Houthi Forces Capture Key Islands in the Red Sea, Control Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
On Friday, Yemen's Houthi forces seized several key islands in the Red Sea, completing their military advance on the Yemeni side of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the central islands of the strait, confirmed by internationally recognized Yemeni government officials and witnesses to multiple English news agencies.
Government forces first withdrew from Perim Island (also known as Mayyun/Perim), after which armed boats landed on the island. The island is located at the narrowest point of the strait, dividing the shipping lane into two, covering an area of about 13 square kilometers, and is approximately 3.5 kilometers from Yemen's western coast. The government later stated that the previously uncontested islands of Greater Hanish and Lesser Hanish were also occupied; Zuqar Island had already fallen into Houthi hands. Witnesses reported that armed personnel were deployed along the coastline of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, patrolling in military vehicles. On Thursday, the Houthis had already captured the western port of Mokha, and on Friday, they took Dhubab and the coastal village of Murad, with officials stating that the entire western coast of Yemen along the Red Sea is now under their control. The week-long offensive reportedly resulted in hundreds of deaths.
The Houthis declared the operation to expel Saudi-supported forces a "success," stating that shipping is safe for all companies except Saudi vessels; the statement did not specifically mention Perim Island. Saudi Arabia conducted airstrikes on Mokha airport, with no public casualty figures reported. According to two informed sources, the Saudi Crown Prince has personally urged the U.S. President to take military action against the Houthis. Iranian officials referred to this development as a "resounding victory." The UAE had previously built an airbase on Perim Island but ended its active military involvement in Yemen in January this year.
The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is the southern gateway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and, via the Suez Canal, to Eurasia. After the Strait of Hormuz was effectively blocked due to conflicts between the U.S. and Iran, Saudi crude oil has increasingly been routed through the Red Sea. Some analysts describe the simultaneous influence of adversaries on both straits as posing a risk of hostile control over approximately one-third of global maritime trade. The Houthis previously controlled most of northern Yemen and the port of Hodeidah but did not yet control the coastline directly opposite the strait and the central islands.
In market terms, this represents a risk premium for the shipping lane, rather than the spot delivery itself. Buyers are shipowners and oil traders who must either reroute around the Cape of Good Hope or pay for war risk; sellers are the shipping capacity still operating in the Red Sea. Beneficiaries include Iran and its Yemeni allies leveraging Saudi export routes; those under pressure include Saudi crude oil exports, Eurasian container shipping, and freight and insurance rates already strained by record highs in diesel and crude oil prices. Capital is shifting from the right of passage through the strait to insurance rates, rerouting fuel, and the price differentials of refined products.
Supplementary structure: The Houthis claim they do not threaten international shipping, only targeting Saudi vessels; government sources link Perim, the Hanish Islands, and the entire western coast into a control network. Saudi Arabia has yet to make a public comment on the latest island transfers.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
The Houthis have controlled Sanaa and Hodeidah for years, but lacked observation and strike geometry in the central part of the strait. Perim splits the narrowest part of the Mandeb into two channels, and the island has a makeshift runway; once government forces withdrew, Dhubab on the shore and Hanish at sea were handed over, effectively upgrading the ability to "see ships" to "standing in the middle of the shipping lane." This is not a tug-of-war since 2015, but rather a completion of the last gap on the western coast within a week. The facilities left by the UAE on the island have become ready nodes for whoever lands first.
Capital pathways follow the two straits. After Iran tightened its grip on Hormuz, Saudi Arabia compressed its export weight to the Red Sea; the Houthis then brought the southern entrance of the Red Sea into range and coastal defense firepower, narrowing the alternative routes for Saudi tankers. Money flows from the risk premium of crude oil futures, war insurance premiums, and the tonnage of rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope into sellers who can continue to ship and markets that can provide insurance. Container companies had already rerouted after attacks in the Red Sea; this time, the "occasional attack" has escalated into a structural premium of "island transfers in the strait."
This is analogous to Iran's asymmetric control over Hormuz and the spike in insurance premiums during the peak of piracy in the Gulf of Aden in the 2010s: controlling not all cargo ships, but making it impossible for insurance companies to price at peace rates. The industry phase is the simultaneous politicization of energy corridors across both straits—one side is Gulf exports, the other is Suez imports. Whoever can make shipowners buy war insurance on both routes will set coefficients for oil and freight prices.
The structural judgment belongs to the shift of pricing power from shipowners to armed control of the strait. The mechanism is: islands do not produce oil, they only change the probability of oil molecules passing through. The withdrawal of government forces is cheaper than a hard assault, yet it hands over the geometry of the shipping lane all at once; the airstrike on Mokha airport is retaliation, not an attempt to retake Perim. Global distillate oil was already tight due to refinery and strait impacts, and the addition of an uninsurable risk at the southern entrance of the Red Sea adds another geopolitical anchor to high diesel and crude oil prices.
ABAB News · Cognitive Law
- Controlling islands does not equal controlling trade, but it does mean adding a premium to trade.
- Once an alternative route becomes the only route, it will be choked by the next hand.
- The runway left by troop withdrawal is more expensive than building a new position.