As a perpetual DEX on Arbitrum, AFX Trade previously relied on third-party bridges for USDC. This attack is suspected to have exploited a vulnerability in the multi-signature verification mechanism, similar to past cases where cross-chain bridge signature keys or thresholds were breached. The Arbitrum team has clarified that this is not an issue with their native bridge.

In terms of capital flow, the attacker directly exchanged for ETH after cross-chaining to achieve rapid liquidity realization, motivated by the desire to avoid the risk of stablecoin freezing. The project and bridge operators face user fund losses and a crisis of trust, highlighting the security risks of outsourcing DeFi bridging.

Similar historical events like Gravity Bridge or Nomad Bridge have shown that third-party bridge risks are common in Japanese or Korean projects. AFX Trade is currently in a phase of Layer 2 DeFi expansion, but its infrastructure security is lagging.

Structural Judgment

This essentially relates to regulatory changes. The multi-signature mechanism of cross-chain bridges is vulnerable to internal or external breaches, pushing the industry towards native bridges and intentional architectures. The mechanism lies in the tension between centralized verification and decentralized execution, prompting capital to concentrate from high-risk third-party bridges to mature Layer 2 native solutions, while accelerating regulatory scrutiny of bridging services.

ABAB News · Law of Cognition

Multi-signature is not security; it is a delayed single point of failure.
The bridge is the throat of funds; whoever controls the bridge controls the flow.
Stablecoin freezing forces out ETH paths; attackers are always one step ahead of the rules.