Back to Flash News

U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy: FAA nationwide ground stop points to L3Harris network equipment issue

U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said on November 14, 2026, that the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) nationwide flight ground stop the day before was the longest nationwide U.S. flight ground stop since 9/11, and stemmed from a network equipment issue involving contractor L3Harris during routine maintenance at a remote FAA site. The ground stop began at about 3:54 p.m. on November 13 and was lifted at around 8:15 p.m., lasting more than 4 hours.

Duffy said that L3Harris was then upgrading old copper lines to fiber-optic cables, after which the upgraded routers began flooding other routers with more than 1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds, causing instability in air traffic control communications and some radar data and affecting multiple en route air traffic control centers. The investigation is determining whether the problem stemmed from router failure, improper installation, or configuration errors, and has not yet reached a conclusion; FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said no evidence of malicious activity or AI-related evidence was found.

L3Harris has issued a statement saying it is supporting the FAA investigation to understand the conditions that led to the nationwide ground stop on November 13, and noting that the company has completed more than 70% of the planned conversion of airspace communications from legacy copper lines to fiber systems with its partner and the FAA. After the ground stop was lifted, systems recovered, but thousands of flights were still canceled on Saturday, and airlines expected operations to gradually return to normal around Sunday evening.

Original source:

  1. Title: FAA blames Friday's ground stop on 'equipment issue' during telecoms network upgrade
    Publisher: NPR
    Publication date: 2026-11-14
    URL: npr.org/2026/11/14/nx-s1-6040952/faa-ground-stop-airplane-travel
    Nature of source: media report
    Verification status: full text actually read for this report (accessed as of 2026-11-14)
    Supporting content: Duffy's remarks about L3Harris performing copper-to-fiber maintenance at remote sites, router flooding, and the scope of the investigation (user error, installation error, or faulty routers); Bedford's statement that there was no malicious or AI-related evidence; the ground stop being one of the longest since 9/11 and the flight impact data.

ABAB AI Insight

L3Harris (formerly Harris Corp) has long operated the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) network since 2002. At that time, the contract had a potential value of $3.5 billion over 15 years and was responsible for integrating multiple legacy telecommunications networks and transmitting voice, data, and radar information to thousands of FAA facilities. The company long used copper-line- and time-division-multiplexing-based analog systems until it began modernizing to IP and fiber in recent years.

The copper-to-fiber work involved in this incident was part of the ongoing FTI modernization project. L3Harris reported in May 2026 that it had completed more than 50% of network connection modernization, and in its November statement said that more than 70% of the conversion had been completed, with plans to finish around 2027. The company also holds other FAA contracts, such as the airspace surveillance modernization contract obtained in July 2026, which will upgrade more than 700 ground stations and operate through 2045. The funding path is that the FAA pays L3Harris through a multi-year managed services contract, and the company is responsible for equipment ownership and service-level agreements.

For comparison, there was the NOTAM system outage in January 2023. At that time, a contractor inadvertently deleted files while synchronizing the primary and backup databases, causing a brief nationwide ground stop for U.S. flights (about 90 minutes), also with no evidence of a cyberattack. The mechanism of the two incidents is similar: a single operation or equipment anomaly during a maintenance window was amplified into a nationwide disruption; the difference is that the 2023 incident was a software file error, while this incident was router flooding involving hardware, lasted longer, and affected more en route centers.

This incident has changed L3Harris's operational risk exposure as the FTI prime contractor. Until the FAA's new network, which had once been planned to be led by Verizon and later AT&T, fully replaces it, the FAA still depends on L3Harris to maintain the legacy and transition systems. A single router failure could force a nationwide ground stop, showing insufficient fault tolerance under the hybrid copper-fiber architecture and possibly prompting a reconsideration of maintenance window timing, equipment testing, and contractor liability provisions.

ABAB News · Law of cognition

  1. An anomaly in a single router during a legacy network upgrade can be enough to trigger a nationwide flight ground stop.

  2. Operational errors or equipment defects during a contractor maintenance window can be magnified into a systemic disruption without malicious intent.

  3. Long-term reliance on a single entity concentrates transitional risk, leaving limited fault tolerance before the new network is fully online.