U.S. Defense Department Reviews Nuclear Use Guidelines, Iran Listed as Non-Nuclear
Elbridge Colby, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated during a closed Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on September 17, 2026, that the department is conducting a classified review of U.S. nuclear use guidelines aimed at increasing options available to the president. He also mentioned that the U.S. would only consider using nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances. The review is justified by changes in the global nuclear landscape. The hearing transcript did not characterize this review as an approval for a nuclear strike against Iran.
Publicly, Iran's stance remains focused on conventional options and blockades. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on October 4 that Iran will never have nuclear weapons, which is a significant national interest for the U.S.; President Donald Trump is determined to achieve this, and if others think he is not serious, it will be detrimental to them. The options he provided were: to abandon nuclear ambitions as requested by the U.S., with no further leverage; or to take a hardline approach. He noted that the president would have all the necessary options, specifically mentioning the executed Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury operations.
Energy Secretary Chris Wright said on the same day on CBS that both diplomatic and military avenues are still being pursued, with no guarantees against conflict. He declined to interpret the expected arrival of the third aircraft carrier, USS Theodore Roosevelt, in the Middle East next month as a decision to escalate after the midterm elections. The U.S. demands that Iran surrender its stockpile of enriched uranium. Iran claims its program is peaceful, refuses to comply, and demands the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of assets first. Trump wrote on Truth Social that negotiations have dragged on too long, and now there will be consequences.
The deployment is described by the Pentagon as increasing options for the president, not as an already issued strike order. Public summaries indicate that during a window after the November 3 midterm elections, there could be three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, two amphibious assault groups, over ten missile destroyers, Marine Corps units, stealth aircraft, and electronic warfare units simultaneously in the theater; about 9,000 additional personnel are being mobilized to the region, which, if overlapping with existing forces, could bring the total maritime personnel to over 20,000. Central Command stated in an earlier operation that it is targeting multiple sites within Iran in response to its ongoing attacks and has fired upon tankers attempting to breach the blockade.
Hegseth acknowledged that Iran is attempting to rebuild damaged projects and stated that Washington controls the Strait of Hormuz. Negotiations are still ongoing through Qatar. Reports indicate that Iran is preparing a harder and potentially broader retaliation plan. Gulf energy facilities have already been attacked, and Wright stated that there is no guarantee that further attacks will not occur, putting upward pressure on oil prices.
This is a thickening of the options list and deployments, not a nuclear strike order. The buyer is the White House, which wants to maintain a blockade, aircraft carrier presence, and negotiation leverage simultaneously; the seller is Iran, which is being asked to abandon enriched uranium or face further actions. Funding is directed towards aircraft carrier strike groups, munitions, and blockade enforcement, not towards an already publicized nuclear strike budget. The beneficiaries are the U.S. government, which has made "non-nuclear" an enforceable red line, and non-Iranian oil that can reroute during the blockade; the pressures are on transit through the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf energy facilities, and Iran's nuclear facilities, which are being treated as a fait accompli after conventional strikes.
National Review speculated on the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons being used against Mount Hossain, not as a directive from the Pentagon. Colby's original statement focused on increasing presidential options, limited to extreme circumstances.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
Elbridge Colby's approach is to rewrite nuclear use from a last resort to a tiered menu. He, responsible for policy at the Pentagon, stated in the September 17 closed hearing that the review aims to increase presidential options while retaining the phrase that nuclear use would only be considered in extreme circumstances. Pete Hegseth's public approach is to strike first and negotiate later: Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury have already been used as evidence against Iran having nuclear capabilities, and on October 4, he consolidated the remaining options into either abandonment or a hardline approach. One is modifying guidelines, the other is altering the realities in the theater.
Resource mobilization is at sea, not in warheads. The USS Theodore Roosevelt, as the third aircraft carrier, is expected to enter next month, and the overlapping window post-election is described as potentially having three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, two amphibious groups, and about 9,000 reinforcements simultaneously. The blockade has already targeted vessels attempting to transport oil. The motivation is to ensure that the enriched uranium stockpile has no intermediate state for delay: diplomacy continues through Qatar, while military options are not paused by negotiations.
This can be compared to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, where blockade, airstrikes, and invasion were all presented to the president, with the blockade ultimately being used; it can also be compared to Israel's single conventional strikes against Iraq's Osirak and Syria's reactor. This time, we are in a control phase where conventional strikes have already occurred, and nuclear facilities are acknowledged to be under reconstruction, not starting deterrence from scratch.
Structurally, this represents a transfer of pricing power. The price of Iran's enriched uranium has shifted from negotiation terms on the sanctions list to the question of whether the aircraft carrier presence and blockade can be sustained. The mechanism is that the options list itself is pressure: the review of nuclear use guidelines does not equal an approved nuclear strike; however, conventional munitions, strait control, and troop increases are already being executed. The counterpart wants to buy a ceasefire, so they must first address the stockpile, not just the declarations.
ABAB News · Law of Cognition
Options on the table do not mean the button has been pressed.
Blockade precedes declarations, aircraft carriers precede agreements.
The phrase "extreme circumstances" encompasses the entire menu.