Marisks Reports Two Super Tankers Hit by Shellfire While Passing Through the Strait of Hormuz
Marisks Reports Two Tankers Hit by Shellfire
The Greek maritime risk management company Marisks stated that two super tankers were hit by shellfire while passing through the Strait of Hormuz; currently, no independent confirmation has been found regarding Marisks' full report, ship names, flags, cargo, extent of damage, or crew casualties.
Recent English maritime reports that can be cross-referenced indicate that there have been previous incidents of commercial vessels being attacked in the Strait of Hormuz and off the coast of Oman: a bulk carrier was hit by an unidentified projectile on its starboard side near Oman, about 0.5 nautical miles from the strait, damaging the engine room and resulting in the death of a crew member believed to be the chief engineer. This incident illustrates that the risk of attacks on commercial vessels in this area is not merely isolated rumors.
Public maritime reports also mention that a crude oil tanker caught fire after being hit by an unidentified projectile, with the crew extinguishing the fire themselves; additional information indicates that a tanker associated with UAE's ADNOC was previously listed as a target for attack. Current public information does not provide a consistent and independently verifiable conclusion regarding the identity of the attackers, the weapons used, or specific accountability.
Super tankers typically refer to VLCC-class vessels, which can carry approximately 2 million barrels of crude oil; however, it remains unverified whether the two vessels mentioned by Marisks are VLCCs, whether they are fully loaded, whether they have completed unloading, or whether they are still seaworthy. Equating "hit by shellfire" directly with a disruption in crude oil supply or military action by any party exceeds the current evidence scope.
Actual navigation through the Strait of Hormuz has recently significantly contracted. Vessel tracking data from Kpler shows that during a recent weekend window, only about 2 to 3 vessels left the strait daily, with no VLCCs or LNG carriers observed passing through; the International Maritime Organization recorded 65 confirmed incidents involving the Strait of Hormuz and Middle East shipping and 17 confirmed fatalities as of August 11.
From a market mechanism perspective, this news will first drive shipowners, charterers, and traders to price for war risk, rerouting, and delays: buyers of tankers carrying Gulf crude will face higher spot freight rates, insurance surcharges, and delivery uncertainties, while sellers may be forced to slow down loading or seek alternative export routes. Beneficiaries are typically oil-producing countries with non-Hormuz export capabilities, tanker capacity holders, and non-Gulf supply sources; Gulf exporters, refinery purchasers, and LNG buyers reliant on strait transportation will be under pressure.
Before obtaining named incident reports from UKMTO, the Joint Maritime Information Center, shipowners, ship management companies, or insurance institutions, this news should be characterized as a preliminary statement from a single maritime risk agency, rather than a fully confirmed incident involving two super tankers being attacked.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
The risks in the Strait of Hormuz have never been limited to a "formal blockade." The "tanker war" during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s demonstrated that attacks, mining, threats of seizure, and high insurance premiums can compress traffic volumes even if the waterway is not legally closed. The attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman in 2019 and the shipping crisis in the Red Sea in 2024 similarly illustrate that shipping networks are highly sensitive to single-point attacks: commercial vessels do not need to sink entirely; as long as shipowners and insurers raise risk thresholds, capacity will proactively withdraw.
The capital transmission sequence typically sees insurance precede physical goods. P&I clubs, war risk underwriters, and shipowners first reassess surcharges for high-risk areas, charterers then demand higher spot rates or refuse to dispatch vessels, and traders subsequently pay premiums for delayed deliveries and alternative sources. If VLCC capacity avoids the strait, the real scarcity is not the global paper crude oil reserves, but the safe berths and export capabilities that can complete loading and delivery at specified times and locations.
Historically, the Red Sea crisis caused container and refined oil vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, with cost increases primarily stemming from longer routes, fuel, and reduced effective capacity; the constraints in the Strait of Hormuz are more direct because it connects the main crude oil and LNG loading ports in the Gulf, and many export goods do not have equally scaled alternative maritime outlets. The current market is transitioning from a "geopolitical risk premium" to "logistical physical constraints": the former affects futures prices, while the latter will impact actual loading, inventory, and delivery.
Essentially, this is about restructuring the supply chain: energy security is no longer solely determined by underground reserves but is jointly determined by export pipelines, ports, fleets, insurance, and naval escorts. After risks emerge, parties with multiple export channels, alternative supplies, strategic reserves, and long-term shipping contracts gain bargaining power; those reliant on a single strait, even with low-cost resources, will lose some pricing power due to unstable delivery.
ABAB News · Law of Cognition
Waterways are not blocked, but capacity withdraws first.
Reserves determine supply, exports determine income.
As war risk rises, geopolitical risks begin to materialize in spot markets.