Pentagon Plans to Withdraw About 25,000 Troops from Europe
NBC cited seven current and former U.S. and Western officials stating that the Pentagon is weighing options to withdraw aircraft, ships, weapons, and tens of thousands of U.S. troops from Europe, potentially amounting to about 25,000 personnel or more, which is nearly one-third of the U.S. military presence in Europe. NATO allies have simultaneously warned of rising threats from Russia.
The plan has not been finalized. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had planned to announce a reduction of about 25,000 troops in Brussels in June, but due to hitting the congressional mandated minimum of about 76,000 troops in Europe and facing internal government resistance, it was changed to a six-month situational assessment. Options are expected to be submitted for review by November 6, with a decision to be made by the president in early December. Policy chief Elbridge Colby has framed the direction as requiring Europe to "quickly and irreversibly" take on conventional defense responsibilities.
Withdrawals that have already occurred include: approximately 5,000 troops from Germany and the cancellation of long-range artillery battalion deployments; the rotation of an armored brigade in Poland has not been filled; a previously rotated unit in Romania has withdrawn; the availability of strategic bombers, fighter jets, tankers, anti-submarine aircraft, submarines, and carrier strike groups in crisis plans has been downgraded. Other sources indicate that the policy office's plan ranges from 25,000 to 50,000 personnel.
The total number of U.S. troops stationed in Europe, including rotations, is about 80,000, which is below the Cold War average of about 94,000. There are only three fighter jet squadrons permanently deployed in Europe, with no permanent strategic bombers; surface ships mainly consist of one command ship from Italy and five destroyers from Spain, the latter often being redeployed to the Eastern Mediterranean. Think tanks warn that filling the gaps in European military capabilities may take until the end of the decade, with the core risk being a mismatch between capability and time.
In market terms, this is a repricing of defense responsibilities rather than an immediate surge in arms sales: what is being bought is the air defense, ammunition, ground forces, and industrial capacity that Europe must procure; what is being sold is the assumption that U.S. rotational brigades can continue to serve as free deterrents. Beneficiaries include European defense contractors and key ammunition lines that need to fill gaps; those under pressure are countries on the eastern flank that rely on U.S. rotational brigades, as well as the U.S. logistics chain that uses bases in Europe as springboards to the Middle East and Africa. Congressional minimums and legal procedures remain a brake on these plans.
Additionally, it was announced in 2020 that about 12,000 troops would be moved from Germany; the 2026 defense strategy has already framed the U.S. role as "critical but more limited support." The assessment itself is being used as a tool to pressure allies who say "no or let’s wait and see."
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During Trump's first term, a withdrawal of 12,000 troops from Germany was rehearsed, and in the second term, it became institutionalized: first written into the 2026 defense strategy, then announced by Hegseth for a six-month review, with Colby advancing the timeline for European conventional defense responsibilities under "NATO 3.0." The figure of 25,000 troops did not materialize in Brussels in June because Congress had set the troop level in Europe at a minimum of about 76,000. NBC's report of "still weighing options" reflects a change in the window for the same plan, not a sudden decision. The executed withdrawals of 5,000 troops from Germany, the vacancy of the Polish brigade, and the downsizing in Romania are part of the early realization of the review results.
The direction of resource mobilization is towards the Pacific and the Middle East, with Europe becoming limited support. The cancellation of the Dark Eagle hypersonic artillery battalion, along with the reduction of tankers and anti-submarine aircraft, can alter the operational picture more significantly than withdrawing infantry. Money will not be immediately moved back from European bases but will manifest as halted rotations, downgraded command levels, and fewer U.S. military modules in crisis plans. Europe needs to make up for gaps in ammunition, air defense, and ground brigades, with the timeline being unilaterally compressed by Washington to around the end of the review.
In comparison to Nixon's Guam Doctrine, Obama's pivot to Asia during a time of European "austerity," and the U.S. military's return to the eastern flank after 2022, the current phase is "strategy written, troops not fully withdrawn": Europe is being asked to fill conventional gaps within ten years, while U.S. reviews may initially widen those gaps between 2027 and 2028. Both Hudson and London defense think tanks agree that Russia is testing whether the alliance will fracture during this gap, not how many fighter jet squadrons the U.S. has left.
The structure belongs to a security responsibility reconstruction driven by regulatory changes. The irreversibility of congressional minimums, NATO command chains, and base closures turns an administrative review into a cross-administration fact. The mechanism is: permanent troops are expensive, rotations can be halted at any time; by halting rotations first and then cutting aircraft and ship availability, the deterrence equation can be changed without breaching the legal troop limits, shifting the pricing power from "U.S. military presence" to "whether Europe can pay to train on Washington's timeline."