Qatar's Gas Exports Plummet 96% Due to Strait of Hormuz Blockage, Losses Estimated at $24 Billion
After being effectively blocked for six months, Qatar's liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports have fallen 96% compared to the same period last year, with only 18 shipments sent out, down from 509 shipments last year; data from energy intelligence firm ICIS.
Qatar is one of the Gulf energy exporters most severely affected by the current conflict. According to Reuters, based on revenue levels in 2025, its gas sales losses are estimated at around $24 billion, equivalent to about five months of the country's fiscal revenue; this figure is an estimate and does not equate to the final financial losses confirmed by the Qatari government.
Qatar's dependence on the strait is greater than that of its neighbors: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, and Kuwait can still export some crude oil through alternative routes or covert transport, but Qatar's LNG exports primarily rely on shipping routes that pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Two Qatari LNG carriers were attacked during the conflict, further increasing shipping, insurance, and operational risks.
U.S. LNG exporters have increased shipments to partially fill the gap left by Qatar. U.S. LNG exports are expected to grow by about 25% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, with more supplies directed to Europe and Asia; however, the new U.S. supply is still insufficient to fully offset the scale of Qatar's near standstill and shipping disruptions.
European gas storage levels are unusually low. Data from Gas Infrastructure Europe shows that as of August 24, the average filling rate of EU gas storage was 62.99%, down from about 79% of the five-year average; Germany was at 51%, and the Netherlands at 44.3%. This is the closest Europe has been to the current low inventory levels since 2021.
The EU is simultaneously facing interruptions in Qatari LNG and the exit of Russian gas: the EU has decided to ban imports of Russian LNG and pipeline gas starting March 18, 2026, and plans to completely stop Russian gas imports by the end of 2027. If the window for replenishing gas storage continues to be limited, Europe will rely more on U.S. LNG, Norwegian pipeline gas, demand reduction, and high-priced spot purchases.
In market mechanisms, the gap from Qatar will drive European and Asian buyers to compete for U.S., Australian, West African, and other available LNG spot cargoes, leading to simultaneous increases in spot prices, freight, and insurance costs; U.S. exporters, LNG shipowners, regasification terminals, and alternative supply countries will benefit. European gas-intensive industries, power generation companies, and end consumers will be under pressure; if the winter is colder than usual, low inventories will amplify the impact of marginal cargoes on prices.
Source: Public Information
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Qatar's vulnerability lies not in resource reserves, but in its single-point dependence on export routes. The North Field gives it one of the largest LNG supply capacities globally, but the liquefied gas must leave the Persian Gulf by ship; once stability in the Strait of Hormuz is lost, the production capacity of the gas fields, liquefaction facilities, and long-term contracts cannot be directly converted into deliverable income. Compared to some energy systems that can export through pipelines or land alternatives, Qatar's logistical bottleneck is more concentrated.
Capital flows have shifted to U.S. LNG. The year-on-year gap of nearly 509 shipments from Qatar has increased European and Asian buyers' reliance on U.S. Gulf Coast export projects, with U.S. export volumes rising about 25%, reflecting this redistribution. U.S. supply is not a "free substitute": buyers must bear longer shipping distances, spot premiums, liquefaction fees, transportation costs, and insurance fees; the bargaining power for long-term contracts has shifted from buyers to exporters who control available liquefaction capacity and flexible cargoes.
A historical comparison is the process of Europe replacing Russian pipeline gas after the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. At that time, Europe relied on high prices to attract global LNG, expanded regasification capacity, and reduced demand to weather the shock; the current situation is more difficult because EU inventories are only at 62.99%, about 16 percentage points below the five-year average, while Middle Eastern supplies are disrupted and Russian imports are on a withdrawal path. 2021 was the only year in the past 15 years that approached current low inventory levels during the same period, after which Europe experienced severe energy price shocks.
This represents a restructuring of the supply chain. The global natural gas market is shifting from "Qatar's low-cost base supply + Russian pipeline gas" to "U.S. dispatchable LNG + European spot bidding + higher transportation and security costs". The mechanism is that both pipeline gas and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have geopolitical single-point risks; once both low-cost supply channels fail simultaneously, marginal supply will be priced by more distant, more expensive, but flexible LNG cargoes, increasing Europe's winter prices' sensitivity to weather and spot arrival volumes.
ABAB News · Cognitive Laws
Resources are underground, pricing power is in export channels
When inventories are insufficient, marginal cargoes determine the price for the entire winter
Energy de-reliance does not mean escaping risks, but changing the source of risks