disruption risk" one of the most complex issues in investing. This is a change that all value investors should pay attention to. ──────────────── 9. The core of traditional value investing is not essentially "cheap," but "predictable" Many people misunderstand Buffett: Low P/E. In fact, the most important asset characteristic for Buffett in later years is: Future is easy to understand. Coca-Cola. American Express. See’s Candies. Simple businesses. Consumer habits are stable. So: It can still be roughly predicted in 10 years. DCF only makes sense. ──────────────── 10. What AI truly disrupts is "cash flow predictability" A company today earns: 100. You expect: 110 next year; 160 in five years. Then calculate: Present Value. But if AI causes the entire industry to: Be reshuffled in three years, This model is almost meaningless. So the biggest AI issue in investing is not: "Does this company use AI?" But rather: Will AI make the future of this company completely unpredictable over the next decade? This is a more advanced question. ──────────────── 11. Ackman used a very good example from Buffett himself He pointed out: Even Warren Buffett, Historically has never fully predicted: How the internet would reconstruct traditional businesses. For example: World Book Encyclopedia. Once had: Brand; Content; Distribution. Seemed like an excellent asset. Then: Wikipedia appeared. Its business model almost directly lost value. This is: Disruption Risk. Moats do not gradually become shallower. But rather: The original castle suddenly becomes unimportant. ──────────────── 12. The most dangerous companies in the AI era may not be the weakest companies today, but rather the "seemingly most stable" companies Why? Because their valuations already include: Stability. If a company today: 30× P/E, The market assumes: Future cash flows are reliable. Once AI proves: The moat is flawed, Valuation will simultaneously experience: Profit decline And: Multiple Compression. A double whammy. This is called: Duration Risk in Equity. The longer the cash flow relies on stable assumptions, The more dangerous it is. ──────────────── Thirteen, this is also why Ackman now has higher demands for "Moat" rather than lower. The AI era does not mean: Moats are meaningless. On the contrary. Because: Ordinary moats are becoming increasingly unreliable, The moats that can truly withstand technological shocks: Are more valuable. For example: Physical infrastructure; Extremely high brand loyalty; Real network effects; Regulatory licenses; Low-cost resources; Irreplaceable scarce assets; Strong pricing power. These may be relatively: More durable than Pure information advantages. ──────────────── Fourteen, but even if AI saves companies a lot of costs, shareholders may not capture all the benefits. Ackman raised a very important question in an interview: After banks and other large institutions use AI: Operating costs will significantly decrease. But: Do all these profits belong to shareholders? Not necessarily. If competition is fierce: Everyone uses the same AI. Ultimately: Service prices will decline. The money saved: Is passed on to customers. This is called: Productivity Pass-through. ──────────────── Fifteen, so "AI increases productivity" and "this stock is worth buying" are two different things. This is a point that investors can easily confuse. An airline: AI helps it save 10% costs. If all airlines save: Competition will force ticket prices down. In the end, consumers take: Most of the benefits. So: Technology Benefit Does not equal: Shareholder Value Capture. Investors must continue to ask: Who has pricing power? ──────────────── Sixteen, the real strongest AI winners are: efficiency increases, but do not have to pass profits to customers. What companies might achieve this? Those with: Monopolistic or oligopolistic competition; Strong brands; Scarce networks; High Switching Costs; Huge demand elasticity. Such companies can: Reduce costs, Without lowering prices. Thus: Margin Expansion Truly enters shareholders' pockets. This is: Value Capture. ──────────────── Seventeen, Ackman also believes AI is the fastest-changing technology he has ever seen. He cited the example of Microsoft in the old days: Windows 1.0 to 2.0: Could take years. Now: AI products can have significant updates in just days. Products like Meta Muse can even change the threshold for ordinary users to build agents in a very short time. This means one of the biggest challenges investors face is: The analysis cycle has become slower than the product cycle. ──────────────── Eighteen, in the past, one could study a company for six months; now six months may have already seen a generation of technology change. This will change value investing itself. Previously: Moat research Was relatively static. In the future, it will require: Continuous Underwriting. Constantly reassessing: Competitive structures. So "buy and don’t look for ten years" Does not mean: No need to revalidate the Thesis for ten years. Rather: Long-term holding + high-frequency validation. ──────────────── Nineteen, but Ackman has not become an AI momentum investor because of this. On the contrary, he believes: AI has already shown obvious bubble-like elements. In a recent interview, he cited examples: Some venture companies: Just completed a round of financing, Two weeks later: Valuation doubled or even multiplied. Also, Series A: Directly reaching tens of billions in pre-money valuation. His judgment is not: "AI is fake." On the contrary. He said: AI may be the most transformative technology of this generation. But: A true technological revolution can coexist with asset bubbles. This is a historical norm. ──────────────── Twenty, railroads are real, and railroad bubbles are also real. Cars are real. The internet is real. Transistors are real. But with each technological revolution: Capital will experience: FOMO. Because investors worry: Missing out on the future. Thus: Reasonable growth Turns into: Overvaluation. This is Ackman's definition of a bubble: Making a lot of money → FOMO → More capital enters → Overvaluation → Bubble bursts. ──────────────── Twenty-one, this is one of the most important frameworks for judging tech bubbles. Do not ask: "Is this technology real?" It should be broken down into two questions: Technology Thesis. Does the technology change the world? Price Thesis. Does today’s price already reflect too much of the future? The internet: Technology Thesis is correct. In 1999, many stocks: Price Thesis was wrong. AI may be the same. ──────────────── Twenty-two, so what should entrepreneurs really do during a bubble? Ackman's advice is very practical: If you can raise funds, then raise funds. But: Do not think: Because capital is abundant today, It will still be abundant tomorrow. He compares the current state of AI ventures to: The late internet bubble. After capital suddenly disappears, Many companies that rely on the next round of financing to survive: Will die quickly. ──────────────── Twenty-three, the real reason startups die is usually not losing money, but "the financing window closes." A startup: Burn: $20M/year. On hand: $30M. It seems: 18 months runway. The founder plans: To raise funds