U.S. President Donald Trump: Reopening Hormuz Will Destroy All Negotiation Leverage Against Iran
U.S. President Donald Trump stated in a recent social media post, "Iran does not want to close the Strait of Hormuz; they want it open so they can earn $500 million every day." He claimed that Iran's threats to "close the strait" are merely because "the U.S. has completely blocked the strait," and Tehran is "trying to save face." Trump mentioned that four days ago, someone conveyed Iran's desire to "immediately reopen the strait," but he believes that agreeing to reopen it now would mean the U.S. would forever lose the possibility of reaching an agreement with Iran, "unless we bomb their remaining country, including their leaders, to the ground."
Source: Public Information
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This statement logically frames the Strait of Hormuz as an "ultimate bargaining chip": as long as the shipping route is blocked, the U.S. holds the power to choke Iran's cash flow, and once reopened, all negotiation leverage will evaporate instantly. In this framework, control over energy routes and military dominance is viewed as a higher-level constraint than written agreements—agreements can be torn up, but once control over the route is relinquished, it is difficult to reclaim without cost. Thus, Trump publicly presents "maintaining the blockade" as necessary insurance for future negotiation space.
Historically and from a geopolitical economic perspective, the Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for global oil and liquefied natural gas; any control over its open status equates to control over the financial lifelines of certain Middle Eastern exporting countries. By emphasizing Iran's dependence on the open route with the high-stakes figure of "$500 million a day," Trump is effectively shaping an internal narrative of "we have absolute advantage," thereby seeking political legitimacy for maintaining a maritime blockade, increasing military spending, and enduring oil price fluctuations.
Notably, he juxtaposes "reopening the strait" with "bombing Iran's remaining territory, including its leaders," openly packaging economic sanctions with military threats against national infrastructure and leadership into a continuous policy framework. This public articulation of binding economic warfare, energy warfare, and targeted strikes is relatively rare in post-Cold War presidential discourse, reflecting a more brutal deterrence logic: by using unambiguous language about "extreme options," it reinforces the adversary's expectations of U.S. willingness to attack, thereby attempting to compress the opponent's options at the negotiating table.
From a longer-term financial and institutional perspective, this approach impacts the international system by further instrumentalizing a key waterway, traditionally viewed as a "global public good," into a unilateral pressure tool for a single hegemon, weakening the multilateral narrative built around shipping freedom and energy security. Should this usage be replicated by other major powers, the risk exposure of the global financial and energy systems to a few channel controllers would significantly increase, forcing markets to incorporate a higher "geopolitical channel premium" into asset pricing, which will be transmitted through oil prices, freight rates, and risk hedging costs into the global economic structure over the long term.