Tasnim News Agency: The U.S. is still preparing for continued conflict, Saudi Aramco oil facilities are potential targets for Iran
Iran's semi-official media Tasnim News Agency issued a statement saying that the U.S. is still preparing for continued conflict while Iran is willing to negotiate. The statement cites military sources indicating that Iran is ready to abandon the restraint previously shown when a new round of conflict begins, bringing "memorable hellish moments," and explicitly lists the Strait of Mandeb, Saudi Aramco oil facilities, the port of Yanbu in Saudi Arabia, and Fujairah in the UAE as potential targets for strikes.
The statement comes against the backdrop of current U.S.-Iran tensions, including U.S. blockade actions against Iranian ports and stalled negotiations between the two sides. Tasnim emphasized that any attack on Iran's electricity or infrastructure would trigger Iran's response against key oil facilities in the Gulf region as a deterrent.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
This statement reveals Iran's core strategy in asymmetric conflict: by threatening to expand the scope of strikes, it aims to transform localized conflicts into systemic risks to global energy flows. The potential linkage between the Strait of Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz, along with the explicit mention of Saudi and UAE oil facilities, seeks to draw third-party countries into the risk distribution chain, raising the operational costs for the U.S. and its allies. This mechanism relies on proxy forces and missile capabilities, attempting to offset conventional military disadvantages with low-intensity deterrence.
Historically, such escalatory threats continue the leverage model employed by resource-exporting countries at energy chokepoints. Over the past few decades, Middle Eastern conflicts have repeatedly reshaped negotiation leverage through control of oil transport routes, and Iran's current statements reflect a systemic response under sanctions and blockade pressures: converting economic vulnerabilities into offensive deterrence, forcing adversaries to recalculate long-term costs in power and capital distribution. It also signals that energy infrastructure is shifting from mere production assets to strategic targets in geopolitical games.
In the long term, this dynamic accelerates the trend of risk reassessment and diversification in global energy supply chains. The platform party (the U.S.) attempts to maintain dominance through naval control, while the constrained party responds by expanding the list of potential strikes, increasing overall energy pricing uncertainty and insurance costs. Regardless of whether negotiations are restarted, such statements reinforce institutional inertia: high-energy economies must face structural adjustments in productivity and distribution during conflict cycles, and the vulnerabilities of electricity and oil flows are becoming core variables in redefining regional power.