after 12 months. If the market suddenly closes: The company's value may instantly: Approach zero. Because: Liquidity is oxygen. Without the next round: No matter how attractive the business model is, It may also die. ──────────────── Twenty-four, this is why cash is often most undervalued in a frenzied market. In a bull market: Everyone feels: Capital is abundant. So crazily: Hiring; Offices; Advertising; Projects. A truly excellent founder should ask: If no one gives me another dollar for three years, can I still survive? This is: Anti-fragile Runway. ──────────────── Twenty-five, Ackman's investment philosophy has undergone significant changes after 2015-2016. Pershing Square at that time experienced: Valeant; Herbalife; Redemption pressure; Significant drawdowns. Ackman later did something very symbolic: He had the team find: A large stone. To truly engrave the core investment principles: Like: Moses’ Ten Commandments. And then placed it on everyone’s desk. This is not decoration. But a form of: Institutional Memory. ──────────────── Twenty-six, the most dangerous thing for investment institutions is not not knowing principles, but forgetting principles after making money. Many disastrous investments are not because: Investors have not learned finance. But because: "This time is special." So they violate: Their own systems. Valeant was exactly like this. Pershing Square originally: Did not like highly leveraged pharma. But because: They knew the team in the past; Had made money together, They relaxed their standards. In the end: Disaster. ──────────────── Twenty-seven, this is the true value of a checklist: to counteract the self-justification of smart people. Pilots: Use checklists. Not because: They don’t know how to fly. But because: The human brain under stress, excitement, or fatigue: Will miss things. Investors are the same. The smarter they are: The more reasons they will find for themselves. So: Checklists Are not for the foolish. But: To limit the biases of the smart. ──────────────── Twenty-eight, Ackman's current core investment criteria can be summarized in six words. He listed in a recent interview: Simple. Predictable. Free Cash Flow Generative. Large-cap / Liquid. Great Management. Durable Moat. It looks very ordinary. The truly difficult part is: Strict execution. ──────────────── Twenty-nine, top investors' alpha often does not come from "knowing more," but from being more willing to wait. Ackman's team has long established: A company "library." Many companies: After they finish their research. Like it. But: 35× Earnings Cannot buy it. So: They put it in. Wait. Then: COVID. SaaS Crash. Industry panic. Prices suddenly: Become reasonable. Then buy. This is: Prepared Patience. ──────────────── Thirty, the best investments are often not "suddenly discovered today," but "companies that have waited five years suddenly go on sale." This is completely different from ordinary investors. Ordinary people: When stocks plummet. Start researching for the first time. Pershing: Had already researched the stocks when they hadn’t dropped. When they drop: They buy directly. So: Crises truly reward: Preparation. Not bravery. ──────────────── Thirty-one, this is why investing in an "asset library" is very important. You should long-term know: Which are: World-class companies. What is a reasonable price? What are the key risks? This way: When the market suddenly crashes, you don't need to: judge from scratch. This is: Watchlist as Intellectual Inventory. The watchlist is: knowledge inventory. ──────────────── 32. Microsoft is a typical case of Ackman's method He mentioned: When the SaaS and software sectors were significantly repriced, Pershing seized the opportunity: to buy Microsoft at what they considered a very attractive valuation. The real reason is not: Microsoft suddenly became a good company. It was good all along. The difference is: Price finally matched return requirement. ──────────────── 33. Netflix better illustrates Ackman's "business quality × price" logic Pershing once: bought Netflix. Later, due to the company's uncertain prospects: they exited. Later, Netflix proved: it basically won the Streaming War; free cash flow significantly improved; competitive position strengthened. But the valuation rose again: no interest. Subsequently, the stock price fell again. So: they bought back in. This is a very important investment mindset: You can like the company but not like the stock. ──────────────── 34. Good companies and good investments are not synonymous The best companies in the world: 100× Earnings. Might not: be a good investment. Ordinary companies: if the price is low enough. Might: be. So ultimately, returns depend on: Business Quality × Entry Price. Both are indispensable. ──────────────── 35. Why does Ackman no longer like shorting? Because shorting has: Reverse Asymmetry. Stocks can go from: 100 → 0. Maximum profit: 100%. But: 100 → 1000. Theoretical loss: 900%. If it continues to rise: losses are unlimited. This is mathematically: asymmetrical. Just the direction is wrong. ──────────────── 36. The most important lesson from Herbalife is not whether he was right or wrong One of Ackman's biggest mistakes was: underestimating: Market Structure Risk. Even if you think the fundamental thesis is very strong: the opponent can still: buy stocks; create a short squeeze; extend time; drag you into: a liquidity war. After Carl Icahn entered Herbalife: it turned a fundamental investment into: a capital market war. ──────────────── 37. Investors often only study the "company" but forget to study the "trade structure" This is an extremely important lesson. A correct viewpoint: does not mean: the trade makes money. Because: leverage; duration; liquidity; counterparties; financing structure also determine the outcome. Long-Term Capital Management is a classic case: Many relative value viewpoints: are theoretically correct. But: leverage prevented it from waiting. So: Thesis Risk ≠ Position Risk. ──────────────── 38. What Ackman prefers today is "positive asymmetry" Losses: are limited. Gains: are huge. For example: a small proportion of funds to buy: CDS; interest rate options; macro hedges. If wrong: loss of premium. If right: can earn: tens of times. This is called: Convexity. ──────────────── 39. The pandemic hedge in 2020 is the most classic case Before the market fully priced in the global halt due to COVID, Pershing Square bought credit protection. Principal: relatively limited. After the pandemic panic broke out: CDS values rose rapidly. Ultimately: huge gains were realized. This is: Asymmetric Macro Trade. Not because: predicting macro every month. But because: in very rare instances: extremely high conviction + extremely high odds appear. ──────────────── 40. Truly excellent macro hedging is not frequent trading, but "not doing it regularly, but redoing it when opportunities arise" Ackman himself emphasizes: Pershing's main business is still: long-term investment in high-quality companies. Only occasionally discovering: extreme non-consensus events can be expressed using: asymmetric tools. This is completely different from: Macro Hedge Funds. This is: Optional Macro Overlay. ──────────────── 