After being effectively blocked for six months, Qatar's liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports have fallen 96% compared to the same period last year, with only 18 shipments sent out, down from 509 shipments last year; data from energy intelligence firm ICIS.

Qatar is one of the Gulf energy exporters most severely affected by the current conflict. According to Reuters, based on revenue levels in 2025, its gas sales losses are estimated at around $24 billion, equivalent to about five months of the country's fiscal revenue; this figure is an estimate and does not equate to the final financial losses confirmed by the Qatari government.

Qatar's dependence on the strait is greater than that of its neighbors: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, and Kuwait can still export some crude oil through alternative routes or covert transport, but Qatar's LNG exports primarily rely on shipping routes that pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Two Qatari LNG carriers were attacked during the conflict, further increasing shipping, insurance, and operational risks.

U.S. LNG exporters have increased shipments to partially fill the gap left by Qatar. U.S. LNG exports are expected to grow by about 25% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, with more supplies directed to Europe and Asia; however, the new U.S. supply is still insufficient to fully offset the scale of Qatar's near standstill and shipping disruptions.

European gas storage levels are unusually low. Data from Gas Infrastructure Europe shows that as of August 24, the average filling rate of EU gas storage was 62.99%, down from about 79% of the five-year average; Germany was at 51%, and the Netherlands at 44.3%. This is the closest Europe has been to the current low inventory levels since 2021.

The EU is simultaneously facing interruptions in Qatari LNG and the exit of Russian gas: the EU has decided to ban imports of Russian LNG and pipeline gas starting March 18, 2026, and plans to completely stop Russian gas imports by the end of 2027. If the window for replenishing gas storage continues to be limited, Europe will rely more on U.S. LNG, Norwegian pipeline gas, demand reduction, and high-priced spot purchases.

In market mechanisms, the gap from Qatar will drive European and Asian buyers to compete for U.S., Australian, West African, and other available LNG spot cargoes, leading to simultaneous increases in spot prices, freight, and insurance costs; U.S. exporters, LNG shipowners, regasification terminals, and alternative supply countries will benefit. European gas-intensive industries, power generation companies, and end consumers will be under pressure; if the winter is colder than usual, low inventories will amplify the impact of marginal cargoes on prices.

Source: Public Information