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User alleges Aster agent transferred about $4.56 million in 44 minutes

X user @fuhuahuai (furongfei) posted on November 16 that his Aster DEX account experienced abnormal activity between 16:22 and 17:08 UTC on November 12: 33 BTC were split into 17 market orders and sold, after which 7 internal transfers moved a total of 4,564,675.50 USDT to a newly registered account.

The user said he did not sign any transaction throughout the process, and his wallet private key was not lost. The post said the signatures for all 7 transfers came from an agent key generated by the web interface, “@aster-desktop” (address starting with 0x647E), rather than the main wallet. The user further alleged that the key’s permissions exceeded the scope shown during setup, and that after the account enabled privacy mode, the rules should not have allowed transfers to other users, but the system still permitted them.

Aster CEO Leonard described the key in written communication as a temporary private key generated locally by the browser after the user authorized the wallet and selected “enable trading.” Aster has set up an investigation team to follow up. As of now, the platform has not publicly confirmed whether there is a protocol-level vulnerability, and full verification of the relevant screenshots and details still awaits an official response.

Original source:

  1. Title: Aster User Alleges Agent Key Drained $4.56 Million in 44 Minutes
    Publisher: TokenPost (Simon Yoon)
    Publication date: 2026-11-16
    URL: tokenpost.com/news/technology/58683
    Source type: media report
    Verification status: full text read for this piece; the report is based on the user’s X post and Aster-related responses
    Supporting content: the user’s alleged time window, 33 BTC market sale and 7 internal transfers totaling 4,564,675.50 USDT, agent key signatures, the CEO’s written description, and Aster’s formation of an investigation team

ABAB AI Insight

Aster CEO Leonard previously worked in high-frequency trading and risk engine roles in traditional finance, later joined Binance as a product manager, and maintained an advisory relationship with Changpeng Zhao (CZ); the project received investment from YZi Labs and is positioned as a privacy-oriented multi-chain perpetual contracts DEX. The agent key mechanism alleged in this case is precisely the temporary trading credential generated locally by the web interface after authorization in order to reduce signing frequency, commonly seen on perp platforms that require high-frequency order placement.

On the same day, another perp DEX, Lighter, also suffered an API key leak incident. Lighter said its protocol and smart contracts were unaffected, and that a single trader (or market maker) experienced account funds being transferred out due to an API key leak, with losses estimated at about $10.4 million to $15.5 million; the platform then suspended withdrawals. Both incidents point to “trading authorization keys” rather than the main wallet private key, but the mechanisms differ: Lighter involved pool-share operations bypassing direct transfer restrictions, while Aster involved a web-generated key and internal transfer permission checks.

This kind of key design is intended to improve trading experience, but once the permission boundaries and server-side checks do not strictly match the documentation (such as the user’s claim that “withdrawals were not permitted, yet withdrawal-level operations were executed”), losses may expand after key leakage. Unlike phishing that directly steals the main wallet private key, key leakage often occurs in the browser, plugins, or local environment, while the user’s main wallet can still log in normally and the remaining assets remain intact.

If the user’s allegations about permissions and privacy mode rules were indeed allowed by the system, then for Aster the core issue would be the server-side validation logic for agent key operations, rather than simply user custody negligence. The key indicator will be whether Aster’s subsequent investigation report discloses the key’s actual permission scope, the basis on which the system allowed it, and whether the default permission settings are adjusted. Against the backdrop of intensifying competition among perp DEXs and growing user fund规模, the minimization of trading-key permissions and strict server-side enforcement are becoming key thresholds for platform trust.

ABAB News · Laws of Cognition

  1. Trading agent keys reduce signing friction, but also extend custody responsibility from the main wallet to the local environment and platform validation.

  2. When permission documentation and server-side execution are inconsistent, a key leak can bypass the apparent restriction of “no withdrawal rights.”

  3. Multiple key-related incidents across platforms on the same day underscore that authorization boundaries at high-frequency trading entry points are becoming a security focus.