41. This is also one of the most valuable aspects of Ackman's investment system: stable core, aggressive tail opportunities Core: excellent companies. Periphery: extreme asymmetric trades. Can be understood as: Barbell. Most capital: long-term compounding. Very little capital: purchasing huge convexity. If designed well: losses are limited. Succeeding once: significantly increases overall returns. ──────────────── 42. But the most important structural change in Pershing Square is not stock selection, but "the capital itself has changed" The biggest problem with hedge funds in the past was: investors could: redeem. This sounds: self-evident. But for fund managers: it can be very fatal. In good times: investors add money. In bad times: investors take money out. Thus fund managers: obtain capital at high points. Are forced to sell assets at low points. This is called: Negative Timing of External Capital. ──────────────── 43. The duration of capital may even be more important than stock selection ability If you have: capital that never needs to be repaid. When the market crashes: buy. If capital might: be redeemed tomorrow. When the market crashes: even if you know: it's cheap. You might: sell. This is a key advantage of Berkshire that Charlie Munger once told Ackman: they are almost never forced to make decisions by: circumstances. This sentence is extremely important. ──────────────── 44. One of the highest realms of investing is to gain the right of "never being forced to act" No need for: Margin Call. No need for: redemptions. No need for: creditors to demand payment. No need for: quarterly pressure. You have: Optionality. When the market panics: others must sell. You can: buy. This is: the most powerful aspect of Permanent Capital. ──────────────── 45. Pershing Square has basically completed this capital structure transformation today According to the 2026 Pershing Square listing document: as of the end of 2025, about 96% of AUM already belongs to permanent capital. The company clearly states that: the stable, non-redeemable capital base is one of the most important competitive advantages. So in your materials: "completely transformed into fully closed permanent capital" the direction is correct. But a more accurate statement is: most of Pershing Square's current capital has been permanentized, rather than literally 100% permanent. ──────────────── 46. Why does Ackman dislike traditional hedge fund fundraising so much? Because this consumes a lot of: CEO Attention. He recalls: performing too well: LPs might redeem due to high position ratios. Performing poorly: LPs also redeem. Thus managers must always: fundraise; roadshow; maintain relationships. This is a paradox in the asset management industry: managing other people's money consumes time that should be used to manage money. ──────────────── 47. Ackman even believes one of his biggest historical investment mistakes is related to distraction from fundraising This statement is important. Because the CEO's Attention: is also capital. If a top investor spends: 30% of their time explaining quarterly performance; soothing LPs; fundraising, their core ability: investment judgment is diluted. Permanent capital releases: Management Bandwidth. Not just the duration of funds. ──────────────── 48. This is why Buffett ultimately left the Partnership model Buffett actually managed: external Partnership Capital in his early years. Later: he shifted to Berkshire. The biggest structural change: capital: is no longer redeemable. He can: retain profits; reinvest; continue compounding. Ackman today clearly admits: he is replicating: this path. ──────────────── 49. Howard Hughes is the most important laboratory for this plan Howard Hughes originally came from: the restructuring of General Growth Properties. During the 2008 financial crisis, Pershing Square bought General Growth at a very low price, and later pushed for bankruptcy restructuring. To make the core shopping center assets more like Simon Property Group, the company stripped out those: that the market disliked; were complex; and hard to value: land; development projects; Master Planned Communities. This formed: Howard Hughes. At the time, competitor David Simon even mocked it: "Shitco." Fifty, but what is called "garbage assets" ultimately turned into a batch of extremely special land platforms. Howard Hughes today core holdings: Master Planned Communities. For example: The Woodlands. Summerlin. And other large community assets in areas with continuous population inflow. Ackman describes this type of business as: SimCity. The company owns: Commercial land; Residential land; Office buildings; Development rights for commercial facilities. Urban population is continuously increasing. Land gradually: Monetizes. ──────────────── Fifty-one, the real strength of MPC is not real estate, but "controlling the appreciation brought by urban growth." Assuming you only own: One building. The surrounding city is prosperous: You benefit. But MPC owners may own: A large amount of land; Commercial centers; Development rights. The entire community improves: All assets appreciate together. This is called: Ecosystem Value Capture. You are not betting on: One house. But betting on: The growth of a city. ──────────────── Fifty-two, why are these types of assets particularly suitable for permanent capital? Because the land value release cycle: Is extremely long. It could be: 20 years; 30 years; 50 years. If the fund: Must exit in 7 years. It is a natural mismatch. Permanent capital: Can truly wait. This is: Asset Duration × Capital Duration Matching. A very important principle in finance. ──────────────── Fifty-three, but Wall Street has long disliked Howard Hughes, precisely because it is too slow and too complex. Real estate + land development: Cash flow is irregular. NAV: Is difficult to understand. Long-term projects: Are not suitable for quarterly models. As a result, the company has long been: Discounted to Asset Value. This is the type of opportunity Ackman likes the most: Asset quality high, market narrative bad. Good assets. Bad story. ──────────────── Fifty-four, today Ackman no longer wants Howard Hughes to be just a real estate company. His real plan is: Gradually release the capital from real estate: Into insurance. And the first core asset is: Vantage Group. Howard Hughes has completed the acquisition of Vantage for approximately $2.1 billion in June 2026. Vantage is a specialized property and reinsurance company. This step is: The modern Berkshire Thesis Truly begins. ──────────────── Fifty-five, why do all those who want to replicate Buffett eventually think of insurance? Because insurance has a special thing: Float. Customers first: Pay premiums. The insurance company in the future: Loses money. In the meantime, The funds: Belong to the insurance company to manage. If: Underwriting itself does not lose money, Then the cost of Float may be: Close to zero Or even: Negative cost. This is an extremely powerful: Source of capital. ──────────────── Fifty-six, the real strength of insurance is not "having a lot of cash," but that the cost of capital may be extremely low. Ordinary companies finance: Borrow money: Pay