An account claiming to be a BitMart employee stated that the platform's closure was not simply due to mismanagement, but rather that founder Sheldon transferred user assets after discovering a funding shortfall, launched high-yield investment products to continue attracting funds, restricted withdrawals, and ultimately announced the closure.

The post detailed a timeline including layoffs, high-yield products, the plummeting of BMX leading to a bank run, employees being forced to sign termination agreements, and risk warnings from the associated platform WooxPro; the official announcement previously stated it was to orderly cease operations.

As a result of this incident, the exit of small and medium exchanges and disputes over user asset safety have intensified, with rising demand for on-chain monitoring and withdrawal verification, putting pressure on users attracted by high-yield products.

Original text: Bitmart HQ @Bitmarthuanqian

BitMart's closure is not due to mismanagement but rather a premeditated asset transfer scheme.

Hello everyone, I am a BitMart employee, and today I am revealing the insider details of this exit scheme.

On July 25, BitMart announced its closure due to "mismanagement."

However, based on the internal information I have, the situation is not simply a failure in management.

The real sequence of events is: Sheldon discovered a funding shortfall → transferred user assets to a personal wallet → used high-yield investments to continue attracting user funds → restricted withdrawals → ultimately announced the closure of the platform.

This is not a normal bankruptcy liquidation, but rather an act suspected of preemptively transferring user assets.

Timeline restoration:

On June 10, Sheldon began the first round of layoffs.

Prior to this, the company had discovered severe funding shortfalls due to an April trading incident.

As a result, Sheldon began transferring user assets exceeding 20 million U, after which the platform gradually experienced failures in large withdrawal approvals.

However, as the financial department continued to attract deposits for BitMart, new funds kept entering, allowing the platform to temporarily maintain some withdrawals, so many users did not notice the problem immediately.

But as the financial pressure increased, the company launched:

12% annualized, 399-day USDT guaranteed investment
Promoted with no purchase limit

The purpose was to continue attracting funds into the platform.

As employees and users began to express doubts, Sheldon further launched on July 23:

18.88% annualized, 10-day USDT guaranteed investment

Hoping to continue attracting user deposits to fill the withdrawal gap.

With such guaranteed investment yields, if this is not a scam, what is? In 2026's market, large exchanges typically offer yields below 5%. Yet BitMart offers a 12% and an 18.88% guaranteed investment, which have no real returns to support them, relying solely on a Ponzi scheme. Additionally, it is worth noting that in the past six months, BitMart has absorbed over 40 million U from users through high-yield products.

On July 23: The bank run officially erupted.

That night, the BitMart platform token BMX plummeted, dropping from about 0.3 U to 0.1 U.

The root cause is quite amusing; a BitMart executive made a mistake in position management, leading to millions of pledged BMX being liquidated by the system, triggering panic selling among BMX holders.

The drop in the platform token caused a large number of users to panic and withdraw funds.

From this moment on, the platform experienced a severe bank run:

Large withdrawals entered a long-term approval failure state;
Some withdrawals were directly rejected;
Balances across multiple chains and currencies gradually approached zero.

Thus, Sheldon began his exit plan ahead of schedule.

On July 24: The platform entered its final phase.

On July 24, the company arranged for employees to work overtime to take down many services.

At that time, ordinary employees were still unaware of the real reason, believing the company was reducing operating costs.

But in reality:

Balances on multiple chains had already reached zero;
Users could only keep canceling withdrawals and trying to withdraw through other chains;
Withdrawals exceeding $10,000 were basically unable to pass approval.

On the same day, the company urgently instructed the investment front end to take down the "investment redemption" button, which deprived users of the last channel to redeem their investments and withdraw funds.

Abnormal events occurring simultaneously:

1. During the week of July 21, the company required formal employees to sign termination agreements under the pretext of "subject change."

Subsequently, all labor relations were changed to consultant contracts.

Employees who refused to sign were directly sent termination agreement emails by HR.

Many employees have preserved relevant evidence.

During the same week, the financial head notified subordinates to quickly transfer their own funds.

At the same time, they continued to assist Sheldon in handling platform assets.

Terminating employees' formal labor contracts was part of the exit plan, and many employees with over five years of service had their compensation directly nullified under this operation.

2. On July 24, CEO Nenter, hired by Sheldon, was dismissed by the company.

During that week, several senior officials, including the head of the U.S. region and the legal head, resigned due to dissatisfaction with Sheldon's asset transfer actions. The financial head proposed to resign but was asked to return to the company.

3. On July 23, BitMart's proprietary market-making team Proton withdrew funds from external exchanges in advance.

However, some of the funds were also pocketed by Sheldon and were not used to compensate users and employees.

4. On July 25, the company began to completely block employee permissions.

Including:

Closing employee Lark private messages;
Reclaiming system permissions;
Many computers were remotely locked (including some employees' personal computers that were forcibly locked due to the installation of the company's cloud hub software).

Meanwhile, some executives and the HR team modified their Lark identity information, and executives instructed employees not to post or defend their rights, promising to provide one-on-one explanations on Monday.

But ultimately, the company only announced through Lark on Wednesday:

Employee salaries would be paid up to July 24;
No compensation would be paid;
Overtime pay and other expenses would not be processed.

This is not bankruptcy; it is an exit after asset transfer.

If a company:

After discovering a funding shortfall, does not choose to replenish funds or disclose risks publicly, but instead:

→ Transfers user assets → Launches high-yield products to continue attracting deposits → Closes redemption channels → Restricts user withdrawals → Terminates employee relationships → Finally announces closure

Then this is fundamentally different from the ordinary meaning of "mismanagement."

What happened after BitMart's closure?

According to internal understanding, after the platform closed, Sheldon prepared to cash out all his coins, piecing together about 2 million U from existing exchange assets:

About 1 million for employee salaries;
About 1 million for user withdrawals.

This is also why:

Daily on-chain recharge amounts are only tens of thousands of U;
Employee salaries continue to be delayed;
User withdrawal limits are extremely low, with the maximum single coin withdrawal limit dropping to 100 U by July 31;
Withdrawal fees have been adjusted to 10% (Sheldon, you are still too merciful; why not adjust it to 99%, then you wouldn't need to run away).

Currently, many internal employees have not been able to retrieve their salaries for months or even a year due to investments, and the difficulty for ordinary users to recover assets is unimaginable.

WooxPro users please note

Currently, Sheldon has begun transferring some executives to WooxPro, preparing to replicate the BitMart exit scheme again.

This exchange was acquired by Sheldon in January 2026, and much of its composition is similar to BitMart, with employees also being BitMart staff. After the acquisition, it attracted user funds significantly through activities like "deposit as much as you can and get as much back."

WooxPro users are advised to withdraw their funds in a timely manner to prevent the tragedy of BitMart from happening again.

Finally

Currently confirmed executives actively cooperating with Sheldon in the related user asset transfer include but are not limited to:

F (CTO)
T (Technical Director)
C (HRD)
S (President's Office Head, Spot Trading Head)

I had no intention of publicly disclosing the company's actions, and today I have only briefly listed some events in the timeline. However, if employees' reasonable and lawful compensation cannot be resolved, I will begin to disclose more facts and evidence details to facilitate users in filing legal lawsuits against you.

I also welcome BitMart employees, users, and those who understand the inside story to contact me at bmzgrb3@yeah.net, and we will jointly disclose the facts and safeguard our legal rights.

Source: Public Information