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Mitsui O.S.K. Lines CEO: Risks in Hormuz Difficult to Return to Pre-War State

Mitsui O.S.K. Lines President and CEO Jotaro Tamura stated that attacks on vessels have heightened the risks of transporting crude oil by tankers, and a ceasefire does not automatically equate to safe navigation. The impact of disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz will last longer than the conflict itself.

In an interview with Reuters during Singapore Maritime Week, he noted that the temporary ceasefire two weeks ago had initially raised hopes, but the agreement did not translate into safety and passage in the Strait; the term "open" itself needs definition—whether it is fully open, partially open, or open but still carries risks. In comments to the Financial Times, he insisted that the agreement must become an operational reality in the Strait for commercial shipowners to return, mentioning mines, navigation rules, and multiple false starts. He estimated that the navigation situation would take at least several weeks, possibly around a month, to stabilize.

Tamura took office on April 1, coinciding with the second phase of BLUE ACTION 2035. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines has one of the largest tanker fleets globally, with approximately 211 tankers, about 35 crude oil carriers, and around 194 LNG vessels. Following U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran in late February, Japanese shipowners collectively halted operations in the Strait; on March 11, the company's container ship One Majesty was damaged at the stern while anchored about 97 kilometers from the Strait, with two holes in the hull, but no casualties or water ingress, and the cause has not been definitively determined.

At the peak of the blockade, there were over a hundred very large crude carriers in the Gulf. Subsequently, there were segmented breakthroughs: in April, LNG and LPG vessels associated with the company passed through the Strait without paying tolls to Iran, which Tamura referred to as adhering to international navigation principles; at the end of April, the Japanese-associated crude oil carrier Idemitsu Maru exited along the northern route designated by Tehran. In July, at least eight Mitsui O.S.K. Lines-controlled vessels—including five very large crude carriers of about 2 million barrels each, two chemical tankers, and one car carrier—changed their routes to exit closer to the Iranian side, some of which had previously attempted to use U.S.-managed routes via Oman without success.

He also told Bloomberg that it is naive to think everything will return to the pre-war state after the conflict ends, stating, "We will not go back to that world." Even if the Strait reopens, the industry will have to diversify procurement according to geopolitical risks; Asian economies are already weighting oil sources outside the Middle East. The company prioritizes the safety of crew, vessels, and cargo, and passage through the Strait still requires guidance from the Japanese government, adding that if the conflict drags on, raw material shortages could impact manufacturing and cargo volumes.

Who is buying and who is selling: the driving forces are war risks, detours, and alternative oil sources, not daily freight rate fluctuations. Cargo owners are paying higher premiums and longer routes to ensure supply, while shipowners are hoarding vessels between "can sail" and "dare to sail"; benefiting are shipowners with fleets that are not heavily tied to Gulf ports and those with diversified fleets, while under pressure are the crude oil trade accounts heavily bound to Gulf ports and the war risk coverage that has not been fully reinsured. The previous structure, with about 130 vessels entering and exiting the Strait daily—accounting for about 20% of global maritime crude oil and LNG—has been rewritten into a permitted passage with convoy systems.

Source: Public Information

ABAB AI Insight

Mitsui O.S.K. Lines is not new to paying tuition in the Gulf. In 2010, its M. Star was damaged by an explosion from a small boat near Hormuz, with UAE investigations pointing to homemade explosives, and the Abdullah Azzam Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack. In 2026, One Majesty again left holes in the hull in the same waters, indicating that the company's risk model's "acceptable" level has never been zero attacks, but rather whether premiums, charterers, and Tokyo diplomacy can simultaneously support a vessel. Tamura's threshold for resuming operations is to lower safety risks to a sufficiently low level, upgrading the 2010 single-vessel incident into a fleet-level suspension rule.

The capital path is transforming tankers from "shortest route turnover assets" to "geopolitical options." Money has not flowed into building an entire alternative to the Strait but rather into war risks, delays, detours around the Cape of Good Hope or Americas oil, and LNG/LPG vessels, which are relatively more permitted. Refusing to pay tolls to Iran is a way to maintain international pricing power while using convoys and designated routes to negotiate actual passage with Tehran. The strategic motive is strong: Japan is highly dependent on imported energy, and if the 211 tankers on shipowners' balance sheets are locked in the Gulf long-term, the BLUE ACTION plan to increase the stable revenue share by 2030 will be choked by a single waterway.

Comparative examples include the Houthis in the Red Sea forcing detours, the Russia-Ukraine war rewriting the Black Sea grain fleet, and the 1953 incident when the Nippon Oil tanker Nichizan Maru broke through the blockade against Iran to transport crude oil back to Kawasaki—Iran's ambassador to Japan in 2026 still referenced this history to explain why Idemitsu Maru could pass through the Strait first. The industry's position has shifted from "global public waterways" to a "permitted passage + national lobbying" phase, with expansion halted and control handed over to coastal and warring nations.

Structurally, this represents a transfer of pricing power. The mechanism is that insurers and charterers no longer price "nominal ceasefires" but only provide verifiable low-attack probability pricing on-site; whoever can simultaneously secure Tokyo diplomacy, reinsurance capacity, and Iranian permitted routes can turn stranded crude oil back into deliverable barrels, shifting the decision-making power of freight rates and oil prices from tons at sea to passage permits.

ABAB News · Cognitive Law

  1. A ceasefire is not a navigation permit; insurable risks are.
  2. When a chokepoint closes, capacity immediately becomes a geopolitical option.
  3. Vessels take the shortest route, while accounts take acceptable risks.

Source

·ABAB News
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8 min read
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