interest. Issue stock: Dilution. Insurance Float: If underwriting is profitable, The company even: Gains insurance profits, While obtaining: Investable funds. This is one of Buffett's magic: Negative-cost Leverage. Negative cost leverage. ──────────────── Fifty-seven, but many people mistakenly understand "insurance Float" as free money. It is not. Insurance companies must bear: Claim Risk. If: Underwriting is too aggressive; Pricing is wrong; Disasters are severe, Payouts can be huge. Float can be very expensive. So Berkshire's real success comes from: Two abilities existing simultaneously: Underwriting Discipline And: Investment Skill. Only knowing one of them: Is not enough. ──────────────── Fifty-eight, what Ackman wants to replicate today is these two ends. Vantage: Responsible for: Liability Side. Underwriting. Pershing Square: Responsible for: Asset Side. Investing. Howard Hughes has officially clarified: Pershing Square will manage the Vantage investment portfolio without charging additional investment management fees. Future portfolio plans gradually include: Cash; Short-term U.S. Treasury bonds; Common stocks. This is highly similar to Berkshire's logic. ──────────────── Fifty-nine, why does Ackman particularly emphasize short-term Treasury bonds? Because insurance must first: Pay claims. Cannot use all Float: To buy stocks. So: A certain portion of assets: Must be highly liquid and safe. To ensure: Claims Liquidity. The remaining long-term capital: Only takes on equity risk. This is called: Liability-aware Asset Allocation. Not an ordinary stock investment portfolio. ──────────────── Sixty, the real Berkshire Flywheel can be written as: Underwriting profits → Float → Investment returns → Book Value growth → Stronger credit capacity → Write more insurance → More Float. Cycle. If every step: Is excellent, The compounding is very scary. ──────────────── Sixty-one, Ackman believes the insurance platform can theoretically achieve 20%+ ROE. He directly said in an interview: If: Underwriting is profitable; The cost of liabilities is low enough; The investment returns on the asset side are excellent, The insurance company can achieve: 20%+ annualized capital returns. This is exactly the direction he hopes Howard Hughes / Vantage will reach. It must be emphasized: This is Ackman's goal and judgment, not a result that Vantage has currently achieved long-term. ──────────────── Sixty-two, Vantage is still very far from being "another Berkshire" today. This is a point that must be kept clear. Vantage: Established in 2020. The history is very short. Scale: Far smaller than Berkshire Insurance. Howard Hughes's: Insurance transformation Has just begun. The acquisition was only officially completed in June 2026. So the "modern Berkshire": Is now: A strategic blueprint. Not: An already realized fact. ──────────────── Sixty-three, what the market really questions is precisely this: Can a real estate company really turn into an insurance compounding platform? This requires: Top Underwriters; Discipline; Credit rating; Capital allocation; Regulatory capability. Once insurance: Lowers pricing discipline for expansion, The entire Flywheel: Reverses. This is the most dangerous aspect of insurance. ──────────────── Sixty-four, what Berkshire really finds hardest to replicate is not Float, but Culture. Anyone can buy an insurance company. But what Buffett has built is: For decades: Not pursuing insurance scale; Not writing if the price is wrong; Always having sufficient cash; Not being forced by the market. This is called: Institutional Patience. If Howard Hughes really wants to become the modern Berkshire, It must replicate: Culture. And not just: Asset structure. ──────────────── Sixty-five, Ackman himself accurately summarizes several core conditions for Berkshire's success. He lists: Control. Control rights. Permanent Capital. Permanent capital. Retained Earnings. No dividends, continuous reinvestment. Investment Skill. Stock investment ability. Talented Operators. Excellent operators. Minimal Dilution. Avoiding continuous issuance dilution. These conditions together form: A compounding machine. ──────────────── Sixty-six, what is truly noteworthy is "Control." Traditional funds: Buy: 10%. No control. How the company allocates capital: You cannot control. Holding Company: Control. Can decide: Profits: Dividends? Buybacks? Acquisitions? Reinvestments? This greatly enhances: Capital Allocation Flexibility. So Ackman is transitioning from: Portfolio Investor To: Holding Company Builder. ──────────────── Sixty-seven, this represents a huge transformation in his investment career. Young Ackman: Bought minority stakes. If he disagreed with management: Fought Proxy. Today: He increasingly hopes: To directly own a long-term control platform. This is a path that aligns very well with the laws of capital accumulation: Activist → Owner. From: Changing the company externally To: Internally owning the company long-term. ──────────────── Sixty-eight, why does Ackman now almost not need traditional Proxy Fights? Because: The influence structure has changed. In earlier years: No one knew him. Had to buy: 5%; Issue open letters; Fight for Board Seats. Today: Pershing is large; Has a long-term Track Record; CEOs actively welcome; Ackman has millions of followers on X. He himself said: Today after buying into some companies, Even CEOs will actively write letters: Welcome him as a shareholder. This is: Reputation Capital. ──────────────── 69. The truly highest form of Activism does not require Activism. If management knows: You: Long-termism; Influential; Have reasonable suggestions, They will naturally be willing to: Listen. This is more efficient than: Open warfare. It also reduces: Legal; Media; Reputation; Transaction costs. So Ackman's activism today has upgraded from: Coercion To: Influence. ──────────────── 70. This is a very natural evolution after capital reaches a certain scale. When poor: Must: Be loud. After having capital: The phone gets answered. Going further up: No need for a phone. Others come proactively. This is: Institutional Power Compounding. Capital not only earns: Financial returns. Also accumulates: Access; Information rights; Influence. ──────────────── 71. This is also why long-term reputation itself is an investment tool. An investor: Today for quarterly profits, Harms the company. Future management: Does not trust. Deal Flow decreases. An investor: 20 years proving: Long-term value orientation. In the future: Quality CEOs will cooperate proactively. This is called: Reputation Flywheel. Long-termism itself: Can generate Alpha. ──────────────── 72. The true value of Ackman's current "permanent capital" structure is far more than just not redeeming. It also makes Pershing Square: More aligned with external shareholders. Ackman and the team themselves hold: A large amount of economic interests in the management company; PSH; Howard Hughes; Other permanent capital entities. This means: They are increasingly like: Owners. And not: Purely collecting 2/20 as Asset Managers. ──────────────── 73. One of the biggest problems in the asset management industry is the Principal-Agent Problem. Traditional Hedge Fund: Manager: