Former U.S. Treasury Official Miad Maleki Says Iran's Oil Exports Near Zero After U.S. Resumes Maritime Blockade
The U.S. blockade has reduced Iran's oil exports to nearly zero.
Former U.S. Treasury official Miad Maleki stated that after the U.S. resumed its maritime blockade, Iran's oil exports have approached zero, with recent satellite images of the Kharg Island export hub showing almost no activity.
Maleki expects that if exports continue to be obstructed, the financial impact on Iran will transmit to the military, security sectors, government employees, and elite groups within the next two to three months, significantly increasing the pressure on the regime to maintain payments and resource allocation. This assessment is his personal analysis and not an official prediction from the U.S. government.
The U.S. Treasury previously stated that Iran's average crude oil loading has dropped from about 1.8 million barrels per day before the conflict to less than 500,000 barrels; this figure clearly shows a significant pressure on exports, but there are differences in statistical criteria and observation timing compared to the latest claim of "near zero."
Maleki noted that about 60% of the Iranian government's payment funds rely on oil exports, covering periodic salaries for military, police, security agencies, public sector, and industrial employees; the financial gap will become apparent when the next round of payments is due after the export interruption.
The U.S. Treasury's "Economic Fury" operation simultaneously targets Iran's oil trade, shadow banking networks, arms procurement, cryptocurrency assets, and sanctions evasion infrastructure. The Treasury stated that as of July 29, it has sanctioned over 100 vessels associated with Iran's shadow fleet by 2026 and blocked hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue used by the Iranian regime and its agents.
Iran may still delay the impact through inventory consumption, discounted sales, ship-to-ship transfers, shadow fleets, third-party trade networks, and informal settlements; thus, a sharp decline in exports does not equate to an immediate zero in oil revenue, fiscal payments, or regime stability. Public reports have not provided independent and verifiable recent total export data.
From a market mechanism perspective, the U.S. maritime blockade and sanctions increase compliance and interception risks for carriers, insurers, traders, and settlement banks. As buyers reduce their acceptance of shipments, Iranian crude oil shifts from regular exports to high-discount, long-chain evasion transactions. Beneficiaries include alternative Middle Eastern crude oil suppliers and compliant transport and security service providers; the pressured parties are Iran's finances, the security system reliant on oil cash flow, and intermediaries bearing sanction risks. If shipping through the Strait of Hormuz continues to be disrupted, the geopolitical risk premium for global crude oil will also rise.
Source: Public information
ABAB AI Insight
The Iranian economy has long relied on oil exports and foreign exchange income, and the pressure from sanctions is not a new phenomenon; however, this round of pressure combines traditional financial sanctions with maritime blockades, shadow fleet sanctions, and crackdowns on cryptocurrency settlement networks. The U.S. Treasury states that it has included oil trade, shadow banking, arms procurement, and channels for evading cryptocurrency assets into the same enforcement framework, indicating that the focus of sanctions has shifted from limiting Iran's "sales capacity" to restricting its ability to "collect, transport, and use revenue."
The key to the capital pathway is how oil revenue is transformed into cash available for the regime. Crude oil must go through loading, transportation, insurance, buyer acceptance, trade financing, and cross-border settlement before it can pay military, police, civil servants, and import bills. Blockades or interceptions do not just reduce the number of barrels; they also cause each participant in the chain to demand higher discounts, longer settlement periods, and stronger risk compensation; even if some crude oil can still flow out, the net cash Iran receives will be eroded by transportation, concealment, financing, and intermediary costs.
This can be contrasted with the oil and financial sanctions against Iran after 2012 and the restrictions on Venezuela's PDVSA shadow fleet: exporting countries can often maintain some flow through ship-to-ship transfers, changing flags, blending oil, and third-party trade, but the widening discounts, delayed payments, and reduced available foreign exchange will continuously erode finances. Iran is currently transitioning from "evading sanctions to maintain exports" to a phase where "export nodes and transportation channels are directly pressured," which typically has a faster impact on short-term cash flow.
Essentially, this is a regulatory change: sanctions have escalated from financial account restrictions to joint control over physical logistics, insurance, and settlement chains. The mechanism at play is that the value of oil does not lie in underground reserves but in the network that can safely and compliantly deliver and recover funds; when shipping, insurance, banking, and traders simultaneously lose their willingness to participate, resource-exporting countries, even if they possess crude oil, cannot convert their stocks into fiscal capacity. Whether the regime is impacted depends on whether the pressure penetrates to elite payments, military and police salaries, and essential imports, rather than a single export valuation.
ABAB News · Cognitive Laws
Oil is not cash; the settlement network is cash.
Sanctions cut off transportation, and finances will bleed.
Livelihoods can endure pressure, but a cutoff to elites will change the situation.