1inch: Binance-related addresses have been blocked; some stolen 1INCH cannot be frozen
On October 30, 2026, 1inch posted on X that it was aware of the Binance exploit and was reaching out to the Binance team to provide support. 1inch's risk management team, working with ZeroShadow, SEAL 911, TRM Labs and others, blocked addresses related to the exploit within the first hour after the incident in 1inch dApp, 1inch Wallet and 1inch API, and continues to add newly identified addresses. The same list will also be provided to resolvers and integrators.
1inch said that some 1INCH tokens are among the stolen assets. 1INCH is a standard ERC-20 token and has no freezing or blacklist function, so the stolen tokens cannot be frozen by anyone. 1inch said it will fully cooperate with Binance and law enforcement to trace and recover them.
Original source:
Title: We're aware of the Binance exploit and are reaching out to the Binance team... Publisher: 1inch (@1inch) Publication date: 2026-10-30 URL: https://x.com/1inch/status/2116023549211406829 Source nature: official project post Verification: full text of the post was read for this report, verification date 2026-10-30 Supporting content: awareness of the incident and reaching out to Binance to provide support; cooperating with ZeroShadow/SEAL 911/TRM Labs and others to block related addresses within the first hour across the dApp/Wallet/API and continue updating them; the list will be provided to resolvers and integrators; some 1INCH is among the stolen assets and, because the standard ERC-20 has no freezing function, it cannot be frozen; will cooperate with Binance and law enforcement to trace and recover it
ABAB AI Insight
1inch completed address blocking within the first hour after the Binance incident, covering three entry points: the dApp, Wallet and API, and synchronized the list with resolvers and integrators. As a DEX aggregator, its risk controls operate at the front-end and routing layers, which can limit related addresses from obtaining liquidity through its services, but cannot interfere with token transfers on-chain themselves.
Some of the stolen assets are 1INCH. The token is a standard ERC-20 and does not have a freezing or blacklist function, so no party can lock it at the contract level. 1inch clearly distinguished service-layer blocking from token-layer non-freezability, indicating that its response boundary stops at its own product entry points rather than control over on-chain assets.
1inch proactively contacted Binance and pledged to cooperate with law enforcement in tracing the funds, which constitutes information and technical support within the ecosystem. Unlike stablecoin issuers that can directly freeze balances, the design of standard ERC-20 tokens means that stolen portions can only rely on on-chain tracing and subsequent recovery efforts, and cannot be immediately stopped through a contract mechanism.
ABAB News · Cognitive Law
The distinction between service-entry blocking and token non-freezability shows that DeFi project risk controls stop at the front-end and API layers.
The lack of a freezing function in standard ERC-20 tokens means stolen tokens cannot be locked by any party; recovery depends on on-chain tracing rather than contract intervention.
Completing multi-product blocking within the first hour and synchronizing integrators shows that aggregators can move risk-control lists upstream to the liquidity routing stage.