Takes management fees. LP: Bears principal risk. The larger the fund: The more the Manager charges. But: The larger the fund: The return may decrease. This creates: Conflicts of interest. Permanent capital + high internal holdings: Can partially alleviate. Because: Manager Wealth And: Vehicle Value Are bound together. ──────────────── 74. The strongest point of the Buffett model is precisely that "wealth aligns with shareholders." Buffett did not become the richest person by: Charging 2/20 every year. But rather: Holding Berkshire himself. Value appreciation: Is how he becomes rich. This structure creates a strong: Alignment. Ackman is increasingly moving towards: This structure today. ──────────────── 75. Pershing Square even believes it can rely on compounding to grow AUM without fundraising in the future. The official listing document clearly states: One of the advantages of permanent capital is: It can achieve AUM growth directly through: Investment returns, Instead of: Having to fundraise first to grow. This is completely different from traditional asset management companies. ──────────────── 76. This is called "organic AUM growth." Traditional Asset Manager: $10B → $20B. Needs: To raise an additional $10B. Permanent capital platform: $10B, If compounding continuously: Theoretically grows by itself. This is called: Capital Compounding as Distribution. No need for a sales team to constantly replenish capital. ──────────────── 77. This is also why Ackman says: if long-term returns are close to historical levels, managing a trillion dollars in 20 years is already sufficient. He publicly stated in his latest interview: If long-term compounding remains, Pershing Square managing: $1 trillion In 20 years is not hard to imagine. This is of course: A future projection. Not a predictive guarantee. But it shows that his thinking has completely shifted from: Fundraising Growth To: Compounding Growth. ──────────────── 78. This may be the highest-level business model in the asset management industry. The worst asset management business: Raises money every year anew. The best: Clients cannot leave; Funds grow by themselves; Management fee income rises with NAV; Operating fixed costs grow slowly. Thus: Operating Leverage Is huge. This explains why: Blackstone; Apollo; Brookfield Have also been pursuing: Permanent Capital. ──────────────── 79. The difference between Ackman and these alternative asset giants is that he prefers to maintain "highly concentrated investments." Pershing Square: Is not: Thousands of assets. Core portfolio: Is very concentrated. This increases: Volatility. But also increases: The contribution of each correct judgment To total returns. This is: High-conviction Capital Allocation. Permanent Capital: Is particularly suitable for this. Because: There is no redemption pressure. ──────────────── 80. This is also why ordinary investors find it difficult to replicate Ackman. Not because: They do not know what he holds. You can check: 13F. What cannot be truly replicated is: The capital structure. He can: Drop 40% and not sell. Ordinary people may: Need money. Fund managers may: Face redemptions. So: Investment strategy And: Capital duration Must be viewed together. Otherwise: The strategy cannot be replicated. ──────────────── 81. One of the most underestimated competitive advantages in investing is actually: Longer Time Horizon. If your competitors: Look at quarters. You look at: 5 years. You have: Temporal Arbitrage. Time arbitrage. The reason many assets in the market are mispriced: Is not: That no one is smart. But: Many capitals cannot wait. This is: Where permanent capital Truly creates Alpha. ──────────────── 82. AI may further enhance the value of this long-term capital. Why? Because AI transformation will create: More volatility; More mispricing; More "winners and losers" repricing. Short-term funds: Are afraid. Permanent capital: Can take advantage. So: The faster the technological changes, The importance of capital duration may actually increase. ──────────────── 83. Ackman's attitude towards the AI bubble is actually very close to Buffett's attitude towards the internet, but more open. Buffett back then: Did not invest in technology he did not understand. Ackman today: Acknowledges that AI is: A highly transformative technology. Also starting to: Invest in Venture; Research Agents; Invest in AI-benefiting infrastructure. But: Unwilling to buy at any price. This is: Participate without abandoning valuation. ──────────────── 84. This may be one of the most correct postures for value investing in the AI era. Completely rejecting AI: May miss the era. Completely chasing AI: May buy into a bubble. The truly mature approach: Acknowledges the technological revolution. At the same time: Adheres to capital discipline. Technology being correct Does not mean: Price is correct. ──────────────── 85. Ackman's evaluation of Brookfield is also very enlightening. He believes: Companies like Brookfield may become winners in the AI era, Because AI needs: Data centers; Electricity; Real infrastructure. He even said: The demand for Compute is nearly: Unlimited. This reflects: He is rethinking the "AI moat": Not only looking at: Software. But also looking at: Physical Bottlenecks. ──────────────── 86. The more virtual AI is, the more physical the underlying is. Model operation requires: Chips. Chips need: Electricity. Electricity needs: The grid. Data centers need: Land; Water; Cooling; Financing. So one of the biggest investment opportunities in AI may precisely be: "The companies that look least like AI." This is called: Second-order Beneficiary. ──────────────── 87. This highly matches Ackman's preferred investment model. He does not need to predict: Which model company will ultimately win. Can invest in: The infrastructure that all models must use. This is: Picks and Shovels. But must continue to judge: Valuation. No asset can be divorced from: Price. ──────────────── 88. One of Ackman's biggest investment advantages is actually being willing to place huge bets after being "extremely certain." Ordinary funds: 50 stocks. One mistake: Impact is small. Pershing: Few investments. Means: Each research must be deeper. If the judgment holds: Can invest: In the billion-dollar range. This is: Research Intensity × Position Concentration. ──────────────── 89. The biggest premise of concentrated investment is not "having confidence," but knowing where you might be wrong. So Checklist. So Expert Networks. So former employees. So competitors. So team Debate. Not for: Proving Thesis. Instead: Finding: Thesis Breaker. This is: Falsification. ──────────────── Ninety, the most dangerous investment research is not "too little data," but that everyone on the team wants to prove the boss right. Therefore, Pershing Square places special emphasis on: Long-term team trust; Open culture. Ackman says he is very confident today that the investment team will tell him: Risks and bad news directly. This is an extremely important organizational asset. ──────────────── Ninety-one, a truly excellent investment institution must make "opposing the boss" a rewarded behavior. Otherwise: Founder Intelligence will eventually turn into: