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Russian Gold Redirected to Hong Kong with Annual Imports Exceeding 92 Tons

After the West imposed import bans on Russian gold, the metal has not ceased operations, with the main channel redirected to Hong Kong. In 2025, Hong Kong is expected to import 92.1 tons of gold from Russia, a year-on-year increase of 42%, with a value of approximately HKD 82 billion, equivalent to USD 10.5 billion, surpassing Dubai to become the largest recipient of Russian gold.

After the U.S., U.K., and EU cut off traditional gold routes in 2022, trading initially surged to Dubai; following U.S. sanctions on Russian mining companies in 2023, Hong Kong's import volume has doubled continuously. There are no restrictions on Russian gold in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, data from Chinese customs shows that direct imports of gold from Russia to mainland China are expected to increase to about USD 3.3 billion between 2023 and 2025, fifteen times the previous amount, particularly concentrated in the fourth quarter.

The U.S. Treasury has named Hong Kong companies. The 2024 sanctions network includes VPower Finance Security, as well as Holden International Trading and Taube Precious HK, accusing them of converting sanctioned gold payments from the mining company Polyus through shell companies in the UAE and Hong Kong into fiat currency and cryptocurrency before flowing back into the Russian financial system. Hong Kong associates and Polyus employees have also been included. Once gold bars are melted and recast, the origin becomes difficult to trace, making transit hubs a blind spot for sanction enforcement.

At the same time, Hong Kong is enhancing its gold market infrastructure: the government-owned precious metals central clearing company will begin trial operations in July 2026, with Bank of China (Hong Kong) as the clearing bank and designated vault, and will connect with the Shanghai Gold Exchange's international board for Delivery Connect. In recent months, the People's Bank of China has increased its inventory in Hong Kong, with some reserves being relocated from London back to Asia. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority and storage companies are still competing for warehouse space after imports peaked, and the delivery volume of gold futures on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has also set records due to the sanctions redirection.

During the Middle East conflict, some traders temporarily sold physical gold in Hong Kong at 15% to 20% below market price, indicating a rush to exchange ownership. Exports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Switzerland have unusually increased during the same period, suggesting that some of this may involve re-exporting Russian gold. London still controls the pricing window, but the weight of physical delivery and storage is shifting eastward.

Mechanically, this is a migration of ownership driven by sanctions, not ordinary speculation. The sellers are Russian mining companies and traders cut off from European and American refining and clearing channels, while the buyers are Asian vaults, mainland reserves, and intermediaries that can melt and re-label the gold without being constrained by Western bans. Funds are shifting from London’s unallocated gold accounts to deliverable inventories in Hong Kong and attempts at RMB settlement. Beneficiaries include Hong Kong storage, clearing licenses, and banks capable of connecting to Delivery Connect, while those under pressure are Western gold merchants who still rely solely on LBMA deliverable bars as the only compliance standard, as well as any Hong Kong shell companies that may face secondary sanctions.

Source: Public Information

ABAB AI Insight

The redirection of Russian gold did not just start in 2025. After July 2022, the UAE, Turkey, and Hong Kong, which have no restrictions on Russia, became known new ports; the U.S. targeted Polyus and other mining companies in 2023, and further targeted transport and payment shells in 2024, effectively acknowledging that the goods have already reached port cities. Hong Kong's role has expanded from transshipping electronic components to transshipping liquid hard assets, utilizing the same dense structure of registered addresses and shell company name changes, which has facilitated both military parts and gold bars.

The capital path is "mining payment - transit melting - reserve storage." Polyus gold payments are converted into cryptocurrency and third-country fiat currency through Hong Kong shell companies, fulfilling the foreign exchange needs of both central banks and oligarchs. The People's Bank of China increasing its inventory in Hong Kong and relocating some gold from London is a strategy to shift political seizure risks from Western vaults to controllable jurisdictions. The establishment of local clearing in Hong Kong and connectivity with the Shanghai Gold Exchange provides a local delivery language for this batch of goods, reducing reliance on London’s unallocated accounts.

A comparison can be made to Iranian oil redirected to teapot refineries and Russian crude redirected to dark ships: the commodities remain, but the compliance labels are washed away. The imports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Switzerland, along with the surge to Hong Kong and Dubai, represent different exits on the same map. The industry phase is shifting from a unipolar clearing dominated by London pricing and Western refining to a fragmented period of Asian receipt and residual Western pricing.

The structural judgment indicates a reconstruction of the industrial chain. The mechanism is that sanctions change not the chemical properties of gold, but the barcodes that can be recognized by Western banks. Those who can provide melting, storage, and payments not subject to bans will collect bridge fees; those who insist on only accepting pre-war London deliverable bars will exit the physical circulation. Pricing power still partially remains in London paper gold, but ownership has already moved to Hong Kong vaults.

ABAB News · Cognitive Law

  1. What is banned is the port, but not the metal that can be melted.

  2. Once gold bars are recast, the origin becomes a negotiation material.

  3. Wherever the clearing center moves, ownership will follow.