Iran's Deputy Speaker of Parliament Says Bill to Withdraw from NPT Under Review
Iran's First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Ali Nikzad, stated to Fars News Agency that the parliament is reviewing a bill to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) under a "triple urgency" procedure. He mentioned that lawmakers distrust the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General Rafael Grossi, accusing inspections of being superficial and continuously issuing negative reports, while also indicating that the review will consider international consequences.
The triple urgency is the fastest track in the Iranian parliament, allowing it to bypass queues, principles, and rules or vote on the same day. On September 20, MP Hossein-Ali Haji-Deligani stated that the withdrawal bill has been submitted to the presidium, awaiting approval from Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf for submission to a public meeting. On September 15, about 130 MPs co-signed a request for the presidium to initiate the legal process for a complete withdrawal as soon as possible and to expand nuclear technology cooperation with "ideologically similar countries." In March, another triple urgency proposal by Malek Shariati included withdrawal from the NPT, abolishing domestic laws implementing the 2015 nuclear agreement, and shifting towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS framework; this proposal has not yet reached a full vote.
An earlier version of the emergency proposal also included withdrawal from the Additional Protocol, halting negotiations with the U.S. and the UK, France, and Germany, and stopping monitoring cooperation with the IAEA. Article 10 of the NPT allows member states to withdraw if they determine that extraordinary events related to the treaty threaten their highest interests, with prior notification required. To date, only North Korea has formally completed a withdrawal and submitted a notification under Article 10, which occurred in 2003. Iran has been bound by the NPT since 1970 and has proposed withdrawal twice by 2026, but has not issued an Article 10 notification.
Public reasons for pushing for withdrawal include: the international mechanism's failure to protect nuclear facilities, attacks on facilities and assassinations of scientists, failure to enjoy the technological benefits promised by the NPT, and inspections being used for intelligence and pressure. On September 8, the IAEA Board submitted Iran's file to the UN Security Council with 23 votes in favor, and 3 votes against from Russia, China, and Niger, with 8 abstentions. Tehran claims it has not violated the treaty, asserting that non-compliance is a direct consequence of U.S. and Israeli attacks on nuclear facilities. The parliament has previously legislated to require the government to suspend cooperation with the IAEA; inspection access has been essentially interrupted since April 2026. IAEA spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi also stated last week that there is a lack of trust in Grossi.
There are differences regarding the final decision-making authority: some MPs claim the parliament can pass the bill independently, while former head of the Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi stated such decisions lie with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. President Masoud Pezeshkian is attending the UN General Assembly in New York, while the parliament is simultaneously advancing the emergency proposal. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that there will be no return to pre-war negotiation conditions, while technical contacts with Vienna have not been completely severed.
In market mechanisms, this is a risk premium driven by political and security events, not a spontaneous switch in energy supply and demand. Buyers view withdrawal as a hedge against sanctions and military risks; sellers still consider Iranian oil and the Strait of Hormuz in their supply calculations. Funds are shifting from risk assets to safe havens and freight insurance. Beneficiaries are alternative oil and defense narratives; those under pressure are nuclear diplomacy that has not completed the Article 10 notification but has already lost inspection coverage, as well as shipping and refineries reliant on Strait passage. The proposal itself does not equate to withdrawal; the market is trading the tail risks after the procedure is activated.
Supplementary data: In June, U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted locations including Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow, with the Bushehr nuclear power plant also being targeted. The IAEA still lists Bushehr as a regular inspection point and stated that Iran confirmed it would provide access for inspections in mid-September. The parliament also passed bills to increase penalties for espionage and regulate micro-drones. Even if the withdrawal bill passes, the government must still issue a notification and wait about 90 days for it to constitute a legal withdrawal.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
Iran's parliament has turned the withdrawal from the NPT into a legislative detonator that can be ignited at any time, which is not the first instance. After Europe initiated snapback sanctions in 2025, triple urgency proposals emerged, and the submissions in March and September 2026 indicate this is a pressure valve, not a trigger that has already been pulled. Nikzad's distrust has shifted from "the treaty does not protect facilities" to directly naming Grossi, personalizing the technical agency for internal mobilization. The real brake lies in the leader's office: the parliament can legislate rapidly, but the Article 10 notification must be issued by the state. The president talks in New York while the parliament legislates in Tehran, representing a division of labor between diplomacy and legislation—diplomacy needs a window, while legislation needs leverage.
The capital and resource pathway rewrites the nuclear program from "safeguarded civilian" to "unmonitored ambiguous capability." Withdrawal from the Additional Protocol and halting monitoring changes the information environment more immediately than the withdrawal from the NPT title: inventories, centrifuges, and underground facilities will no longer have regular photographs. Cooperation with "ideologically similar countries" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS is aimed at finding alternative supply chains and technological endorsements for enrichment and fuel cycles. Domestic laws post-attacks have already required a reduction in cooperation with the IAEA, and the withdrawal bill is a way to formalize the established facts as a treaty option. Money will not immediately appear in new reactors but will show up in insurance, freight, and regional air defense orders.
A comparable case is North Korea's public nuclear testing path after its withdrawal in 2003, and Iran's gradual breaking of limits while remaining within the NPT after the nuclear agreement's collapse over the past decade. The former exchanged withdrawal for clarity in deterrence, while the latter exchanged remaining in the treaty for a seat at the negotiating table. Iran is currently doing two things simultaneously: legally preparing to exit while diplomatically keeping the window open. The industry and security phase is in a gap in the safeguards system: inspections were interrupted after April, the Board sent the file to the Security Council in September, and the parliament is responding with withdrawal. If the next step involves only legislation without notification, the market will interpret it as a stance; once an Article 10 notification is issued, it will be read as a structural rupture.
Structural judgments belong to regulatory changes. The mechanism is: multilateral safeguards rely on continuous access to maintain credibility, and military strikes have undermined the exchange of "staying in the treaty for security." When member states believe the treaty only constrains themselves and not attacks on facilities, withdrawal becomes a legislative option rather than a taboo. Pricing power shifts from the IAEA's quarterly reports to the parliament's emergency procedures and whether the leader issues a notification. Until notification is given, Iran remains an NPT member; once the procedure is activated, risks related to the Strait, enrichment levels, and regional proxies will be repriced together.
ABAB News · Cognitive Law
- Emergency legislation is leverage; Article 10 notification is withdrawal.
- Once inspections stop, the treaty becomes a piece of paper that can be torn.
- Diplomatic openings and parliamentary legislation are often the same hand.