Atreides founder Gavin Baker publicly rebuts the WSJ’s “backdoor” characterization of Jensen Huang’s Southeast Asia computing power布局
The Wall Street Journal published an investigative report on November 14, 2026, titled “How Jensen Huang Built the Backdoor Route That Keeps Beijing in the AI Race.” The report said that large data centers in Southeast Asia, including in Malaysia, use gaps in U.S. sanctions to provide advanced computing power to Chinese companies and to provide cover for suspected chip smuggling. The report said that former Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang cultivated a network of Asian partners and lobbied Washington to keep this channel open; Megaspeed reportedly arranged to ship nearly $12 billion worth of high-end Nvidia chips to Chinese companies between March 2024 and June 2025.
Atreides Management founder and CIO Gavin Baker responded on X on November 14, saying that a more accurate headline would be: “A fully legal backdoor that ensures the United States stays ahead of China in AI and gains enormous leverage in any future conflict.” He said that the relevant arrangements have lawful pathways under the regulatory frameworks of both the Biden and Trump administrations, and that not all overseas computing services can be broadly described as evading export controls. He also pointed out that major U.S. cloud service providers also operate GPU clouds in Southeast Asia, but that the report did not mention this.
Baker further explained in subsequent posts that Southeast Asian GPU clouds, including availability zones run by U.S. hyperscale cloud providers, can be shut down immediately in a conflict, thereby giving the United States leverage; limited secondary GPU exports and remote cloud access help reduce China’s incentive to build a fully independent alternative hardware ecosystem. The legality of specific transactions still depends on the chip model, customer, end use, and licensing conditions.
Original source:
Title: How Jensen Huang Built the Backdoor Route That Keeps Beijing in the AI Race
Publisher: The Wall Street Journal
Date of publication: 2026-11-14
URL: wsj.com/tech/jensen-huang-backdoor-ai-data-centers-a5e4499d
Nature of source: English investigative report from the media
Verification status: Public abstract and key passages of the report were read for this piece (2026-11-15)
Supporting content: Supports the WSJ’s description of Southeast Asian data centers as a “backdoor” channel using sanctions gaps to provide computing power to China, as well as the statement that Megaspeed arranged nearly $12 billion worth of chips
ABAB AI Insight
The WSJ report characterizes Jensen Huang’s Southeast Asia data center network as a “backdoor,” with the core basis being that Chinese companies can obtain computing power through remote access to high-end Nvidia chips deployed locally, without directly importing restricted chips into China. The report also links Megaspeed and Alice Huang’s commercial arrangements, and places this structure in the context of Huang’s personal relationships and export-control disputes.
Baker’s rebuttal focuses on two points: first, that the policy frameworks of both U.S. administrations allow secondary GPU exports and overseas cloud access, so not all such activity can simply be equated with evading controls; second, that U.S. hyperscale cloud providers, such as AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud operating in places like Singapore, also provide GPU clouds in Southeast Asia, but the report did not mention this symmetrically. He sees remotely accessible computing power that can be shut off immediately as leverage for the United States in a conflict, rather than as a mere loophole.
At the policy level, the United States has long restricted the direct export of the most advanced Nvidia chips to China, while allowing older or lower-performance models to be exported under certain conditions, and there is room for remote access to overseas data centers. The “gap” described by the WSJ and the “lawful pathway” Baker refers to are two different interpretations of the same phenomenon: the former emphasizes the effect of Chinese customers actually obtaining computing power, while the latter emphasizes policy design and the ability to shut it off. Whether specific transactions comply still requires case-by-case review of chip models, end users, and licenses.
For Nvidia, Southeast Asian partners are part of its global cloud business; for U.S. policymakers, whether remote access to computing power should be tightened further has become a focal point in export-control discussions. Baker’s view represents a strategic judgment that it is beneficial to keep China dependent on the U.S. technology stack in order to gain leverage, while the WSJ report highlights the risk that this could become a potential workaround channel. The actual effect depends on subsequent regulatory enforcement and the results of investigations into specific cases.
ABAB News · Cognitive Law
The WSJ called remote computing power in Southeast Asia a “backdoor,” while Baker redefined it as lawful leverage that can be shut off.
The policy framework allowed by both administrations is Baker’s core basis for rebutting the claim that it is “uniformly evading controls.”
Baker pointed to the Southeast Asian GPU clouds of U.S. hyperscale cloud providers as a counterexample that the report did not mention symmetrically.