US Military Launches New Round of Strikes Against Iranian Revolutionary Guard Targets, Focused Around the Strait of Hormuz
The US military expands strikes against Iranian Revolutionary Guard targets
The US military has launched a new round of strikes against Iranian Revolutionary Guard targets, focusing on areas around the Strait of Hormuz; the US Central Command stated that the actions are a response to recent Iranian attacks on merchant ships and threats to US forces in the region.
Iranian media reported explosions in several locations around Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and the Strait of Hormuz; Tasnim, associated with the Revolutionary Guard, reported that strikes hit targets near Qeshm Island and Bandar Abbas. The US has not publicly disclosed a complete list of targets, types of munitions, casualty assessments, or the duration of operations, so the specific extent of damage from the "bombing of important energy hub ports" cannot be independently confirmed.
Prior to this escalation, the US military had conducted limited precision strikes on two Iranian rocket launch facilities on Larak Island. The US claimed that the Revolutionary Guard was preparing to launch rockets carrying mines into the Strait of Hormuz; Iranian media reported that this strike resulted in at least three deaths, two of whom were reported to belong to the Revolutionary Guard Navy.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard subsequently claimed to have launched ballistic missiles at two bases in Jordan housing US troops, with the Jordanian military stating that it intercepted missiles entering its airspace; there were also reports of Iranian drones entering UAE airspace and being intercepted. There is a gap between Iranian claims regarding attacks on the Bahrain US military base and independent public confirmation; as of now, there has been no confirmation from the US Central Command or Bahraini officials of substantial damage to the base.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard claimed to have shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone using surface-to-air missiles, stating that the wreckage fell into the Gulf waters; this claim has not been publicly confirmed by the US military. Meanwhile, shipping safety agencies and vessel tracking organizations reported that two supertankers carrying Saudi crude oil were struck by unidentified projectiles while leaving the Strait of Hormuz: the Bahri-operated Sidr was hit northeast of Khasab, Oman, and the Sinokor-operated Senegal Prosperity was struck by three projectiles east of the same area. The attribution of the attacks has not been independently confirmed.
In market mechanisms, buyers are hedging against risks of disrupted passage through the Strait of Hormuz, declining Gulf oil exports, and regional war spillover, with funds first flowing into Brent crude, gold, defense, missile defense, maritime security, and war insurance; sellers are shippers, insurers, and regional capital bearing risks related to tankers, shipping routes, refining materials, aviation fuel, and Gulf assets. The attacks on the two supertankers will raise insurance rates and rerouting costs, and even without a long-term blockade, will reduce the capacity willing to transit the Strait immediately; oil prices have risen to a five-week high due to concerns over conflict and supply disruptions.
Source: Public Information
ABAB AI Insight
The US strikes on targets near the Strait of Hormuz continue Washington's long-standing military logic of targeting Iran's "denial capabilities" rather than comprehensive occupation capabilities. In the 1988 "Operation Praying Mantis," the US Navy destroyed Iranian offshore platforms and vessels in response to mine attacks in the Persian Gulf; after 2019, the US has repeatedly viewed Iran's mines, anti-ship missiles, fast boats, and drones as threats to shipping in the Strait. The value of the Larak Island launchers and the current Revolutionary Guard targets lies in their potential connection to mine deployment, Strait monitoring, and coastal denial networks, rather than the individual facilities themselves.
The core of the capital pathway is to use low-cost attack tools to force high-cost defense systems to operate continuously. Iran does not need to permanently block the Strait of Hormuz; it only needs to make tankers, insurers, and shipowners believe that the tail risks of passing through the Strait are rising, thereby forcing vessels to slow down, adjust routes, increase war insurance, and wait for higher security guarantees. After reports of the Sidr and Senegal Prosperity being attacked, capital costs will quickly transmit from crude oil futures to shipping rents, insurance, refinery inventories, and spot purchases by Asian buyers; the US will need to invest in naval escorts, mine sweeping, air defense, intelligence monitoring, and regional base protection.
Historical comparisons should consider the 2019 attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman and the 2023-2024 Red Sea crisis. The former drove a sharp rise in tanker insurance and Gulf security risks, while the latter forced container ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, extending travel times and raising global logistics costs. The difference is that the Strait of Hormuz is more directly linked to global crude oil and liquefied natural gas exports: approximately 20 to 30 tankers, carrying about 9 to 10 million barrels of crude oil, pass through the southern route each night, and any repeated attacks would establish both "the Strait is not closed" and "the Strait cannot be used at normal costs" simultaneously.
Essentially, this is a transfer of pricing power. Iran does not need to control the total supply of international oil prices; it can influence marginal crude prices, insurance conditions, and vessel availability by creating uncertainties in passage; the US, on the other hand, is attempting to regain pricing power over Strait security by destroying mine-laying and ship-attack capabilities. The real battlefield of the conflict is not whether a particular port is destroyed, but who can determine the risk valuations for shipowners, insurers, and refiners for the next voyage. Missiles, drones, and mines change expectations, and expectations will reconstruct energy trade profits before actual halts occur.
ABAB News · Cognitive Laws
The Strait does not need to be closed; rising risks can already elevate oil prices
Low-cost attacks change expectations, while high-cost defenses consume budgets
The energy war is not about reserves, but about passage pricing power