Organizational risk. The more dominant the investor: The easier it is: Confirmation Bias. So a truly professional organization must: Systematically create: Dissent. This is a problem that all billionaire-led organizations need to solve. ──────────────── Ninety-two, Ackman's career is actually a very typical process of "from smart to disciplined." In his youth: Searching for: Complex transactions; Activism; Big battles. Later: He was taught lessons by Valeant and Herbalife. Today: Simple; Durable; Predictable; Permanent. This is actually a common path for many top investors. Young investors like: Smart. Mature investors like: Survivability. ──────────────── Ninety-three, the truly most important ability for long-term investing is not to earn the fastest, but to avoid permanent exclusion. This is similar to Moritz's Tail Risk thinking. A serious mistake: If: Leverage; Redemption; Shorting overlap, it can: End a career. So: Risk Management The primary task is not: To reduce daily volatility. But to: Prevent Ruin. ──────────────── Ninety-four, what Ackman truly learned from 2015-2016 is that "even if the Thesis is ultimately correct, you may not live to see that day come." This is a very important principle in the capital world. Keynes's classic saying: "The market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent." Herbalife: This is the structure. Therefore: Investors must be correct at the same time on: Direction; Structure; Timing. ──────────────── Ninety-five, this is also the ultimate value of permanent capital: it enhances the ability to "wait until you are right." You cannot: Eliminate price volatility. But you can: Eliminate many: Forced trades. This is: Structural Alpha. Not stock-picking skills. But: Investment advantages brought by organizational design. ──────────────── Ninety-six, AOI, Howard Hughes, and Pershing Square may seem completely different, but they are fundamentally based on the same Ackman logic. AOI: Long-term neuroscience. Howard Hughes: Long-term community + insurance. Pershing Square: Long-term holding of top companies. The common point of the three: Long Duration. Ackman is increasingly obviously engaged in: Projects with very long cycles. This indicates that his time preference: Has changed. ──────────────── Ninety-seven, once you are truly wealthy to a certain extent, the capital question will shift from "how much money can I make" to "which matters are worth my investment for twenty years." This is the ultimate transformation for all ultra-high-net-worth investors. In the first half of life: Accumulation. In the second half of life: Allocation of Life. Where to invest money. More importantly: Where to invest time. Lucy's medical incident has clearly accelerated this change. ──────────────── Ninety-eight, AOI may ultimately become Ackman's largest "non-financial investment." Investing in stocks: Success. Earning: Tens of billions of dollars. If AOI: Truly changes: Brain injury rehabilitation; Blindness recovery; BCI; Neurodegenerative diseases, its social return: Cannot be measured by: IRR. This is: Impact Compounding. ──────────────── Ninety-nine, but AOI also needs to avoid a common risk in wealthy scientific research projects: Money ≠ Scientific Truth. Having money can: Buy equipment; Hire talent; Accelerate experiments. But: Cannot: Buy the correct answers. Neuroscience is extremely complex. Many treatments: Fail clinically. So for AOI to truly succeed: It must establish: Strong scientific governance; External validation; Randomized controlled studies; Long-term data. Cannot let: Founder Conviction replace: Scientific Evidence. ──────────────── One hundred, this is also the biggest difference between Ackman's investment logic and scientific logic. Investing: High Conviction can be heavily invested. Science: High Conviction must still: Be falsifiable. So if AOI truly absorbs Ackman's execution power, while retaining: Scientific rigor, it may become: A very unique institution. ──────────────── One hundred one, the first lesson from Bill Ackman in 2026 that is truly worth learning: business moats must be re-examined. What was effective in the past: Does not mean it will be effective in the future. Especially: Information moats; Software interfaces; Traditional processes; Inefficient intermediaries. AI may quickly erode all of these. Any long-term investment today must ask: If AI can reduce the costs of this industry by 80%, who will take away the value? The company? Competitors? Customers? ──────────────── One hundred two, the second lesson: do not pursue "AI winners," pursue "those who can retain profits after AI." All companies will: Increase efficiency. True shareholder returns depend on: Retention of Efficiency Gains. If: There is no Pricing Power, Efficiency dividends: Will ultimately go to consumers. So: AI Stock Picking is essentially still: Industry Structure Analysis. ──────────────── One hundred three, the third lesson: finance in bull markets, survive in bear markets. For entrepreneurs: When capital is cheap: Take the money. But: Do not burn money based on: The assumption that you can always raise funds in the future. The best companies after the bubble bursts: Instead have the opportunity to: Buy talent; Buy assets; Expand markets. The premise: Survive first. ──────────────── One hundred four, the fourth lesson: establish a "world-class asset library." Do not chase: New stocks every day. Long-term research: The best companies. Wait for: The price. When the market: Panics, You have: Knowledge Advantage. This is one of the easiest Ackman methods for ordinary people to replicate. ──────────────── One hundred five, the fifth lesson: funding sources must match investment cycles. Long-term assets: Do not use: Short-term liabilities. Illiquid Assets: Do not use: Capital that can be redeemed at any time. This is a principle applicable from: Real Estate; Private Equity; Insurance to: Hedge Funds Match Duration. ──────────────── One hundred six, the best investment advantage may not be "smarter," but "less forced." If others: Margin Call. You do not. Others: Redemption. You do not. Others: Quarterly KPIs. You do not. Then: The more panic in the market, The greater your competitive advantage. This is: Freedom from Forced Action. ──────────────── One hundred seven, the seventh lesson: do not be obsessed with public shorting. Shorting has value in: Information discovery; Market supervision. But it is very cruel to portfolio structure. If you want to express a negative view, A better way is usually to: Define the maximum loss. For example: Options; CDS. That is: Known Downside, Open Upside. ──────────────── One hundred eight, the eighth lesson: a good investment system must record "what mistakes you have made." Slate Checklist: The real value is not the principles. But: The mistakes: Permanent memory. Every company should have: A Failure Library. Why did we: Fail? Which assumptions: Were wrong? How to prevent: It from happening again? This is: Institutional Learning. ──────────────── One hundred nine, activism should ultimately upgrade to ownership. Young capital: Changes others. Mature capital: Owns. If you truly believe: You can do better, The ultimate strongest way: Is