Chun advocates for ending the mandatory use of seatbelts on commercial flights and simultaneously discontinuing the use of in-cabin activity space suits, arguing that both create high-friction rituals for extremely low-probability protections.

He wrote that in the past decade, the U.S. has seen serious injuries approximately once every 400 billion flight miles; most of the time, passengers are asleep with seatbelts hidden under blankets, yet crew members insist on checking under the blankets, which is particularly resented in first and business class. Official U.S. travel data presents another perspective: from 2003 to 2023, there were a total of 675 serious injuries in domestic aviation, averaging about 32 per year; in 2023, 33 injuries corresponded to 773 billion passenger miles. In turbulence-related incidents, the injury rate for crew members is higher than that for passengers. These figures describe the overall aviation injury rate and do not individually prove that the risk of turbulence after unbuckling seatbelts is zero.

The second tweet extends the same logic to space travel. He states that IVA space suits, which have been in service for over 60 years, have had “zero lifesaving, and real emergencies have not been resolved,” yet they occupy a significant amount of training time, now more like symbols and identities. He suggests that future large crewed spacecraft should have independent pressurized refuge compartments to give time back to on-orbit work. Public space history does not align with this: in 1971, three astronauts on Soyuz 11 were not wearing life suits and died from cabin depressurization upon re-entry; NASA technical briefings indicate that if the launch re-entry abort suits had been worn correctly, the depressurization could have been survived. In 2003, the Columbia crew wore such clothing, but gloves or masks were not properly in place, and depressurization was still fatal. Following this, Soyuz mandated the use of Sokol life suits, which was a response to the deaths from not wearing suits. There have been records of spacesuit failures, and Smithsonian experts state that documented spacesuit failures have not directly caused deaths.

The design goal of aviation seatbelts is to limit vertical displacement during turbulence and facilitate evacuation, hence the widespread use of two-point belts instead of three-point belts. Pilot seats, however, use five-point belts. Federal regulations still require seatbelts to be fastened during taxiing, takeoff, landing, and turbulence. In space, the launch re-entry abort suits are separated from the extravehicular suits: the former is the last layer against cabin depressurization and ejection, while the latter is for extravehicular operations.

In market mechanisms, what is bought is the regulatory agency's visible compliance to reduce litigation and public opinion impact, while what is sold is the crew's check time and astronaut training time. Funds remain in procedures, clothing procurement, and retraining, rather than being converted into structural refuge compartments or dynamically lifting checks based on turbulence forecasts. Beneficiaries are airlines, space agencies, and clothing contractors that write "checked seatbelt/worn life suit" into liability chains; the pressured parties are first-class sleep experiences and on-orbit work time. The event-driven aspect is the questioning of regulatory symbols by personal experiences, not new accident statistics being released.

Independent pressurized compartments exist in discussions of some spacecraft designs, but have not yet replaced personal pressure suits as the mainstream airworthiness path during launch and re-entry phases. Whether flights can cancel mandatory seatbelt use based on cabin status or sleep state remains governed by airworthiness regulations rather than cabin experience.

Source: Public Information