Reuters: Chinese university buys Nvidia H200 chips despite being on U.S. export blacklist
Reuters: PLA-linked Chinese university bought Nvidia H200 chips despite being on the U.S. export blacklist
Reuters reported exclusively that Northwestern Polytechnical University, one of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense” and closely linked to the PLA, purchased two Nvidia H200 AI chips last month through a domestic supplier, despite the school having been placed on the U.S. Entity List since 2001.
According to the university’s website procurement record dated October 21, the School of Management bought the two chips for 874,700 yuan ($123,000) from Shaanxi Bosuan Network Technology, rather than directly from Nvidia. H200s require U.S. export licenses and are typically denied to blacklisted entities.
The university also obtained access to H200 and other restricted Nvidia AI processors this year through five computing-power leasing contracts signed with Chinese companies. Other Chinese procurement records reviewed by Reuters show that multiple universities and research institutions obtained or leased restricted chips through domestic channels.
The U.S. Commerce Department placed the university on the Entity List in 2001 over allegations involving missile proliferation and military research, and further tightened restrictions in 2019.
Original source:
Title: EXCLUSIVE: PLA-linked Chinese university bought Nvidia H200 chips despite US blacklist, records show Publisher: Reuters Publication date: 2026-11-11 URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/pla-linked-chinese-university-bought-nvidia-h200-chips-despite-us-blacklist-2026-11-11/ Source nature: exclusive news report Verification status: read in this request; procurement records, amount, supplier, and blacklist status are consistent with the paraphrase Supporting content: supports the facts that Northwestern Polytechnical University purchased two H200 chips, through a domestic supplier, and leased computing power
ABAB AI Insight
The report is based on public procurement records and shows that blacklisted entities can obtain restricted chips through domestic intermediaries rather than purchasing directly from the original manufacturer. Export controls primarily constrain U.S. companies and authorized exports, with limited constraints on subsequent domestic circulation.
The scale of two chips is limited, but it shows an enforcement gap in controls. The university’s research involves military aircraft, missiles, and satellites, making it a defense-related entity of concern to the United States.
Computing power can be obtained through leasing and other means, further increasing the difficulty of tracking and blocking it. The relevant findings are connected to broader discussions of export-control enforcement.
ABAB News · Cognitive Law
Entities on the Entity List can obtain restricted chips through domestic suppliers.
Export licenses mainly constrain direct exports, while subsequent circulation has gaps.
Computing-power leasing provides an additional access route.