not to write an open letter. But to: Control capital allocation. This is the true meaning of Howard Hughes. ──────────────── One hundred ten, insurance is not a "financial business," but a long-term capital machine. Many people see: Insurance. Think of: Selling policies. Buffett sees: Capital Source. This is a primary cognitive difference. Ackman is doing: The same thing today. But whether it can succeed: Ultimately depends on: Underwriting discipline + investment returns. Not: The story. ──────────────── One hundred eleven, if Howard Hughes really succeeds, it would complete a very interesting asset transformation. Phase One: Land. Phase Two: Sell land to obtain cash. Phase Three: Cash injection into insurance. Phase Four: Insurance creates Float. Phase Five: Float + Equity invests in stocks. Thus: Illiquid Real Estate Capital gradually transforms into: Compounding Financial Capital. This is a very beautiful capital project. ──────────────── One hundred twelve, it is essentially about increasing the "capital reinvestment rate." Real Estate: Every piece of land sold, assets decrease. If the money: is used to buy land again, the real estate cycle continues. Ackman now says: No longer infinitely buying new properties. Instead: Direct cash into: Vantage. This is equivalent to: turning a naturally self-liquidating business into: a: Capital Recycling Machine. ──────────────── One hundred thirteen, what truly excellent capital allocators do is continuously migrate capital from low-return forms to high-return forms. Cash: low return. Real Estate: medium. Insurance Equity + Float + high-quality stocks: if executed perfectly, higher. This is: Capital Migration. Berkshire is also: Textiles → Insurance → Stocks → Operating Companies. ──────────────── One hundred fourteen, so what the "modern version of Berkshire" should really replicate is not the industry, but the ability to migrate capital. Many people mistakenly imitate Buffett: buy insurance. In fact: insurance is just a tool. The real core: is to continuously send every dollar to the place with the highest long-term risk-adjusted return. Today: Apple. Tomorrow: Railroads. The day after tomorrow: Energy. This is called: Dynamic Capital Allocation. Whether Howard Hughes can ultimately succeed: depends on this. ──────────────── One hundred fifteen, Ackman is currently trying to upgrade himself from a "stock picker" to a "capital system designer." This is a change in professional hierarchy. Level 1: Pick Stocks. Level 2: Build Portfolio. Level 3: Manage Fund. Level 4: Design Permanent Capital Vehicle. Level 5: Own Operating Businesses + Insurance + Capital Allocation Platform. Buffett: eventually reaches: Level 5. Ackman is clearly also moving in this direction. ──────────────── One hundred sixteen, this is also why he is no longer satisfied with being a "great Hedge Fund Manager." Hedge Fund Manager: career lifespan is limited. Holding Company: can: cross generations. So the deepest motivation behind the modern Berkshire plan may be: Institution Building. Not: how much to earn this year. But: a hundred years later: will this machine still exist? ──────────────── One hundred seventeen, this is very similar to his motivation for establishing AOI. Funds: may rely on Ackman. AOI: should not. Howard Hughes: should not either. A truly long-cycle institution: must achieve: Founder Eventually Becomes Optional. This is: Institution. Otherwise: it is just a personal extension. ──────────────── One hundred eighteen, so the most interesting change in Ackman's identity is not investment style, but time scale. In youth: Trade / Campaign. In middle age: Concentrated Investing. Now: Permanent Capital; Insurance; Brain Institute. The time cycle has changed from: quarters; years; to: decades. This is: Duration Expansion. The larger the capital: the longer the time. ──────────────── One hundred nineteen, and AI precisely creates the greatest cognitive conflict for this long-termism. On one hand: he wants to invest in: companies that won’t be sold for ten years. On the other hand: AI makes: the predictability over ten years decrease. So Ackman's hardest work in the future may not be: finding cheap stocks. But: finding those: even with rapid changes in AI, still possess: Durable Economics. This is: the real issue for the next generation of value investing. ──────────────── One hundred twenty, which assets might have this AI-era Durability? Possibly including: infrastructure; scarce physical assets; global networks; top brands; businesses with regulatory or licensing barriers; low-cost production assets; insurance; a few platforms that truly possess system-level data and distribution. In contrast: pure information intermediaries; simple SaaS; industries that profit from manual inefficiency; ordinary content; may be more dangerous. This is not an absolute answer. But: a new moat ranking. ──────────────── One hundred twenty-one, the most important model for investing in the AI era may further upgrade from DCF to "Disruption-adjusted DCF." Traditional DCF: Revenue; Margin; Growth; Discount Rate. In the future, an implicit variable is also needed: Probability of Business Model Obsolescence. If: there is a 30% probability that the business model will be replaced within 10 years, valuation: should significantly decline. This is actually similar to: Credit Risk. Future stock analysis may increasingly resemble: Default Probability of Moat. ──────────────── One hundred twenty-two, this is also why in the AI era, "easily predictable" companies may receive a higher valuation premium. Not because: they are boring. But because: the risk of prediction decreases. If all digital companies face high Disruption Risk, companies that can prove: long-term cash flow stability may have a lower cost of capital. This is a very interesting second-order effect of AI on asset valuation. ──────────────── One hundred twenty-three, what should ordinary investors learn most from Ackman? Not: to replicate his holdings. But: First, have a Checklist. Second: establish a long-term Watchlist. Third: write clearly before buying: Thesis. Fourth: think clearly: what conditions indicate you are wrong. Fifth: do not use leverage that may permanently put you out. Sixth: allocate long-term assets for long-term capital. Seventh: companies you do not understand: do not need to buy. ──────────────── One hundred twenty-four, ordinary investors should also particularly remember Ackman's response about Index Funds. He said very directly in a recent interview: If you are willing to truly invest a lot of time: to study companies, you can invest actively. If you just want to achieve: long-term growth in the stock market, index funds are: a very good method, and have outperformed most active investors in the long run. This is a very memorable answer given by a billionaire active fund manager. ──────────────── One hundred twenty-five, those who truly want to invest actively must accept a fact: research is not an interest, but a job. Watching CNBC: is not called research. Watching stock groups: is not called research. Real research includes: 10-K; 10-Q; conference calls; competitors; experts; management; valuation; industry structure. A