The SVM Layer 1 network Fogo reported that the foundation was breached by an unknown attacker, with approximately 400 million FOGO tokens transferred to the attacker's address. The blockchain itself continues to produce blocks.

The foundation has notified relevant exchanges and is in contact with law enforcement and on-chain forensic teams, stating that further reports will follow, but no network upgrades have been announced yet. Public market data shows the token price around $0.0075, with a daily drop of about 18%. The total supply is recorded as 10 billion tokens in project materials, with 400 million representing about 4% of the total; 200 million tokens were burned before launch, with an initial circulation of about 39%. Funding paths include seed rounds from Distributed Global and CMS Holdings, approximately $8 million through the Echo platform, and a presale at the wallet end. OtterSec had previously audited its session framework and listed high-risk items such as unrevoked authorizations and rental account permissions, which do not align with the official statement of "the foundation was hacked, and tokens were transferred"; the official report did not specify the type of vulnerability.

The transferred tokens were controlled by the foundation, not due to validator downtime or consensus forks. Whether exchanges can freeze the incoming address will determine if the selling pressure leads to an immediate crash or gets stuck on-chain. The normal operation of the network only indicates that block production has not stopped, not that the treasury keys or multi-signature are still intact.

From a market mechanism perspective, this is a sell-off expectation transaction after the treasury was breached. The buyer is a trader taking over or shorting the circulating supply, while the seller is the address holding the stolen tokens. Funds move from the foundation's wallet to the attacker's address, and whether they can be liquidated depends on the cooperation of exchanges. The beneficiaries are the exchanges that can quickly mark the address for risk control, while the pressured parties are the holders of the circulating supply and market makers treating the foundation's inventory as a buffer for unlocking. A one-time turnover of 4% of the total supply is enough to impact short-term depth; the chain's operation does not hedge against the loss of inventory. Notifying exchanges is a standard action, and whether freezing is successful will change supply and demand.

In supplementary statements, the official has not disclosed the stolen address, announced any buyback or issuance for hedging, nor clarified whether the multi-signature is still controlled by the original signers.

Source: Public Information