Apple Physical Gift Cards to Include Security Chips
Code from the official candidate version of iOS 27 shows that Apple physical gift cards will be equipped with security chips, compatible with iPhones for back scanning to verify if the card is genuine and if the balance has not been spent, allowing for direct redemption without the need to manually enter a redemption code.
MacRumors contributor Aaron Perris revealed the "This card has been blocked" and "This card has been canceled" screens in the redemption process, which are used to intercept cards that have been voided or stolen. This capability briefly appeared in the feature list during the June 2026 WWDC keynote, but Apple did not elaborate at the time. The feature will accompany iOS 27, and there is currently no official list of supported models and rollout scope.
Existing scams focus on shelf swapping: taking cards from supermarkets, scratching off the coating to copy the redemption code, and then resealing them back on the shelf; after customers activate them at checkout, the gang quickly redeems the balance. In a case in New Hampshire, a gang used stolen balances to purchase about 4,000 iPhones, worth approximately $8 million to $9 million, which led to a homicide. Australian police also seized dozens of Apple cards valued between $100 and $500, and Apple had already changed to tamper-proof packaging in the area by early 2025.
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission reports that annual losses from gift card and prepaid card fraud exceed $212 million. Institutions like Apple and the IRS emphasize that any call requesting payment via gift cards is a scam. Retail activation mechanisms cannot prevent the "copy code, put it back, wait for activation" process, as the redemption code remains a visible string.
The back scanning redemption utilizes the existing near-field reading capability of the iPhone, similar in logic to Apple Pay's Tap to Provision: the card must be present, and the server then confirms its status. The chip transforms the "visible string of code" into a hardware credential that can be verified by devices, causing fake cards and already redeemed cards to fail directly during the scanning process. Apple has not clarified whether old cards will be retrofitted with chips or who will bear the cost of the chips.
In market mechanics, the buyers are customers of gift cards on the shelf and the Apple account balance system, while the sellers are the new chip-equipped cards and the iOS redemption entry. The event is driven by the exposure of system code, not by a new product launch. Beneficiaries include Apple's direct sales channels and the new card inventory that can be verified by phones; those under pressure include offline gangs involved in code copying, counterfeiting, and swapping, as well as third-party gift card distributors still relying on coatings and printed codes. If supermarkets do not synchronize with the new cards, the old inventory remains a target.
The secondary market does not have separate gift card securities that can be traded, with observation points focusing on whether the official version of iOS 27 opens the scanning entry and whether retail packaging features new cards that can be read by NFC.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
After Apple turned physical cards into prepaid entry points for the App Store and retail stores, redemption codes have long been stuck in the scratch-off coating era. Tamper-proof packaging, shelf monitoring, and activation before recharging have not stopped the "copy first, then put back" method. The cases in New Hampshire and Australia indicate that the opponents are not scattered individuals, but gangs using gift cards as money laundering tools: the shelf is the code retrieval point, and Apple products are the cash-out point. Apple previously only modified the paper boxes and prompt texts, until iOS 27 finally transferred the verification authority to the phone and chip.
Resource mobilization follows existing near-field capabilities: Wallet, Tap to Pay, and card tap activation are now reused for gift cards. The motivation is that gift card balances go directly into Apple accounts, and fraud will trigger account bans and customer service compensation, with costs falling on Apple and retailers, not just on cardholders. Strategically, whoever controls "the card must be present to redeem" eliminates remote code copying. The chip also increases card production costs, compressing the profit margins of fake cards.
Comparable examples include the transition of bank cards from magnetic stripes to chips, Visa and Apple reducing fraud rates for tap card activation, and Starbucks gradually moving physical gift cards to the app. The gift card industry is still in a transition period from printed credentials to hardware credentials, with the black market still consuming old inventory. Apple's relationship with distributors like InComm and Blackhawk will become closer, as chip cards must come from authorized production lines.
The structural judgment belongs to technological substitution. The mechanism is: visible redemption codes separate theft from verification, while the chip ties verification back to the physical card and Apple server state machine, making code copying no longer equivalent to asset possession. Pricing power shifts from plastic pieces on the shelf to credentials that can be certified by the iPhone; old cards without chips and third-party printed cards will become discounted inventory, while systems with scanning capabilities will change fraud from "post-customer service" to "on-the-spot rejection."
ABAB News · Cognitive Law
Codes that can be copied are not assets.
Tamper-proof packaging cannot stop process loopholes.
Verification authority received on devices will cut off shelf scams.