company like Pershing: usually requires: two analysts to dig deep. Then: the entire team challenges. So active investing: has a high threshold. ──────────────── One hundred twenty-six, Ackman's use of AI is actually very restrained. Interestingly: although he highly recognizes AI, Pershing Square currently does not let AI: directly build investment models. The main use still leans towards: Research Tool. Ackman believes: when everyone has the same AI, the real difference still comes from: Outside-the-box Thinking; creative insights. This statement is very important. ──────────────── One hundred twenty-seven, AI may eliminate "information advantages," but it increases the value of "judgment advantages." In the past: you knew information that others did not. Alpha. In the future: everyone asks AI. Information becomes increasingly: Commodity. What remains is: Interpretation. The same information: different conclusions. This is: Judgment Alpha. Investing may increasingly return to: the most primitive human ability: independent judgment. ──────────────── One hundred twenty-eight, so AI may not make top investors lose value, but rather may widen the gap. Ordinary analytical work: is automated by AI. Everyone can get: beautiful reports. Then the real question is: who dares: to bet when everyone disagrees? Who knows: which fact is the most important? Who knows: what the model has not seen? This is: Meta-level Judgment. ──────────────── 129. One of the most interesting aspects of Ackman's career is that his greatest gains often come from judgments outside of models. Financial Crisis: Bought bankrupt General Growth Equity. COVID: Bought credit protection early. Inflation: Bet on rising interest rates. None of these were: Traditional Screening Models that automatically told him. So his Alpha often comes from: Structural Insight. Seeing: What the system will do. ──────────────── 130. And this is also one of the parts that is truly difficult to automate in the AI era. AI is good at: Summarizing history. But extreme Alpha often comes from: New combinations that have never appeared in the world before. Pandemic + Credit. AI + Electricity. Insurance + Real Estate + Permanent Capital. This requires: Analogical Reasoning. Piecing together new structures from different fields. ──────────────── 131. Finally, back to Lucy: this life crisis actually explains all the changes in Ackman today. When a person truly faces: The possibility of a child's death, Many things that were important in the past: Suddenly become small. Wealth; Fund rankings; Media wins and losses are reordered. During his daughter's hospitalization, Ackman even moved his office near Mount Sinai hospital, accompanying her while completing the listing work for Pershing Square. This is a very strong: Life Compression. ──────────────── 132. The greatest value of wealth at such moments is not consumption, but "optional rights." Ordinary families encounter: Experimental treatments; Global experts; Long-term rehabilitation that may be: Limited by funds. Ackman can: Summon doctors; Purchase equipment; Research new therapies; Even: Establish research institutes. This is the true highest function of wealth: Optionality under crisis. Not: Luxury homes. Not: Planes. But: When the world suddenly changes, Having more: Choices. ──────────────── 133. But his truly interesting next step is trying to transform private optionality into public capability. If it’s just: To save his daughter. This is: Private wealth. If he can turn: Doctors; Equipment; Methods; Research; Data into: AOI, so that future ordinary patients can also benefit, then that is: Institutionalized Optionality. Turning the privileges of the wealthy: Into: Public healthcare capabilities. This is what AOI is truly worth paying attention to. ──────────────── 134. This is actually completely aligned with the ultimate evolution of Ackman's investments. Young: Earn his own money. Later: Manage other people's money. Today: Build: A capital machine that can operate even after he leaves and: A research machine. This is moving from: Wealth Creation to: Institution Creation. ──────────────── 135. What is truly worth remembering from Bill Ackman's latest interview is not which stock will rise, but three types of "permanence." First: Permanent capital. Allowing investors not to be pressured by the market. Second: Permanent moats. Searching for cash flows that can still sustain in the AI era. Third: Permanent institutions. Establishing: Howard Hughes; Pershing Square; AOI, that can compound even after he leaves. These three things are actually the same thought: How to turn short-term success into long-term compounding? ──────────────── The most memorable sentence: In the first half of Bill Ackman's career, he was most famous for: Confrontation. Short selling. Proxy battles. Public criticism. High-concentration bets. But what he is truly building today is increasingly unlike a traditional hedge fund. Pershing Square is turning capital into: Permanent Capital. Howard Hughes is turning: Land assets that will gradually be sold into: Insurance Float + Stock Assets + Long-term Holding Platforms. AOI is trying to turn: A private family disaster into: A brain science and rehabilitation research institution that can last for decades. The common point of these three things is: Compounding without forced interruption. Not being forced to interrupt compounding. This is also Warren Buffett's most important secret. It’s not: Picking Coca-Cola. Nor is it: Having insurance Float. But: For decades, almost never being pressured by others: To make decisions at the wrong time. Permanent capital gives him: Time. Insurance Float gives him: Low-cost capital. Excellent companies give him: Compounding objects. And discipline gives him: The ability not to destroy this machine. What Ackman is trying to replicate today is not: "Another Berkshire portfolio." But rather: Berkshire's capital operating system. Control. Permanent capital. Retained profits. Low-cost liabilities. Minimal dilution. Concentrated investments. Excellent operators. And then: Decades without interruption. Meanwhile, AI has pushed this entire philosophy towards a more difficult new question: If the speed of change in the world has become so fast that even today's greatest companies may suddenly lose their moats, then what is still worth holding for ten years? This may be the real question Ackman needs to answer in the next phase of his investment career. Not: How much are AI companies worth? But rather: Which companies can leverage AI but will not be commoditized by AI? Not: Who has the greatest cost reduction. But rather: Who can retain the cost reductions as shareholder profits? Not: Which industry is the hottest. But rather: Which business model can still predict, price, and generate free cash flow even as technology continues to change at the current pace? True value investing has never been about: Buying cheap stocks. It’s about finding: The most durable compounding structures in an uncertain world. And Bill Ackman in 2026 is increasingly less like a: Hedge fund trader. And more like a: Capital systems designer. This may be the most important perspective to understand him today.