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Ledger confirms hardware implant incident has spread to Berlin and Dubai

On November 18, 2026, Ledger updated the progress of its investigation into the hardware implant incident, confirming that tampered devices have also appeared outside Southeast Asia, and that they are the same incident disclosed on October 15. All confirmed devices have the same type of physical modification, used to steal seed phrases during the setup process. The company said the security chip and operating system have no vulnerabilities, and no devices purchased from ledger.com have been affected so far.

At present, one Ledger Nano Gen 5 has been confirmed affected in Southeast Asia; a small number of tampered devices have been found in Berlin, Germany; and two suspected devices in Dubai are under investigation. Ledger advised users who bought devices in Southeast Asia, through third-party channels in Dubai, or through third-party channels in Berlin starting in January 2026 to contact official support, and is offering X-ray inspection for a limited time.

The investigation is still ongoing, and the company expects that more affected devices may be found. It is working with partners and authorities to locate them.

Original source:

  1. Title: Update on the Hardware Implant Incident Investigation
    Publisher: Ledger
    Publication date: 2026-11-19
    URL: support.ledger.com/article/Update-on-the-Hardware-Implant-Incident-Investigation
    Source type: official announcement
    Verification status: The relevant passages were actually read in this report, verification date 2026-11-20
    Supporting content: the incident is the same one, tampered devices appeared outside Southeast Asia, physical modifications were used to steal seed phrases, there are no vulnerabilities in the chip or system, and the specific confirmed numbers and user advice for each location.

ABAB AI Insight

Ledger first disclosed the incident on October 15, 2026, saying that an organized crime group had bought genuine devices, implanted hidden components, and put them back into the market through Southeast Asian distributor channels. The Donjon security team dismantled and confirmed that the implant could read seed phrases on the screen and transmit them via LTE. This update expands the scope to Berlin and Dubai, showing that the main attack surface is the distribution endpoint rather than the factory or the official website.

On the capital and business path, the attackers are targeting the last-mile distribution link after the devices leave Ledger’s control. The company had previously suspended sales by some Southeast Asian distributors and required European retailers such as MediaMarkt to remove them from shelves. The Berlin devices confirmed this time were concentrated in devices bought through third-party channels after January 2026, while the Dubai devices are still under investigation and have not yet been fully attributed.

Compared with the initial stage disclosed in October 2026, which was concentrated in Southeast Asia, this expansion shows that the same physical modification technique has been replicated across regions. Unlike counterfeit devices alone, these are external implants on genuine security chips, and Genuine Check cannot detect them. Previous hardware wallet supply-chain attacks were mostly limited to regional counterfeits; this case shows organized, cross-channel physical modification capability.

This update changes the risk pricing and user verification costs for third-party distribution channels. Devices bought directly from the official website currently have no confirmed affected cases, but users who bought in Berlin, Dubai, or Southeast Asia through third-party channels need additional physical inspection or need to replace their seed phrases. If the investigation confirms that more devices have entered circulation, suspending distributor sales and users proactively contacting support will become the main path to limiting losses until the source of the implant is located.

ABAB News · Cognitive Law

  1. When the hardware wallet security chip has no vulnerabilities, end-of-chain distribution implants can still steal seed phrases.

  2. The same physical modification technique appearing across regions indicates that the current attack surface is the distribution chain rather than the factory.

  3. The risk boundaries between official direct purchases and third-party channels in this incident are now clearly separated.